What can the poor expect from trade liberalization?: opening the "black box" of trade modeling by Bou�t, Antoine
       i   
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
The author is grateful to Valdete Berisha, Caesar Cororaton, Ashok Gulati, Alex 
Mc Calla, Simon Mevel, David Orden, Alberto Valdes and participants to a seminar at 
IFPRI on September 16
th, 2005 for their helpful comments and suggestions. Special 
thanks to Alex Mc Calla for very helpful and interesting discussions. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
 
      ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 1 
 
2.   ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION: HOW? .................... 7 
2.1  Non Spatial Partial Equilibrium Modeling...................................................... 7 
2.2  Spatial Partial Equilibrium Modeling.............................................................. 9 
2.3  Single Country Trade Modeling.................................................................... 10 
2.4  Multi Country Trade Modeling...................................................................... 13 
2.4.1  Multi Country CGEM...................................................................... 16 
2.4.2 Gravity  Equation.............................................................................. 17 
 
3.   A NEW ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION        
  ON DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY................................................................... 21 
3.1  A Technical Presentation of the MIRAGE Model......................................... 23 
3.2  The Geographic Decomposition.................................................................... 27 
3.3  Product Decomposition.................................................................................. 30 
3.4  The Initial World............................................................................................ 32 
3.4.1 The  Pre-Experiment......................................................................... 32 
3.4.2   Main Features of the Initial Trading System .................................. 32 
3.5  Expected Benefits from Trade Liberalization................................................ 39 
3.5.1  Impact of Full Liberalization at the World Level............................ 39 
3.5.2  Impact of Full Liberalization at the Country Level ......................... 41 
3.5.3 Trade  Liberalization  and  World Income Distribution...................... 48 
3.5.4  Decomposing Trade Reform............................................................ 51 
 
4. MODELING  TRADE  LIBERALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT UNDER 
  CGEM: A SURVEY................................................................................................... 61 
4.1  Divergences among Assessments of Trade Liberalization  under CGEM .... 61 
4.1.1 Trade  Pessimism? ............................................................................ 61 
4.1.2 Convergent  Conclusions.................................................................. 66 
4.2  Why do CGEM Assessments Diverge so much?........................................... 70 
4.2.1  Experiments are not the same .......................................................... 70 
4.2.2  Data are not the same....................................................................... 77 
4.2.3 Behavioral  Parameters are not the same .......................................... 81 
4.2.4 Theoretical  Assumptions are not the same ...................................... 84 
4.3  Evaluating the Impact of Trade Liberalization on Poverty............................ 90 
4.4  A Sensitivity Analysis.................................................................................... 95 
4.4.1 Different  Experiments: No Pre-Experiment .................................... 97 
4.4.2  Different Data: MFN vs. Preferential Duties................................... 99 
4.4.3  Different Behavioral Parameters: Trade Elasticities...................... 101   iii
4.4.4  Different Modeling Features: If Trade Increases Global Factor .........  
   Productivity…................................................................................ 102 
4.4.5  Different Modeling Features.......................................................... 104 
 
5. CONCLUSION......................................................................................................... 106 
 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 110 
 
LIST OF ANNEXES 
 
Annex  1   Arable land per person (rural population).................................................. 118 
Annex  2   Correspondence tables............................................................................... 119 
Annex  3  Initial pattern of protection – Reporting country / Partner - 2005............. 121 
Annex  4  Initial pattern of protection – Reporting country / Product - 2005............ 122 
Annex  5  Initial pattern of trade –  Exporting country / importer- 2005................... 123 
Annex  6  Initial structure of exports - 2005............................................................... 124 
Annex  7  Impact of full trade liberalization on world prices (%).............................. 125 
Annex  8   Decomposing full trade liberalization by liberalizing region.................... 126 
Annex  9   Decomposing full trade liberalization by activities................................... 128 
Annex  10   Decomposing full trade liberalization by instruments............................... 130 
Annex  11   Assessing the impact of full trade liberalization by CGEM...................... 133 
Annex  12   Recent assessments of the impact of full trade liberalization.................... 136 
Annex  13   Assessing the impact of a Doha Development Agenda by CGEM: Recent ...  
    assessments of the impact of a Doha Agenda............................................ 137 
Annex  14   Custom taxes in proportion of domestic GDP........................................... 138 
Annex  15   No pre – experiment................................................................................... 139 
Annex  16   No preferential duties................................................................................. 141 
Annex  17  Higher trade elasticities.............................................................................. 143 
Annex  18  Trade increases factor productivity............................................................ 145   iv
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1  Geographical decomposition ...........................................................................28 
Table 2  Sector decomposition.......................................................................................31 
Table 3  Impact of full trade liberalization- World indicators.-2015-                          
Rate of change   (%).........................................................................................39 
Table 4  Distribution of welfare gains among beneficiary zones and the rate of change    
 in  welfare…………………………………………………………….............42 
Table 5  Impact of full trade liberalization: Macroeconomic indicators for 2015- rate         
  of change (%)………………………………………………………………. .42 
Table 6  Full trade liberalization: Macroeconomic indicators on production and          
exports (rate of change in %)…………………………………………….......43 
Table 7  Impact of full trade liberalization: Remuneration of production factors for            
  2015 – Rate of change (%)–Real terms……..……………………………….47 
Table 8  World redistribution associated with full trade liberalization..........................49 
Table 9  Trade pessimism? Potential losers from full trade liberalization.....................65 
Table 10  CGEM assessments of full trade liberalization: Convergent conclusions.......69 
Table 11  The “Harbinson” proposal...............................................................................71 
Table 12  World welfare gains by region (%) – Full trade liberalization under                      
different theoretical variations.......................................................................105   v
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1  Structure of a computable general equilibrium model................................. 17 
Figure 2  Protection applied and faced by zone - 2005............................................... 33 
Figure 3  Protection by product - 2005........................................................................ 36 
Figure 4  Geographical structure of exports - 2005..................................................... 37 
Figure 5  Product composition of exports - 2005........................................................ 38 
Figure 6  Net exports of agricultural and food products – 2005 - $ bln...................... 38 
Figure 7  Impact of full trade liberalization: World prices for -                                     
  2015 rate of change (%)………………………...………………………….40 
Figure 8  Lorenz curve on world inequality................................................................ 49 
Figure 9  Impact of full trade liberalization on net agricultural exports ..................... 50 
Figure 10  Welfare gains by region (%) – Northern full trade liberalization................ 52 
Figure 11      Welfare gains by region (%) – Southern full trade liberalization ............... 53 
Figure 12  Welfare gains by region (%) – Full trade liberalization in agriculture........ 55 
Figure 13  Welfare gains by region (%) –  Full trade liberalization in industry........... 55 
Figure 14  Welfare gains by region (%) – Full elimination of border protection......... 57 
Figure 15      Welfare gains by region (%) – Full elimination of export subsidies........... 57 
Figure 16      Welfare gains by region (%) – Full elimination of domestic support......... 58 
Figure 17  Trade pessimism? - Impact of full trade liberalization on world welfare             
 ($  bln)………………………………………………………………………62 
Figure 18      Trade pessimism? Impact of full trade liberalization on poverty               
  headcount (mln - 2$ per day definition)…………………………… .......... 64 
Figure 19  Trade uncertainty: assessments of the Doha Agenda in 2005 ($ bln).......... 66 
Figure 20  Bound duties – Switzerland – 2001 – HS6.................................................. 73 
Figure 21  Bound and applied agricultural tariff rates (%), by region - 2001............... 80 
Figure 22  A partial equilibrium representation of unilateral liberalization.................. 82 
Figure 23  Why do global trade models differ so much? The rate of change in the     
  world welfare as compared to the central experiment………………….… 97 
Figure 24  Welfare gains by region (%) – Full trade liberalization from 2001............. 98 
Figure 25  Welfare gains by region (%) – Full trade liberalization without non-             
 reciprocal  preferential schemes………………………………………….... 99 
Figure 26  Welfare gains by region (%) – Full trade liberalization with Linkage             
 trade  elasticities………………………………………………………….. 101 
Figure 27  Welfare gains by region (%) – Full trade liberalization under a positive     
  relation between trade openness and total factor productivity……………103 
 
   vi
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AGOA  African Growth Opportunity Act  
AMVdM  Anderson, Martin and Van der Mensbrugghe 
AVE    Ad Valorem Equivalent 
CEPII     Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
CES     Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
CET     Constant Elasticity of Transformation 
CGE     Computable General Equilibrium 
CGEM   Computable General Equilibrium Model 
CRP     Conservation Reserve Program 
DDA     Doha Development Agenda 
EBA     Everything But Arms 
EFTA    European Free Trade Area 
EU     European Union 
FDI    Foreign Direct Investment 
FL   Full  Liberalization 
GDP    Gross Domestic Product 
GEP    Global Economic Prospects 
GSP    Generalized System of Preferences 
GTAP   Global Trade Analysis Project 
HRT      Harrison, Rutherford, Tarr 
HS     Harmonized System 
IQTR    Inside Quota Tariff Rate 
LDC     Least Developed Countries 
LES-CES  Liner Expenditure System - Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
MENA   Middle East and North Africa 
MIRAGE  Modeling International Relations under Applied General Equilibrium 
NAFTA   North America Free Trade Agreement 
OECD   Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OQTR   Outside Quota Tariff Rate 
RD    Research and Development 
SACU   Southern Africa Custom Union 
SDT    Special and Differentiated Treatment 
SSA    Sub – Saharan Africa 
TRQ    Tariff Rate Quota 
TWB   The  World  Bank 
UN   United  Nations 
USA    United States of America 
WTO    World Trade Organization    
   vii
ABSTRACT 
 
Trade liberalization is expected to act positively on development and poverty 
alleviation, both of which have become a high priority of international community. This 
explains why numerous studies have focused on assessing the expected benefits of trade 
liberalization on poverty. The main empirical tool for these assessments has been the use 
of multi-country Computable General Equilibrium Models (CGEM). These models, 
however, have produced divergent results.  As demonstrated by recent studies, the 
associated increase in world welfare from full trade liberalization ranges from 0.2% to 
3.1% — results that differ by a factor of 15 to 1! The impact on poverty headcount is also 
very divergent as the number of people lifted out from poverty ranges from 72 million to 
446 million —a ratio of 5.5 to 1! This is a rather contrasting picture of the effects of trade 
liberalization on poverty. It gives the impression that with global trade modeling, 
divergent results are the rule. Moreover, as a sophisticated and complex tool of analysis, 
CGEM often appears as a “Black Box”, the results of which are difficult to understand.  
The objective of this study is to examine the efficiency of trade modeling in 
capturing the benefits from trade liberalization. It will provide a survey of methodologies 
utilized to assess the impact of trade liberalization on poverty and will examine the extent 
to which such assessments diverge.  The survey also demonstrates the benefits of 
“complementary analysis”, which utilizes different methodologies to study a specific 
topic.  
First, the paper examines the advantages and drawbacks of each method, with a 
particular focus on multi-country general equilibrium models. Second, the paper 
undertakes a global modeling under general equilibrium — MIRAGE model— the results 
of which are compared to those obtained in recent studies.     viii
Using the MIRAGE model 
1 full trade liberalization is estimated to increase world 
real income by $100bln (+0.33%) after ten years of implementation. This trade reform 
would be development-friendly, as it entails a larger growth rate for developing countries, 
and especially for Least Developed Countries (LDC). It would also contribute to poverty 
alleviation, as unskilled labor would gain  in numerous developing zones, especially in 
Latin America and most of Sub – Saharan Africa. Finally, full trade liberalization would 
reduce world income inequality as the Gini coefficient of world income distribution 
(taking into account population distribution) would be reduced marginally. Nevertheless, 
certain developing countries might lose by this world trade reform, such as Argentina, 
Mexico, and South Africa. 
Trade liberalization implies allocative efficiency gains, which are positive in any 
case. But liberalizing trade may cause deterioration of terms of trade either because rising 
world prices of agricultural commodities have adverse effects on net food importing 
countries (Middle East North Africa countries, Mexico, Tunisia, Bangladesh, China) or 
because preferential access is eroded (SubSaharan Africa – SACU
2 not included – 
Mexico, Tunisia, Bangladesh.) Furthermore, assuming imperfect competition and product 
differentiation in industry and services, agricultural specialization has a cost; trade reform 
gives agricultural countries incentives to reallocate productive factors in the primary 
sector. In so doing, economies of such countries benefit less from economies of scale and 
varieties. This mechanism mainly explains why in the simulation presented here 
Argentina loses from full trade liberalization. Other countries, such as Australia, New 
Zealand, and Brazil, are negatively affected by this mechanism, but to a lesser extent.  
Finally, conclusions that have been unanimously adopted by the literature are 
confirmed: 
                                                
1 The MIRAGE model was developed at the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
(CEPII) in Paris. Full description of the model is available at the CEPII Web site (www.cepii.fr).
 
2 South Africa Custom Union.   ix
•  Agriculture liberalization plays a major role in the benefits that can be drawn 
from liberalization. 
•  Tariffs are by far the main source of distortions. 
•  Liberalization in developing countries is a key element of the trade reform. 
•  The paper also offers four explanations on divergent results of multi-country 
general equilibrium models, including the MIRAGE model undertaken here:  
1) Experiments are not the same 
2) Data are not the same  
3) Behavioral parameters are not the same  
4) Theoretical features are not the same  
Each explanation is examined in detail. The simulation in this paper is also 
utilized to check explanations of divergent results in the literature. In order to quantify 
the importance of the four factors, a sensitivity analysis is carried out. This method 
provides a quantitative assessment of expected benefits from liberalization when one 
hypothesis is modified and it confirms that: 
•  Direct trade barriers like tariffs, tariff quotas, and anti-dumping duties are smaller 
than previously expected. Furthermore, the worldwide structure of protection is 
less penalizing for developing countries than it was frequently stated few years 
ago. This is due to the multiplication of preferential schemes, which were not 
taken into account previously. Consequently, the expected benefits from full trade 
liberalization are not as large as they were assessed in recent literature. 
•  In multi-country trade models the size of the expected benefits depends crucially 
on the value of Armington trade elasticities. The simulation that has been carried 
out in this study is founded on GTAP elasticities which are small  compared to   x
others used in the literature. These values have been validated by a recent 
econometric research carried out by Hertel, Ivanic, Preckel, and Cranfield (2000.)  
•  The size of expected benefits from trade liberalization also depends crucially on 
the potential positive impact of trade openness on factor productivity. Several 
multi – country trade models utilize ad hoc methodologies to capture this element, 
like an equation relating positively total factor productivity to trade openness. 
This relation makes sense; openness may accelerate transmission of technologies. 
This is broadly confirmed by empirical works, but this kind of econometric study 
meets a significant number of conceptual and empirical difficulties. Furthermore, 
the previous direct relation between total factor productivity and trade openness is 
not founded on microeconomic basis and the parameters of the relationship are 
not measured with sufficient precision. As a result, integrating this relation 
automatically amplifies expected benefits, but  the size of benefits has to be 
gauged with extreme care; this, however, does not highlight the channels through 
which trade integration raises factor productivity. 
While this work is primarily focused on the issue of poverty, it does not provide 
an estimation of the extent to which full trade liberalization could alleviate poverty. Such 
an assessment would require utilization of numerous household surveys in developing 
countries,  which goes beyond the technical feasibilities of this survey.   
Another method of assessment would be possible: using poverty elasticities as in 
the Global Economic Prospects (2002 and 2004) or as in Cline (2004). An examination of 
this method, however, reveals that it is founded on weak assumptions. Furthermore, it 
presents the relation between trade liberalization and poverty alleviation as a mechanical 
one. According to this method, it would be sufficient to liberalize trade for increasing 
remuneration of unskilled labor in developing countries and reducing automatically (and 
proportionally) the stock of poor people in the world. This presentation is not realistic. 
Trade liberalization has frequently contrasting effects on poverty (poor people engaged in 
agricultural activities vs. poor working in industry or services, urban poor vs. rural poor,   xi
level of education, etc.) Studies on poverty alleviation have to focus on these contrasting 
effects and on (international and domestic) policies that have to be simultaneously put in 
place in order to accompany liberalization. Finally, poverty alleviation is a concept with a 
high qualitative content while in these studies people can be lifted out from poverty 
simply because they earn few cents more. 
Benefits from eliminating tariff barriers, domestic support, and export subsidies 
have been recently revised downwards, first, because liberalization has progressed in 
recent years (end of implementation of the Uruguay Round, China’ accession to WTO, 
etc.), and second, because regional agreements and preferential schemes were not taken 
into account in previous works. When these elements are accounted for, two points 
explain divergent results across studies: trade elasticities and dynamic relations. Thus, it 
remains that trade liberalization is beneficial and contributes to poverty alleviation. It is 
all the more plausible for two reasons:  first, trade reform could also concern non tariff 
barriers, trade facilitation, and obstacles to trade in services,  and second, appropriate 
domestic reform accompanies trade reform. These two areas have not been enough 
investigated by economic research. They could constitute priorities in research agenda in 
order to understand fully the potential benefits that developing countries could draw from 
trade liberalization. 
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WHAT CAN THE POOR EXPECT FROM TRADE LIBERALIZATION?  




1. INTRODUCTION   
Development and poverty alleviation have become a high priority of the 
international community. One of the key objectives—the Millennium Development 
Goals— set forth by the United Nations for 2015 is a reduction by half of the number of 
people living on less than a dollar a day. But, the world poverty headcount was stagnant in 
absolute terms during the 1990’s. In 2003 nearly one quarter of the world population was 
living with less than 1$ per day, and one half with less than 2$ per day. To combat these 
high poverty levels, the current global trade negotiations conducted by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) have been placed under the title of the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA). 
While recent literature confirms the positive relationship between liberalization and 
poverty alleviation, it also emphasizes that this relationship is not a mechanical one. 
Winters et al (2004) and Reimer (2002) identify several key linkages such as the price and 
availability of goods, the factor prices, the government transfers, the incentives for 
investment and innovation, the evolution of terms of trade, and the short-run risk.  
The traditional argument in favor of a positive relationship between liberalization 
and poverty focuses on the first two linkages. A large proportion of poor people are 
working in the agricultural sector where trade distortions are particularly high. 
Liberalization could imply higher world agricultural prices and raise activity and 
remunerations in this sector in the Third World. The same beneficial outcome could occur 
in the textile and apparel sectors where protection remains high and developing countries 
have a comparative advantage.  
                                                
3 Senior Research Fellow, Markets, Trade and Institutions Division, IFPRI, 2033 K Street NW Washington 
D.C. 20006 USA. Email: a.bouet@cgiar.org   2
Nevertheless, openness might lead to negative outcomes. First, the decrease in 
import duties might reduce custom revenues so that the government’s public receipts may 
be cut and the government transfers can shrink. Second, terms of trade can be negatively 
affected either because import prices increase or exports prices decrease due to more severe 
competition in export markets. Third, cutting trade barriers in a country increases import 
competition; this implies reallocation of productive factors which entails adjustment costs 
and short-run risk.  
Furthermore, the previous economic mechanism emphasizes the predominance of 
agricultural activities in developing countries and the relationship between poverty and 
agriculture. But not all developing countries have a comparative advantage in agriculture, 
and not all poor people are engaged in agricultural activities. In fact, benefits for poor are 
expected from trade liberalization, but adverse effects can also occur in the short and the 
long run, which explains why numerous studies have focused on this issue.  Some of the 
analytical instruments used to address this issue are: spatial and non-spatial partial 
equilibrium models, gravity equations, and single and multi country computable general 
equilibrium models.   
The objective of this study is to provide a survey of methodologies utilized to assess 
the impact of trade liberalization on poverty, and examine the diverging results of such 
assessments. The paper is divided into five sections. Section 1 consists of this introduction. 
Section 2 looks at the advantages and drawbacks of each model, with a particular focus on 
multi-country general equilibrium models. Section 3 undertakes a global trade modeling 
under general equilibrium – MIRAGE model. Section 4 provides a literature review, which 
is followed by a conclusion provided in section 5.  
Section 2 suggests that while no single method is better than others in all 
methodological aspects, the multi country computable general equilibrium models are an 
attractive analytical instrument thanks to the availability of complete database (GTAP) and 
the increasingly calculation capability of computers. While offering a consistent picture of   3
world economy, this analytical instrument can be utilized today to evaluate the impact of 
trade reform on a large number of productive sectors, trading zones, and productive factors. 
Section 3 undertakes a global trade modeling to asses the impact of liberalization on 
poverty. Using the MIRAGE model
4  full trade liberalization is expected to increase world 
real income by $100bln (+0.33%) after ten years of implementation. This trade reform 
would be development-friendly as it would entail a larger growth rate for developing 
countries, and especially for Least Developed Countries (LDC.) It could also contribute to 
poverty alleviation and reduce world income inequality. Nevertheless, certain developing 
countries might lose from this world reform due to adverse evolution of their terms of trade 
or excessive specialization in agriculture. Finally, the section highlights the major role 
played by agriculture and tariffs in expected benefits from liberalization. 
Is the MIRAGE assessment comparable to conclusions of recent studies on the 
same topic? In order to respond to this question, section 4 provides a literature review. 
Recent assessments using CGEM clearly highlight major divergences. From full trade 
liberalization, the associated increase in world welfare ranges from 0.2% to 3.1% (Dessus, 
Fukasaku and Safadi, 1999), results that differ by a factor of more than 15 to 1!
5 The 
impact on the poverty headcount is also divergent as the number of people lifted out from 
poverty ranges from 72 million (Anderson, Martin and Van der Mensbrugghe, 2005) to 440 
million (Cline, 2004), a ratio of 6 to 1
6. This is a rather contrasting picture of the effects of 
trade liberalization on poverty.  Moreover, as a sophisticated and complex tool of analysis, 
CGEM often appears as a “Black Box”, results of which are difficult to understand.   
Section 4 provides four different explanations for divergent results of trade 
modeling: 
                                                
4 The MIRAGE model was developed ate the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
(CEPII) in PARIS. Full description of the model is available at the CEPII web site (www.cepii.fr). 
5 Comparisons must be done in % terms as welfare might be defined either in $1997 or $2001. 
6 In 2003, the number of people in poverty (2$ per day definition) is estimated at 2.8 bln (World Development 
Indicators, 2004). Full trade liberalization is estimated to decrease world poverty by a percentage ranging 
from 2.5 to 15.1.    4
1) Experiments are not the same. Assessing the impact of a DDA is a difficult 
task because of insufficient information on the contents of the final agreement and on the 
way countries will implement it. Even if the experiment is based on full trade liberalization, 
divergences could arise: does the experiment concern all distortions or only border 
measures? Is a pre-experiment conducted in order to account for the trade shocks that occur 
between the database period and the implementation date of the liberalization
7? Finally, 
some modeling analyses envisage fiscal policy implemented simultaneously in order to 
offset the loss of tariff receipts, while others do not.  
2) Data are not the same. At this level, potential sources of divergent assessments 
are manifold: social accounting matrix and data on economic policies. Amongst different 
assessments, the main source of divergence comes from data on market access. The data 
may or may not take into account all regional agreements and all preferential schemes. 
Tariff reduction may be imposed on bound or applied duties.. Furthermore, data on the 
bound level of domestic support may or may not be included. Finally, sector and product 
decomposition can differ.  
3) Behavioral parameters are not the same. A CGEM needs an estimation of 
several parameters. A key parameter of this modeling exercise is trade elasticity. There is a 
disagreement on the level of these parameters within the scientific community. The impact 
of liberalization on trade flows, and thus on activity, is highly sensitive to these figures.  
4) Theoretical assumptions are not the same. Models can differ by their 
theoretical assumptions. Labor and capital may be sector-specific or they can be re-
allocated to other sectors. Land supply may be fixed or may be positively related to real 
remuneration. Competition may be perfect or imperfect. Openness may or may not have a 
positive effect on factor productivity. Divergence may also concern functional forms: 
                                                
7 For example, recent assessments study the effects of implementing liberalization in 2005, whilst the most 
recent available database is for 2001. A pre-experiment can be realized to account for different trade 
agreements that took place between 2001 and 2005, like the end of the Uruguay Round, Everything But 
Arms, African Growth Opportunity Act, the accession of China to WTO… If not, the effects of trade 
liberalization would be overstated.    5
utility function, complementarity vs. substitutability of productive factors and intermediate 
consumption or between intermediate goods. 
Each explanation is examined in detail. In order to quantify the importance of these 
factors, a sensitivity analysis is carried out, which includes several specifications. This 
method provides a quantitative assessment of hypothetical modifications and confirms that: 
•  Direct trade barriers like tariffs, tariff quotas and anti-dumping duties are 
smaller than previously expected.  
•  In multi-country trade models the size of the expected benefits depends 
crucially on the value of Armington trade elasticities.  
•  The size of expected benefits from trade liberalization also depends on the 
potential positive impact of trade openness on factor productivity or capital 
accumulation.  
In addition to providing explanation on divergent results of trade modeling, the 
paper also sums up convergent conclusions of these studies, which affirm that: 
(i)  Liberalizing agriculture is the main source of expected gains, accounting for 
about two thirds of global gains.  
(ii)  Tariffs are by far the main source of distortions.  
(iii)  Developing countries could be great beneficiaries of these reforms.  
(iv)  Liberalizing trade policies of developing countries could contribute to about 
half of the expected benefits.  
(v)  Full trade liberalization could be beneficial for nearly all countries 
throughout the world, while it is quite plausible that the incomplete 
liberalization envisaged by DDA could be negative for numerous 
developing countries, especially if it leads to special and differentiated 
treatment (SDT). This policy option could mean less liberalization for 
middle income countries, no liberalization for Least Developed Countries   6
(LDC), and numerous exemptions in the way in which agriculture is 
liberalized in rich countries.   
This work does not provide any estimation of how full trade liberalization could 
alleviate poverty. Such an assessment would require the utilization of numerous household 
surveys in developing countries, which goes beyond the technical feasibilities of this 
survey.  But, another method would be feasible: using poverty elasticities as in the Global 
Economic Prospects (2002 and 2004) or as in Cline (2004.) An examination of this method, 
however, reveals that it is founded on weak assumptions: normal or lognormal internal 
distribution of income and constant dispersion of this distribution after the trade reform.  
Furthermore, this method presents the relation between trade liberalization and 
poverty alleviation as a simplistic one: it would be sufficient to liberalize trade for 
increasing unskilled labor’s remuneration in developing countries, which would 
automatically (and proportionally) reduce the stock of poor people in the world. This 
presentation is not realistic. Trade liberalization has frequently contrasting effects on 
poverty (poor people engaged in agricultural activities vs poor working in industry or 
services, urban poor vs. rural poor, level of education, etc.) Studies on poverty alleviation 
have to focus on these contrasting effects and on (international and domestic) policies that 
have to be put in place simultaneously in order to accompany liberalization. Finally, 
poverty alleviation is a concept with a high qualitative content while in these studies people 
can be lifted out from poverty simply because they earn few cents more. 
The objective of this study is to examine the efficiency of trade modeling in 
capturing the benefits from trade liberalization. It is aimed at evaluating the advantages and 
drawbacks of different methodologies but it is focused on multi-country computable 
general equilibrium models, which have received great attention in the last years from 
academics, development institutions, and public opinion. This methodological evaluation 
will be founded on our own modeling of expected benefits from full trade liberalization, the 
results of which will be carefully compared to those obtained in recent studies. The 
ultimate aim of this work is threefold:    7
(i)  Assessing realistically the consequences of trade liberalization on 
development. 
(ii)  Understanding the divergences that come out of recent studies. 
(iii)  Defining the role that can be played by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) in this area.   
As a matter of conclusion, section 5 responds to these three questions.  
2.  ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION: HOW? 
  Several methodologies are available for evaluating economic consequences of trade 
liberalization: (i) spatial and (ii) non spatial partial equilibrium analysis; (iii) single country 
and (iv) multi country general equilibrium model.  This section provides an overview of 
these methodologies and identifies their main advantages and drawbacks. For a better 
understanding of the structural differences, in each case, a very simple model illustrates the 
methodology. Two possible applications are developed for multi-country general 
equilibrium trade models, as the most sophisticated method of assessment in spite of its 
major drawbacks. 
2.1  NON SPATIAL PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELING 
Consider a certain sector in a country. In the simplest theoretical framework, 
domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes. 
Let Q
D be the demanded quantity, Q
S the supplied quantity, M
D the imports 
demand, M
S the imports supply, P the domestic price of the good studied, P* its world 
price, t is the tariff applied domestically on imports of this good.  
A non spatial partial equilibrium model can be expressed as a model of five 
equations. Equations (1) and (2) are expressing, respectively, the quantities demanded and 
supplied by domestic agents as a function of domestic price (P).    8
) 1 ( ) (P Q Q
D D =  
) 2 ( ) (P Q Q
S S =  
The level of domestic price is such that the demanded quantity is greater than the 
supplied quantity; the difference is imported from the rest of the world. 
() () ) 3 ( P Q P Q M
S D D − =  
The foreign supply depends on the level of the world price (P*).  
) 4 ( *) (P M M
S S =  
The domestic tariff t creates a difference between the world and the domestic 
prices: 
() ) 5 ( 1 . * t P P + =  
This model can be even simpler as the inclusion of equation (4) reflects that the 
importing country is large. In case of a small country, one would consider that whatever its 
import demand, world price remains constant: equation (4) vanishes.  
The obvious advantage of this kind of model is its simplicity and its tractability. 
Quantity of this good can be normalized so that the world price is equal to 1. If the 
importing country is small, the economic consequences of a tariff can be derived 
immediately from this system of equations; calculating the distortion resulting from 
protection (variation in consumer surplus, producer surplus, and public receipt) only 
requires information on the level of the tariff, the levels of domestic consumption and 
production, and the price-elasticity of demand and supply.   
Even in the case of a less simplistic formulation (it is possible to suppose that 
domestic and foreign goods are not perfect substitutes
8, or to consider a multi-product 
partial equilibrium model where, for example, one product is used as the input of a second 
                                                
8 See for example Hufbauer and Elliot, 1994 in an assessment of US trade policy or Messerlin, 2001, for the 
European Union.   9
one
9) several immediate (and strong) criticisms can be addressed to this method. It 
supposes that commodities originating from several exporting countries are perfectly 
homogenous: it accounts for neither an imperfect substitutability between foreign products, 
nor the differentiated transportation costs. Therefore, it is unable to measure bilateral trade 
flows. This metric issue will be addressed in the next subsection on spatial partial 
equilibrium models. 
The previous system of equations does not include general equilibrium effect. It is 
only sustainable in cases of small sectors of domestic economies. If, on the contrary, the 
sector under consideration is large, the imposition or elimination of a tariff might have non 
marginal effects on the demand of productive factors and intermediate consumptions, 
consumers’ income, etc. The construction a general equilibrium model allows for taking 
into account these effects (see subsection 2.3.)  
2.2  SPATIAL PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELING 
Suppose now n countries (i=1, 2, …n) with 1 being the domestic country, j = 2, …, 
and n is the index for foreign countries. In the sector studied, imports and domestic goods 
are imperfect substitutes: the Armington
10 hypothesis precisely means that products are 
differentiated by their country of origin. Equation (6) is the demand function for 
domestically produced goods, while equation (7) is the demand function for imports from 
country j. Substitutability between products implies that demand for one product depends 
on all prices. 
) 6 ( ) ;...; ; ( 2 1 1 1 n
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The supply of domestic good is: 
                                                
9 See Roningen, 1997.  
10 See Armington, 1969.   10
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The supply of foreign goods depends on foreign prices:  




j P Q Q =  
Partial equilibrium model supposes that the consumers’ income and the cost of 
productive factors are constant, so that they do not exert any impact on demand and supply.  
Finally, the gap between domestic and foreign prices reflects the domestic tariff and 
the cost of transportation from country j to country 1 (τj - in %). The domestic tariff is 
indexed by j (the exporting country) as preferential schemes, regional agreements or certain 
features of the protective instrument
11 can result in trade discrimination. 
( ) ) 10 ( 1 . * j j j j t P P τ + + =  
This model is easily tractable (see the COMPAS model –Francois and Hall, 1993- 
for a log-linear version or Francois and Hall, 1997, for a CES version).More information on 
discriminatory trade regimes is available (see Bouët, Decreux, Fontagne, Jean and Laborde, 
2005a). The estimation of bilateral transportation costs is a much more difficult issue, but 
the great advantage of this method is that it allows for measuring bilateral trade flows.  
2.3  SINGLE COUNTRY TRADE MODELING 
As a complex methodology, general equilibrium modeling can be time-consuming, 
but it allows for taking into account fundamental effects of economic reforms—like income 
effects and interdependence between sectors of production. The expansion of activity in a 
sector may have economy-wide effects which can be captured by this framework,  but 
which are not accounted for by partial equilibrium model. This expansion increases 
demand for primary factors and their remuneration; it therefore raises the cost of 
production for other sectors, and the demand of intermediate goods addressed to other 
                                                
11 The tariff may be specific and not ad valorem, or it can be an anti-dumping duty.    11
sectors. Further, it affects the level of net public receipts/expenses if the production or the 
utilization of some factors is either taxed or subsidized; the variation of remuneration 
modifies the income level of households, which in turn, change their levels of 
consumptions. 
As a result of this full integration of income and interdependence effects, general 
equilibrium accounts for the complete budget closure of a model. If the behavior of n 
agents is modeled and that (n-1) agents are globally in budget deficit (they consume more 
than they produce), it ensures that the n
th agent is in surplus: s/he produces more than s/he 
consumes; and her/his surplus exactly matches the global deficit of the (n-1) other agents. 
In doing so, a general equilibrium model is fully consistent.  
The most direct way to account for general equilibrium effects is to construct a 
single country trade model. Of course this kind of model is unable to measure bilateral 
trade flows, but it takes into consideration general equilibrium effects.  To illustrate this 
method, consider one country and N sectors (k=1, 2…N). In the following simplistic 
structure, imported and domestic goods are perfect substitutes; there is no intermediate 
consumption in production, no government, and labor is the sole productive factor (its 
remuneration is w). These are uncommon features of single country trade models used in 
the literature, but they allow for a concise presentation of the model in only 8 equations – 
from (11) to (18) -. Furthermore, there is perfect competition in all markets and perfect 
mobility of labor across sectors. Demand function of good k depends on all prices 
(allowing for substitutability or complementarities between goods) and national income, 
supposedly distributed to a single household whose demand is representative: 






k = =  
P is a vector of N prices. The country’s supply of good k is function of domestic 
price of good k and of the remuneration of labor: 




k =    12
Let EDk be the domestic Excess Demand for good k. If it is positive (respectively 
negative), it represents imports (respectively exports).  




k k − =  
Let ES*k be the rest of the world’s Excess Supply of good k. If it is positive 
(respectively negative), it represents exports (respectively imports) of the rest of the world. 
) 14 ( *) ( * * P ES ES k k =  
The government is applying import duties tk on good k.  
() ) 15 ( 1 . * k k k t P P + =  
Pk might be sufficiently low for EDk to be positive: the country imports good k 
which is in excess supply in the rest of the world (ES*k>0). Exports occur in the case of Pk 
high (the case of positive exports and positive tk is possible; then tk represents an export 
subsidy). Then EDk and ES*k are negative.  
Let L
D
k be the demand of labor by sector k and L  the total endowment of labor. 
The labor market equilibrium requires: 
() ) 16 ( ; L P w L k
D
k =  
National income comes from labor and import taxes: 
∑ + =
k
k k k ED P t L w Y ) 17 ( *  
It is important to note that in case of exports, either tk is zero or exports are 
subsidized (tk positive and EDk is negative).  
There are several ways to operate a closure of this model. One is to consider that the 
current account is constant – or in other words, the country is unable to borrow from, or to 
lend to, the rest of the world:   13
) 18 ( * CA ED P k k
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When comparing this very simple single country trade model to the partial 
equilibrium model presented in subsection 2.1, it is possible to point out the four main 
features that distinguish partial from general equilibrium analysis. First, demand depends 
on all prices and income, thus, making possible real income effect on consumption. 
Second, supply also depends on the remuneration of productive factors. Third, from 
equation (17) the national income is affected by factor remuneration and tariff receipts; 
equilibrium on factor market determines the level of remuneration; it affects product 
demand and thus the formation of equilibrium on the product market. This mechanism 
might be inversed as economic activity determines factor demand
12. Fourth, equation (16) 
constitutes a linkage between sectors, through the equilibrium on factor market
13. The 
economic expansion of one sector raises its demand of productive factors and thus their 
cost; it affects the marginal cost of production in other sectors.  
As a matter of conclusion, general equilibrium model is much richer than partial 
equilibrium model as it adds interdependence effects between sectors (through real income 
effects or factor remuneration effects) and between types of markets (products / productive 
factors).  Finally, one of the major drawbacks of general equilibrium model is the fact that 
it requires more information on economic variables which greatly reduces its tractability.  
2.4  MULTI COUNTRY TRADE MODELING 
The previous framework is now extended to n countries (i=1,2…n); there are still  
N sectors (k=1,2…N). Products are differentiated by their country of origin (Armington). 
To simplify the presentation, suppose that there is no government, no intermediate 
consumption in production and labor is the sole productive factor. 
                                                
12 In fact there is no anteriority in this sequence as one of the main conclusions of the general equilibrium 
theory is that equilibrium occurs simultaneously on all markets.  
13 Another one is intermediate consumption: expansion in activity in sector i raises demand for intermediate 
consumption, whose prices are increased. It penalizes activity in other sectors.   14
Let  j i k CP , , be the price paid by country j’s consumers when they buy good k 
produced in i (consumer price)
14. Demand in country j of good k produced in country i 
D
j i k Q , , depends on all consumer prices and of country j’s income: 




j i k Y CP Q Q =  
If i is different from j,
D
j i k Q , , represents trade flows of good k from i to j.  
Let  j i k PP , , be the price received by country i’s producers when they sell good k in 
country j (producer price). The supply of good k produced in i to country j 
S
j i k Q , , depends on 
the producer price in j of good k produced in i  j i k PP , , and the cost of labor in i.  




j i k w PP Q Q =  
Let  j i k t , ,  be the tariff imposed by country j on good k coming from country i. The 
gap between producer price and consumer price is defined by
15: 
( ) ) 21 ( 1 , , , , , , j i k j i k j i k t PP CP + =  
If  i k L , is the demand of labor in sector k in country i and  i L is the total supply of 
labor in country i, factor market equilibrium requires: 
() ) 22 ( ; ,. , , i
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Finally all countries’ current balances are constant: 
                                                
14 In case of double country index (i,j), the first index i refers to supply; the second one j refers to demand.  
15 We could also add a transportation cost  j i k , , τ of good k from i to j but it would require the modeling of a 
transportation sector.    15
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As compared to a single - country model, the immediate advantage of a multi-
country trade model is its ability to calculate bilateral trade flows. It is all the more 
important in a world where trade discrimination is extensive. Single-country trade models 
can not really capture discriminatory effects of trade, like regional agreements or 
preferential schemes.  
Nonetheless the complexity is significantly increased as it adds a new dimension to 
trade. Equations can now be four-dimensional (intermediate consumption: two sectors; two 
countries) and their number is increasing exponentially with the number of geographic 
zones and sectors
16. All theoretical assumptions (households’ disaggregations, imperfect 
competition, imperfect mobility of productive factors, unemployment, etc.) which can be 
applied in a single-country trade model can also be adopted in a multi-country trade model, 
but these extensions are constrained by computational capacity. This  is the reason why 
these models are complementary analytical instruments of trade liberalization: for example, 
multi-country trade models can evaluate the impact of regional agreements at a 
macroeconomic level, while a single country trade model with extended disaggregation of 
households can use this macroeconomic shock (variation in world prices) to evaluate its 
distributional impact. 
An illustration of this would be to undertake a computable general equilibrium 
model. This is the focus of the next subsection. Another analytical tool founded on multi-
country general equilibrium model is the gravity equation (see 2.4.1.2), which is based on 
econometrics. 
                                                
16 That is to say: intermediate consumption of good k originated in country i by sector k’ in country j. Thus 
decomposing in 10 sectors and 10 geographic zones leads to 10*10*10*10=10,000 equations for intermediate 
consumption.   16
2.4.1  Multi country CGEM 
A Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGEM) is founded on a theoretical 
representation of the world economy; this theoretical representation is a multi-country 
general equilibrium model. Computable means that the model is calibrated so that it 
represents the world economy at the initial period of time.  
The modeler must choose behavioral representations of consumers, producers, 
governments, and so forth. These choices are made based on the objective of the study. 
When studying trade reform, modeling the economy’s real sector is prioritized while the 
financial one is disregarded. When the objective is the impact on poverty, numerous 
households are included in order to account for the diversity of income sources and 
consumption shares. 
In order to represent the world economy, it is necessary to have data on household 
consumption, on sector production, added value, intermediate consumption, exports and 
imports, data on economic policies, and so forth.  
Figure 1 is a close representation of a CGEM. The core of the model is composed of 
a theoretical representation of the economy. It is fed, on one side, with data on 
macroeconomic aggregates and economic policies, and on the other side, with behavioral 
parameters identified through econometric investigation.  This information represents a 
benchmark on which economic reform is applied. The experiment generates new values of 
economic variables and compares them to initial values.   17
Figure 1—Structure of a computable general equilibrium model 
 
Thus, a CGEM is an attractive way of modeling the consequences of trade reform 
as it is a fully consistent representation of the world economy, and it takes into account 
income effects and the interconnections between sectors. When considering the impact of 
trade reform at the world level, a multi-country trade model can be employed even if it 
lacks a great in-depth view of the functioning of national economies. On the contrary, a 
single country trade model can be employed when the modeler prioritizes the impact on 
domestic variables: it is, for example, of great usefulness for the study of redistributive 
effects of trade reform. 
2.4.2 Gravity  Equation 
The gravity equation has been an attractive analytical tool for researchers in the 
international trade area as its utilization has been manifold. Gravity equation can be utilized   18
to evaluate market access, border effects, trading potentials, impact of regional agreements, 
and so forth. 
Yet, the first generation of gravity equations had no solid theoretical foundation; 
intuitively, it sounded appealing to explain international trade through attractive forces 
(activity in the exporting zone, demand in the importing one) and resistive forces 
(transportation costs, trade barriers, etc). Fortunately, gravity equation has received a 
specific theoretical attention with the works of Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1989, 1990), 
Deardorff (1998), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and is now well-founded.  
Consider a gravity equation following Fontagne, Pajot, and Pasteels’ theoretical 
model (2001): all goods are differentiated by place of origin and each region is producing 
only one good. The supply of each good is fixed. Consumers have identical and homothetic 
preferences represented by a CES utility function. Let cij be the consumption of good 
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subject to the budget constraint: 
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σ is the elasticity of substitution between all goods, βi is a distribution parameter 
and pij is the price in j of the good produced in i. If pi is the exporter’s supply price then: 
   ) 27 ( ij i ij p p τ =   
τij is greater or equal to 1 and includes trade costs. Trade costs might be seen only 
as direct costs resulting from transportation and taxation at the border. They might also 
include information costs on quality, technical features, and availability of the product.    19
Trade costs are of iceberg-type: (τij-1) % of origin production is lost in trade such 
that, if Qi is production of i: 
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 Value of exports from i to j is defined by:  
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Finally country i’s total income is: 
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If all quantities are normalized such that pi = 1, the following expression can be 
drawn from this model: 
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is a CES index of the rate of trade costs when acceding to country j 
The meaning of the gravity equation (31) is intuitive and straightforward. Exports 
from i to j are positively related to the supply capacity of i (i’s income), the demand 
capacity of j (j’s income) — these are the attractive forces —and negatively related to trade 
costs.  
Compared to the initially designed gravity equation expressed in McCallum (1995) 
and Wall (1999), a new insight is the inclusion of not only absolute trade costs (τij), but   20
also of relative trade costs — see the numerator of the third fraction in (31). Consider the 
case of trade flows from New Zealand to Australia: they are larger because the absolute 
geographic distance between the two countries is smaller, but also because the importing 
country is remote from all countries in the world. Considering that the level of bilateral 
protection is fixed, increased protection of Australia on products coming from the rest of 
the world strengthens trade flows from New Zealand. 
The advantage of the gravity equation is its extreme tractability. Furthermore, it 
gives very positive econometric results. Nevertheless, it explains only exports; even though 
in a tentative yet not convincing effort, Wall (1999) tried to draw welfare costs associated 
with protection from gravity equation
17. 
In conclusion of this methodological review, it is important to note that these 
analytical instruments are complementary, not substitute. Multi-country general 
equilibrium models are the most comprehensive and consistent analytical tool for 
evaluating the consequences of trade liberalization: they account for income effects, 
interdependence between factor and product markets, discriminatory aspects of 
international trade, and so forth. Nevertheless, they are complex and demanding in terms of 
statistical information. Furthermore, they cannot fully reflect the complexity of national 
economies because the modeler is bound to simplify theoretical representation to 
simultaneously account for international trade relations with other geographic zones. On 
the other hand, partial equilibrium models offer less consistency and are less extensive, but 
they give the modeler more freedom to study a specific aspect of trade liberalization. 
Nevertheless, it is questionable to use a partial equilibrium model in the case of a large 
economic sector. 
The rest of this study focuses on multi-country general equilibrium models. First, 
they constitute the most ambitious way for studying the potential impact of trade 
liberalization on developing countries. Second, they have been extensively used in recent 
                                                
17 Wall (1999) tests econometrically a non microeconomically-founded equation, utilizes a weakly-founded 
index of trade policy and derives welfare effects by applying a proportion rule to the trade effect.   21
years in order to study the potential impact of full trade liberalization or a potential Doha 
agreement
18. Third, these studies have drawn a very contrasting picture of these 
consequences so that their credibility has been questioned. Fourth, these models often 
appear as a “black box” the results of which are difficult to understand.  
The next section focuses on an evaluation of full trade liberalization with the 
MIRAGE model. It tries to put in better perspective the stakes of trade reform for 
developing countries while highlighting the advantages and the drawbacks of the analytical 
instrument. 
 
3.  A NEW ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
ON DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY   
 
The objective of this section is to carry out an experiment under a multi-country 
computable general equilibrium model which analyzes the impact of full trade 
liberalization on developing countries. World poverty is mainly found in the agricultural 
sector, which also constitutes major trade distortions worldwide. Thus, full trade 
liberalization would entail a positive impact on poverty alleviation. Liberalization of textile 
and clothing industry —which is labor intensive—could bolster economic activity and 
contribute to poverty reduction in developing countries. Moreover, elimination of domestic 
distortions could enhance welfare and economic growth.      
Nevertheless, some questions remain. Some developing countries are highly 
specialized in products on which distortions are very low worldwide (coffee, cocoa, copper, 
etc.). Is there any potential positive impact of full trade liberalization on these economies?  
Exports of other developing countries, especially Least Developed Countries and 
Sub - Saharan countries, have been granted large trade preferences by rich countries, 
                                                
18 See for example the development of the GTAP network, but also the works of the World Bank (Global 
Economic Prospects, 2002 and 2004), and of Cline (2004).    22
especially the European Union (the “Cotonou” regime, the EBA – Everything But Arms) 
and the US (AGOA – African Growth Opportunity Act, the US Caribbean Initiative). 
Naturally, they will gain no improvement in market access; instead, they will be negatively 
affected by tougher competition from large agricultural exporters, like Cairns group. 
Eroded trade preferences have been at the heart of contention since the beginning of the 
Doha Agenda. This issue requires special attention.  
Today, most of the intervention in agriculture contributes to augmented world 
production and diminished demand, pushing down world prices of agricultural 
commodities. Therefore, elimination of these distortions should raise world prices. It could 
have negative effects on net food importing countries, however, even if the increase in 
prices contributes to augmented domestic agricultural production.  
From a theoretical point of view these questions are appealing. When liberalizing an 
economy, welfare gains are stemming from two major sources: allocative efficiency gains 
and terms of trade gains.  A country’s own trade reform explains the former: by eliminating 
import tariffs, consumption surplus is increased and productive factors are allocated to 
more efficient utilizations. These gains are obtained regardless of what trade partners are 
carrying out. They are called WYDIWYG gains (‘What You Do Is What You Get’ – 
Winters, 1999). Terms of trade gains can be achieved through raising export prices and/or 
lowering import prices. Improved access to foreign markets contributes to the former. From 
a mercantilist point of view, the main goal of trade liberalization is achieved through 
opening foreign markets and raising exports. Contrary to that, neoclassical theory puts an 
emphasis on allocative efficiency gains (WYDIWYG gains).  
The inspiration of CGEM is neo – classical. In this sense, allocative efficiency gains 
are fundamental in these studies: WYDIWYG gains have even been considered as the 
major source of gains for developing countries in the Uruguay Round. From a policy 
perspective, it means that every country will gain from its own trade reform.    23
But CGEMs capture other sources of gain through the evolution of terms of trade 
(under constant trade volumes, increased export prices or decreased import prices mean 
improvement in terms of trade, while decreased export prices or increased import prices 
mean deterioration in terms of trade). Terms of trade effects might be negative so that 
multilateral liberalization can imply welfare losses for a country. From a policy 
perspective, this could be a result of tougher competition on export markets (eroded 
preferences imply that exports are more competed) —which entails reduced export prices 
— or rising import prices.  
Thus, in this kind of modeling exercise, methodological choices are fundamental. 
Aggregating all developing countries in one zone, for example, would mislead policy 
conclusions: a global zone composed of South America and Sub Saharan Africa would be a 
net food exporting zone, while some Sub Saharan African countries are net food importing 
countries. In order to tackle the issues previously mentioned, special attention has to be 
given to the geographic decomposition of the model. Also, the importance of the way in 
which competition is modeled and dynamic gains are captured can be emphasized. A 
sensitivity analysis has to be specifically devoted to these issues.   
Subsections 3.1 to 3.3 describe technical features of the MIRAGE model and the 
geographical and sector decomposition adopted. Subsection 3.4 presents the pre-
experiment and draws a picture of the world just before implementing full trade 
liberalization: level of GDP and trade, and level of distortions. Subsection 3.5 describes the 
impact of full trade liberalization both, at the world and country levels. It finally 
decomposes the shock in order to tackle the main economic policy issues: which countries 
are the main beneficiaries? Which are the most distorting measures? 
3.1  A TECHNICAL PRESENTATION OF THE MIRAGE MODEL 
The MIRAGE (Modeling International Relationships in Applied General 
Equilibrium) model is a multi-sector, multi-region CGEM devoted to trade policy analysis.   24
The model is done in a sequential dynamic recursive set-up: it is solved for one period and 
all variable values, determined at the end of a period, are initial values of the next one. 
Macroeconomic data and social accounting matrixes, in particular, come from the 
GTAP6 database (see Dimaranan and McDougall, 2006) which describes the world 
economy in 2001. Tariff averages have been re-calculated using the MacMap methodology 
(see Bouët, Decreux, Fontagne, Jean and Laborde, 2005a and 2005b).  
From the supply side in each sector the production function is a Leontieff function 
of Added Value and intermediate consumption: one output unit needs for its production x% 
of an aggregate of productive factors (labor, unskilled and skilled; capital; land and natural 
resources) and (1-x) % of intermediate consumption. These proportions are fixed.  
The intermediate consumption is an aggregate CES function of all goods: it means 
that substitutability exists between two intermediate goods, depending on the relative prices 
of these goods. This substitutability is constant and at the same level for any pair of 
intermediate goods. Similarly, added value is a CES function of unskilled labor, land, 
natural resources, and of a CES bundle of skilled labor and capital. This nesting allows 
introducing less substitutability between capital and skilled labor than between these two 
and other factors. In other words, when the relative price of unskilled labor is increased this 
factor is replaced by a combination of capital and skilled labor, which are more 
complementary.  
Factor endowments are fully employed. The only factor the supply of which is 
constant is natural resources. Capital supply is modified each year due to depreciation and 
investment. Growth rates of labor supply are fixed exogenously. Land supply is 
endogenous; it depends on the real remuneration of land. In some countries land is a scarce 
factor (Japan, European Union, etc.) such that elasticity of supply is low. In others 
(Australia, Brazil, Argentina, etc.) land is abundant and elasticity is high.  
Skilled labor is the only factor perfectly mobile. Installed capital and natural 
resources are sector – specific. New capital is allocated amongst sectors according to an   25
investment function described later on. Unskilled labor is imperfectly mobile between 
agricultural sectors and non agricultural sectors according to a CET function: the unskilled 
labor’s remuneration in agricultural activities is different from non agricultural activities. 
This factor chooses its distribution between these two series of sectors according to the 
ratio of remunerations. Land is also imperfectly mobile, but of course, between agricultural 
sectors. 
Therefore, in MIRAGE there is full employment of labor, or more precisely there is 
a constant aggregate employment in all countries: labor markets adjust by wage. It is quite 
possible to suppose that total aggregate employment is variable and that there is 
unemployment; but of course, this greatly increases the complexity of the model so that 
simplifying assumptions have to be made in other areas (the number of countries or 
sectors). This could amplify the expected benefits of trade liberalization for developing 
countries (see Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, Orden and Robinson, 2005).  
Capital in a given region, whatever its origin, domestic or foreign, is assumed to be 
obtained by assembling intermediate inputs according to a specific combination. The 
capital good is the same whatever the sector. The MIRAGE model describes imperfect as 
well as perfect competition. In sectors under perfect competition there is no fixed cost and 
price equals marginal cost. Imperfect competition is modeled according to a monopolistic 
competition framework. It accounts for horizontal product differentiation linked to 
varieties. Each firm in sectors under imperfect competition produces its own and unique 
variety with a fixed cost expressed as a fixed quantity of output. According to Cournot 
hypothesis, each firm supposes that its decision of production will not affect production of 
other firms. Furthermore, the firms do not expect that their decision of production will 
affect the level of domestic demand (which would be what modelers call a Ford effect.)  
The monopolistic competition framework implies that each year firms exert their 
market power by applying a mark-up to their marginal cost. This mark-up depends 
negatively on the price-elasticity of demand according to the Lerner formula. This price-
elasticity, as perceived by firms, depends positively on the elasticity of substitution   26
between the goods produced domestically and abroad, and negatively with the number of 
competitors and the market share of the firm in the demand region
19. In the long term the 
number of firms is endogenous as it increases when profits are positive. An implication of 
this hypothetical structure is that international trade has pro-competitive effects and reduces 
marks-up and prices.  
The number of firms may adjust progressively, either quickly (2 years in 
“fragmented” sectors) or slowly (5 years in “segmented” sectors). This distinction is based 
on the seminal work of Sutton (1991). Empirically, the pertinence of this classification has 
been confirmed by Oliveira-Martins (1994) and Oliveira-Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat 
(1996). These works are the basis of the taxonomy used by MIRAGE to distinguish 
fragmented and segmented sectors.  
Thus, the last version of MIRAGE includes new assumptions:  
•  imperfect mobility of labor between agricultural and non agricultural 
sectors; 
•  endogenous land supply;  
•  the European land set-aside program is modeled; it decreases the quantity of 
land available for production in the wheat sector. 
The demand side is modeled in each region through a representative agent whose 
propensity to save is constant. The rest of the national income is used to purchase final 
consumption. Preferences across sectors are represented by a LES-CES function: this 
specification means that for consumers there is constant substitutability depending on 
relative consumer prices, not between total consumptions, but between the excess of total 
consumption relatively to a minimal level. It implies that consumption has a non – unitary 
income elasticity; when the consumer’s income is augmented by x% the consumption of 
each good is not raised by x% systematically.  
                                                
19 This specification is very close to the one used by Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1997).   27
When competition is imperfect the product is horizontally differentiated (varieties) 
and consumers have increased utility with more varieties; this is a traditional hypothesis 
(called Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz function). But the MIRAGE model introduces here two 
specific features. First, products coming from developed countries and those from 
developing countries are supposed to belong to different quality ranges. Their 
substitutability, therefore, is assumed to be lower than the substitutability between products 
coming from the same quality range. Second, domestic products benefit from a specific 
status of consumers; they are less substitutable to foreign products than foreign products 
between each other, within a given quality range.  
The macroeconomic closure is obtained by assuming that the sum of the balance of 
goods and services and FDIs is constant and equal to its initial value.  
3.2 THE  GEOGRAPHIC  DECOMPOSITION 
Table 1 indicates the geographical decomposition which has been designed for this 
study. Given that the study is an assessment of trade liberalization on developing countries, 
14 of the 20 selected zones are developing countries
20.  
The MIRAGE model has two features that influence geographical decomposition. 
First, land supply is endogenous and a distinction is made between countries with abundant 
land supply and countries with scarcity of land. Second, a vertical differentiation is 
introduced considering that products coming from the North (rich countries) are of high 
quality and products from the South are of low quality. These two features are given in the 
last two columns of table 1. The country classification according to the scarcity of land is 
based on a calculation of arable land per person (rural population). Data come from the 
2003 World Development Indicators and are available in Annex  1.
                                                
20 Annex  2 gives the geographic and sector correspondence table between these decompositions and the 
GTAP classification.   28
Table 1— Geographical decomposition 
# Abbrev Zone North/South
Land = scarce factor
1 AUNZ        Australia/New Zealand North No
2 Cana         Canada North No
3 DvdA         Developed Asia North Yes
4 EU25         European Union - 25 North Yes
5 USAm        USA North No
6 Roec         Rest of OECD North Yes
7A r ge         Argentina South No
8B gld         Bangladesh South Yes
9 Braz         Brazil South No
10 Chin         China South Yes
11 DvgA         Developing Asia South Yes
12 Indi         India South Yes
13 Mexi         Mexico South Yes
14 SACU         Southern Africa Custom Union South Yes
15 Tuni         Tunisia South Yes
16 Zamb         Zambia South Yes
17 Rame         Rest of America South Yes
18 Rmen         Rest of Middle East and North Africa South Yes
19 RSSA         Rest of SubSaharan Africa South Yes
20 RofW         Rest of the World South Yes  
 
The geographical decomposition presented in Table 1 reflects specific 
characteristics of various countries and regions. The reason why, for example, the 
European Union and the USA are presented as separate zones is because they have the 
richest markets in the world and they have granted large trade preferences. Australia and 
New Zealand are powerful agricultural exporting countries, which could be among the 
main beneficiaries of this trade shock. The zone ‘Developed Asia’ gathers countries with 
extremely high protection in agriculture (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). In other rich 
countries, Canada has a very low density of rural population per arable land. The zone 
entitled ‘Rest of OECD’ is composed by rich countries (Mexico is not included) with land   29
as a scarce factor and with a very high protectionism in agriculture: Switzerland, Norway, 
and Iceland.  
As far as developing countries are concerned, India and China have been isolated as 
they concentrate 37% of the world population and 50% of the world poverty (2$ per day 
definition
21). Moreover these countries could be winners of worldwide full trade 
liberalization for different reasons:  
(i)  it would entail an elimination of large domestic distortions as today they are 
highly protected countries, especially India
22;  
(ii)  They have been granted only small trade preferences, such that liberalization 
should imply a significant improvement of their market access to the rest of 
the world.  
Brazil and Argentina are powerful agricultural exporting countries, with very large 
productive capacity, and they have only been conceded a small preference in their access to 
Europe and USA, as compared to other developing countries.  
On the contrary, Tunisia and Bangladesh could be penalized for two reasons: they 
are net food importing countries and their export performance has been bolstered by large 
trade preferences (the Euromed partnership in the case of Tunisia, the EBA in the case of 
Bangladesh). Zambia mostly exports copper which is only marginally taxed by import 
duties throughout the world. Moreover, Zambia is a beneficiary of all main preferential 
schemes: EBA, AGOA, and GSP. The Southern Africa Custom Union (SACU) must be 
distinguished from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa: its members are not Least Developed 
Countries, except Lesotho. Mexico has a relatively low income average per capita and free 
access to USA. It may be also concerned by an erosion of trade preferences. 
                                                
21 This data on population and poverty are coming from the World Development Indicators – 2003. 
22 According to the MacMap-HS6 database, the average protection of India was 33.5% in 2001. China is less 
protected with 14.1% at the same year.     30
Finally, four developing zones have been distinguished due to the specificity of 
their geographic trade composition: the rest of the developing Asia, the rest of Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA), the rest of America (excluding OECD countries) and the rest of 
Sub – Saharan African countries. The MENA zone is a large net-food importing country 
and it exports mainly primary, non agricultural, and oil commodities. This product structure 
of exports is also a feature of the ‘Rest of South America’ zone (Bolivia, Chile, and 
Venezuela). The rest of Sub – Saharan countries have extended preferences on their exports 
towards Europe and USA. 
Thus, the geographical decomposition of this study emphasizes the heterogeneity of 
developing countries according to forces that could contribute to successful stories for 
some countries (Brazil, China, India), but also to great loses for others (Bangladesh, 
Mexico, Tunisia, Zambia). Of course, a global welfare impact is needed in all these cases 
as the elimination of domestic distortions can offset increased prices of imported goods 
and/or eroded preferential margins.  
Since the launching of the Doha Agenda, several negotiating blocks have appeared, 
adding complexity in this process, as compared to the negotiation between USA and the 
European Union which has characterized the last trade rounds. This geographical 
decomposition illustrates the new partition: USA, the European Union, the rich countries of 
the Cairns group (Australia, Canada, New-Zealand), the G-10 (with the Developed Asia 
zone and the Rest of OECD zone), the G-20 (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa), the G-90 (Zambia, Tunisia, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa). Thus, this model could 
also be utilized to explain the positions of these negotiating blocks. 
3.3 PRODUCT  DECOMPOSITION 
The sector decomposition emphasizes the existence of key sectors where distortions 
are high and numerous. Of course agriculture must be the main focus of study. This is the 
reason why out of the 17 sectors considered, 9 are agricultural.   31
Amongst these agricultural activities, some are of key concern as distortions are 
especially high: tariffs for wheat, sugar, meat, rice, milk; domestic support for cotton 
(plant-based fibers). In the case of sugar, rice and milk, the processed goods have been 
isolated, as paddy rice, raw milk, sugar cane and sugar beet are only marginally traded. 
Finally, vegetables and fruits constitute a key agricultural activity for numerous developing 
countries.  
Textile and clothing sectors are still highly protected as compared to the rest of 
industrial activity throughout developed countries.  
In Table 2, the last three columns give valuable information for the MIRAGE 
model. In each sector, competition may be perfect or imperfect. According to the 
traditional point of view, agricultural sectors and transportation are characterized by perfect 
competition, whereas other sectors are characterized by imperfect competition. According 
to Oliveira-Martins and Scarpetta (1999) textile and clothing/apparel are assumed to be 
fragmented; other sectors under imperfect competition are assumed to be segmented.  





1 Whet Wheat Perfect - Agricultural
2 VgFr Vegetables and Fruit Perfect - Agricultural
3 Plfb Plant-based fibers Perfect - Agricultural
4 Meat Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse Perfect - Agricultural
5 Milk Milk (processed) Perfect - Agricultural
6 Rice Rice (processed) Perfect - Agricultural
7 SugrS u gar (processed) Perfect - Agricultural
8 OtFP Other Food Products Perfect - Agricultural
9 Otag Other Agricultural Products Perfect - Agricultural
10 Oprm Other Primary products Perfect - Non agric.
11 Text Textile Imperfect Fragm. Non agric.
12 Weap Wearing and Apparel Imperfect Fragm. Non agric.
13 Mich Metal mineral petroleum and chemical products Imperfect Segm. Non agric.
14 Veeq Vehicles and equipment Imperfect Segm. Non agric.
15 Omnf Other manufacturing products Imperfect Segm. Non agric.
16 OtSr Other services Imperfect Segm. Non agric.
17 TrT Transport and Trade Perfect - Non agric.    32
In the version of MIRAGE utilized for this central experiment, unskilled labor is 
imperfectly mobile between agricultural activities and non agricultural activities. The last 
column indicates this distinction: the food sector is considered as agricultural, here.  
3.4 THE  INITIAL  WORLD 
3.4.1 The  pre-experiment 
Initial data (Social Accounting Matrix and tariffs) are from 2001. As substantial 
liberalization occurs between 2001 and 2005, a pre-experiment is conducted: data on 
market access are changed in order to include the last implementation of the Uruguay 
Round, the elimination of the Multi - Fibre Arrangement, enlargement of the European 
Union, implementation of the “Everything But Arms” initiative and of the African Growth 
Opportunity Act, and finally, the accession of China to WTO. These reforms should result 
in welfare benefits but are not part of a current deal on trade liberalization.  
3.4.2   Main features of the initial trading system 
The initial world is characterized by a few statistics: level of tariffs, export structure 
by destination, export structure by product, and net trade balance in agricultural and food 
products. This choice is justified by the arguments mentioned previously: domestic support 
and export subsidies are only minor distortions as compared to tariffs; preferential access to 
a large market is a common feature such that its erosion is a central concern; agricultural 
world prices are expected to rise such that being a net importer/exporter is a key issue.   
Annex  3 gives bilateral levels of protection for each zone in 2005. Each row 
defines the average tariff charged by an importing country while each column indicates the 
average duty faced by a country on its exports to a specific destination. The last column 
indicates the average protection in each zone, while the last row expresses the average duty 
faced on exports. This information is summarized in Figure 2.  
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Source: author’s calculation. 
India is by far the most protectionist country, but trade barriers are also high in 
Bangladesh, Sub – Saharan Africa, and Tunisia, marginally less in Brazil, Argentina, and 
Zambia. Global protection in rich countries is lower.  
Due to preferential schemes (EBA, AGOA, Cotonou, Caricom) or specialization in 
products little taxed across the world (coffee, coca, cotton, mining), numerous developing 
countries are facing low average tariff on their exports: Tunisia, Rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Bangladesh, Zambia, and especially Mexico and Rest of Middle East and North 
Africa. For Mexico, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides free 
access to a major market, while for the other zone this is a combination of two elements —
Euromed partnership and exportation of raw commodities—which explains the very low 
average duty faced on exports. In the case of Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, and 
Argentina, specialization in agriculture implies that their exports are penalized more than   34
those of other countries. Conversely, specialization in industry gives a relatively good 
access to foreign markets: Canada, Developed Asia, EU, USA, and China.  
The necessity of taking fully into account preferential schemes and regional 
agreements is now widely admitted by the international community of researchers. It has 
changed the global picture of the world protection, not only because average world 
protection is now considered lower than previously thought (see above), but also because 
trade policies from industrial countries appear less anti-development.  
For example, in 2004 the Global Economic Prospects from the World Bank put an 
emphasis on the regressive aspect of trade policies. 
‘Tariffs imposed by the industrial countries on imports from developing 
countries are typically much higher than those they levy on other 
industrial countries. In agriculture, the industrial countries impose an 
average 15 percent tariff on imports from other industrial countries, 
whereas the rates on imports from developing countries range from 20 
percent (Latin America) to 35 percent (Europe and Central Asia). Outside 
of agriculture, the discrepancy is even more striking. Tariffs on imports 
from other industrial average 1 percent, while those from developing 
countries face tariff averages ranging from 2.1 percent (Latin America) to 
8.1 percent (south Asia).’ (Global Economic Prospects 2004, The World 
Bank, p. 81) 
From Jean, Laborde and Martin (2005) it appears now that:  
“…developing countries’ exporters of agricultural products faced an 
average tariff of 16 percent in 2001, a rate that is expected to fall to 15 
percent once current commitments, particularly by China and other 
developing countries, are phased in. The average tariff facing industrial 
countries was 17 percent in 2001, and will fall to 16 percent with full 
implementation of current commitments. The LDCs as a group face lower,   35
but still significant barriers, with an average tariff of 12 percent even after 
preferences are taken into account” (Jean, Laborde and Martin, 2005.)  
In agriculture the imposition of specific duties by numerous rich countries 
(Switzerland, European Union, Norway) has a very negative impact on protection faced by 
developing countries: as they export products of lower unit value on average, thus, the rate 
of protection associated with the same duty is higher. Nevertheless, the impact of 
preferential schemes is substantial. This means that, globally, trade policies are 
progressive, in the sense that poorest countries are facing lower average duty on their 
exports than richer countries, and not regressive, as previously thought. Of course, these 
two new qualifications (lower world protection and ‘progressive’ trade policies) are key 
elements to keep in mind in explaining trade pessimism. 
In Europe, preferences have been given to Bangladesh and Sub – Saharan Africa 
(EBA), Middle East and North Africa (the Euro – Mediterranean partnership), the rest of 
OECD (the EU – EFTA agreement – European Free Trade Agreement-); in USA, to 
Canada and Mexico (NAFTA), Sub – Saharan Africa (AGOA). Annex  3 shows that these 
schemes imply systematically lower rates of protection.  
Annex  4 gives the level of protection by importing country/zone and product, while 
Figure 3 provides a graphical snapshot of the world average protection by product. 
Protection is very high in the case of rice (with a record duty of 615% in Developed Asia), 
sugar, and milk, substantial for meat and wheat. In industry, only textile and clothing 
/apparel are significantly taxed.  36



























Source: author’s calculation. 
Even if it is not systematic, there is evidence of tariff escalation as protection on 
sugar cane and sugar beet, raw milk and paddy rice (these products are contained in the 
‘Other agricultural products’) is much lower than average import duty on processed sugar, 
processed milk and processed rice. On average, cotton (plant-based fibers) is also less taxed 
than textile which is less taxed than clothing and apparel. 
While Annex  5 provides detailed information, Figure 4 gives a synthetic 
representation of the initial geographical structure of exports: Europe, USA and Developed 
Asia are the main destinations of world exports. It also highlights the impact of regional 
agreements or preferential schemes; trade is highly concentrated in North America (from 
Canada and Mexico to USA) and in Europe (inside the European Union and from the 
EFTA –Rest of OECD - to the EU). The European Union is by far the first destination for 
exports from Tunisia and to a lesser extent Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Figure 4 illustrates the global heterogeneity in destinations of exports from 
developing countries. While Bangladesh, Tunisia, Mexico, and China concentrate their   37
exports towards market of rich countries, Argentinean exports clearly prioritize middle 
income countries.  
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Source: author’s calculation. 
Figure 5 illustrates the product composition of exports (detailed information is in 
Annex  6.) On one side, some countries are specialized in industry (Zambia of which 70% 
of exports are metal, mineral, petroleum, and chemical products, Bangladesh of which 70% 
of exports are textile and apparel, Mexico, China, Developed Asia); others in agriculture 
(Australia-New Zealand, Brazil, and especially Argentina.) 
Figure 6 shows the net trade balance of the 20 zones in agricultural and food 
products. North Africa and Middle East countries, the EFTA, the European Union, Mexico, 
the Developed Asia, and China are net food importers and could lose from an increase in 
agricultural world prices. Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, and Argentina are conversely 
large net food exporters.  38
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Source: author’s calculation. 
Figure 6—Net exports of agricultural and food products – 2005 - $ bln 
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Source: author’s calculation.  39
It is noteworthy that no simple categorization, of developing countries as net food 
exporters and developed countries as net food importers can be made: Australia-New 
Zealand is the first net food exporter while some developing zones do not have 
comparative advantage in this activity. On the same line, it is not relevant to consider all 
developing countries as preference-receiving and developed countries as preference-giving 
countries: Canada, Mexico, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries have an 
excellent preferential access like LDCs, while middle income countries have only a minor 
one. Some rich countries like Japan do not concede large preference. 
3.5  EXPECTED BENEFITS FROM TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
 Before providing results of the impact at the country level, the impact of full trade 
liberalization at the world level is analyzed. 
3.5.1  Impact of full liberalization at the world level 
As compared to the baseline situation, full trade liberalization increases world 
welfare (real income) by 0.33%, or USD 99.6 bln
23 (see Table 3). When focusing on the 
rate of increase in real income, if the reference is the last group of assessments based on 
recent data on market access and domestic support, this result is close to Hertel and Keeney 
(2005), and Francois, Von Meijl and Tongeren (2005). But it is smaller than the figure 
pointed out by Anderson, Martin and Van der Mensbrugghe (2005). The difference is large 
with Cline’s results (2003) or with the Global Economic Prospects’ assessment (2002 and 
2004).  
Table 3—Impact of full trade liberalization- World indicators.-2015- Rate of change 
         (%) 
World agricultural trade 33.67
World Merchandise Trade 5.25
World Welfare 0.33  
Source: author’s calculation.
                                                
23 This version of MIRAGE does not include exogenous change in factor productivity. As a consequence it is 
better to adopt a reasoning in relative terms.   40
This welfare increase is associated with an augmentation of world trade by 5.25%. 
As trade barriers are numerous in the agricultural sector, world agricultural trade increases 
by 6.5 times more. 
Trade liberalization consists of eliminating import tariffs, and production and 
export subsidies. Thus it increases world demand and decreases world supply, contributing 
to an augmentation of world prices. This point is confirmed by Figure 7, which indicates 
the evolution of world prices after trade liberalization (see first column of Annex  7), for 
three sectors (primary, industry, services). But price augmentations are uneven: while they 
are only minor in industry and services, they are large in agriculture, especially for wheat, 
plant – based fibers, and other agricultural products. These increases in agricultural world 
prices are quite similar to those obtained by other studies (see for example Diao, Somwaru 
and Roe, 2001). 
Figure 7—Impact of full trade liberalization: World prices for 2015 -                           
         rate of change (%) 
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Source: author’s calculation.  41
Annex  7 indicates the evolution of world prices by exporting countries. In a model 
like MIRAGE, there is not a single world price for a specific commodity: according to 
Armington hypothesis, every country produces a specific product; the world price indicated 
in Figure 7 is an average of export prices. It is particularly contrasting for meat, plant-based 
fibers, (processed) rice, (processed) sugar, and wheat.  
3.5.2  Impact of full liberalization at the country level 
What is the country impact of this trade reform? It is progressive: the increase in 
welfare is proportionally higher for developing countries, and especially for LDCs (see 
Table 4), although their share of the overall world welfare increase might be smaller. The 
rate of change in welfare is 2 times greater for LDCs than for middle income countries and 
more than 2 times greater than for rich countries. In this sense, full liberalization is 
development – friendly. 
This does not mean, however, that each developing country profits evenly from this 
higher rate of change in welfare. Table 5 shows that welfare gains are unequally distributed 
among developing countries. In this table, countries are ranked by income levels: first, the 
rich countries, then the middle income countries, finally the LDCs. This information is 
completed by macroeconomic indicators on production and exports in Table 6. 
There are several sources of welfare variations. First, distortions are reduced and 
productive factors are re-allocated in sectors where they are more efficient. Table 5 
indicates these allocation efficiency gains which are systematically positive, as numerous 
distortions are eliminated
24.  
                                                
24 As some distortions like (final, intermediate) consumption taxes remain after the shock, and as the 
economic variable on which these taxes are levied can be modified by trade reform, allocation efficiency 
losses could occur.   42
Table 4—Distribution of welfare gains among beneficiary zones and the rate of  
       change in welfare 
  Share of total welfare gain  Increase in welfare 
Rich countries  73.8%  +0.3% 
Middle income countries  24.1%  +0.4% 
LDCs 2.2%  +0.8% 
Source: author’s calculation. 
 
Table 5— Impact of full trade liberalization: Macroeconomic indicators for 2015- rate 
        of change (%) 
Welfare
Allocation efficiency gains
Terms of trade gains
Australia/New Zealand 0.9 0.1 1.4
Canada -0.1 0.6 0.2
Developed Asia 1.4 2.3 0.1
European Union - 25 -0.1 0.2 -0.1
Rest of OECD 1.0 1.0 0.1
USA 0.1 0.0 0.1
Argentina -0.1 0.3 0.3
Brazil 0.2 0.1 0.4
China 0.6 0.8 0.1
Developing Asia 0.4 0.7 -0.1
India 0.7 1.5 -0.9
Mexico -0.3 1.3 -0.5
Rest of America 0.0 0.8 -0.2
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 0.9 1.2 -0.5
Rest of the World 0.1 0.9 0.0
Southern Africa Custom Union -0.2 0.3 0.6
Tunisia 0.4 0.4 -0.4
Bangladesh 1.5 1.8 -1.1
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 0.6 1.3 -0.6
Zambia 0.3 1.6 -2.4  
Source: author’s calculation.   43
Table 6—Full trade liberalization: Macroeconomic indicators on production and  
        exports (rate of change in %) 
Agro-food production (vol)
Non agro-food production (vol.)
Exports (volume)
Australia/New Zealand 18.3 -1.5 10.1
Canada -2.8 -0.1 -3.7
Developed Asia -6.4 -0.2 6.8
European Union - 25 -2.5 -0.2 -4.4
Rest of OECD -10.8 0.2 0.8
USA 0.5 -0.2 -0.5
Argentina 7.5 -2.5 12.5
Brazil 12.2 -1.3 21.7
China -0.2 0.8 9.0
Developing Asia 7.1 0.3 8.8
India -4.0 2.8 52.2
Mexico -4.9 -1.8 4.4
Rest of America 4.4 -1.2 20.0
Rest of Middle East and North Africa -6.1 1.6 11.9
Rest of the World -3.4 -1.4 14.3
Southern Africa Custom Union 7.6 -1.4 6.4
Tunisia 0.8 1.1 -4.2
Bangladesh 0.7 2.7 55.5
Rest of SubSaharan Africa -4.0 -0.4 19.2
Zambia -4.4 3.2 21.2  
Source: author’s calculation. 
 
Second, terms of trade are modified. A better access to foreign markets increases 
export prices while, on the contrary, erosion of preferences implies more competition on 
export markets and lower export prices. Furthermore, as distortions are numerous in 
agricultural sectors, full trade liberalization entails an increase in the relative world price of 
these commodities. Agricultural exporters are generally benefiting from an improvement in 
their terms of trade while net food importing countries are penalized.    44
Nevertheless, consideration of only the initial agro-food balance (see Figure 6) can 
be misleading: trade of wheat, sugar, rice, and meat is severely distorted, while other 
agricultural products are much less distorted. Specialization of each country is not evenly 
distributed in all agricultural sectors. For example, agricultural exports of India, the ‘Rest 
of America’ zone and the ‘Developing Asia’ zone are highly concentrated in the ‘Other 
food products’ (respectively at a level of 46%, 45% and 61%). This is the only agro – food 
commodity the world price of which decreases after trade reform (see Figure 7). 
Conversely, these three zones are also net exporters of industrial products the world price 
of which remains almost constant (metal, mineral, petroleum and chemical products). As a 
result, these three zones lose from a deterioration of their terms of trade even if they were 
initially net food exporting countries (Table 5).  
But like other models of its generation, MIRAGE captures other effects of welfare 
changes (otherwise the first column in Table 5 would be equal to the sum of the two other 
columns). It accounts for imperfect competition activities so that expansion of these sectors 
implies new welfare effects. As production increases, average costs and prices are cut, 
bringing efficiency. Moreover, as horizontal differentiation is modeled, selling on a larger 
scale allows for an increased number of varieties to be produced: it implies accrued utility 
for variety-lover consumers.  
But conversely, as already noted by Francois, Von Meijl and Tongeren (2005), this 
feature has negative consequences on countries where specialization in perfect competition 
activities (agriculture) increases due to liberalization. As compared to the baseline, it might 
entail a smaller economic activity in industry, less economies of scale and fewer varieties.  
Finally, in MIRAGE like in the World Bank’s LINKAGE model, land supply is 
endogenous and is determined by its real remuneration. This effect is particularly strong in 
countries with large endowments of land.  
In rich countries, the impact of full liberalization is positive, except in the case of 
Europe and Canada where it is negative, even if this welfare loss is marginal. The welfare   45
gain is quite marginal for USA, but it is significant for others as distortions are very high in 
the case of Developed Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), and the rest of OECD 
(Switzerland, Norway, Iceland). For Australia/New Zealand full liberalization implies a 
significant increase in real exports and activity, and a substantial improvement in terms of 
trade as it raises prices of exported goods and provides a better access to large markets like 
USA and Europe. Agro-food production increases by nearly 20% in this zone while it 
decreases in other rich countries (except USA for which the augmentation is insignificant – 
see Table 6).  
Agricultural specialization has a mixed effect in the case of Australia/New Zealand, 
Argentina and Brazil as it entails augmented real remuneration and supply of land, but less 
activity in industry and fewer welfare effects associated to this sector.  
Agro – food production decreased significantly for Canada, although initially, it 
was a net food exporter. For Canada, multilateral liberalization implies a much more severe 
competition on its first exports’ destination: USA (initially 75% of its exports). Its export of 
meat to USA decreases by 10%, vegetables and fruits by 4%, rice by 18%, clothing and 
apparel by 28%, metal, mineral and chemical products, vehicles, and equipment by 9%. 
Globally, this full trade liberalization entails a cut in its total exports of merchandise by 
nearly 4%, resulting from the loss of preferential access to its rich neighbor and a reduced 
activity in both industry and agriculture. This evolution has two negative consequences for 
Canada: first, industrial activity is reduced as compared to the baseline situation; it 
decreases welfare gains coming from economies of scale and varieties. Second, as 
agricultural production is negatively affected, real remuneration of land decreases, such 
that land supply is reduced.  
In developing countries, efficiency gains are large where distortions are initially 
high: India, Bangladesh, and Sub – Saharan Africa. As Brazil, Argentina, and SACU are 
large net food exporters, the rise in agricultural world prices implies an improvement in 
their terms of trade. The zone Rest of Sub –Saharan Africa is initially a net food exporter 
(see Figure 6). Nevertheless, its terms of trade are worsened as it faces more competition   46
on large markets like the European Union where its preferential access is eroded: its export 
prices decrease. Furthermore, in the cases of Bangladesh and ‘Rest of MENA’, preferences 
are eroded and prices of imported goods are raised: these two negative effects are 
cumulative.  
The adverse effect of agricultural specialization on welfare gains which comes from 
economies of scale and product differentiation, explains global welfare losses of Argentina, 
Canada and SACU
25. Allocating more productive factors in sectors under perfect 
competition reduces the gain from multilateral liberalization in the case of Australia/New 
Zealand, Brazil, and “Rest of America”. Conversely, full trade liberalization expands the 
industrial sector and increases associated welfare gains in Bangladesh, Tunisia, and 
Zambia.  
The case of Bangladesh is fascinating as full trade liberalization entails a 55% 
increase in total merchandise exports (in volume). Bangladesh is a very specialized country 
with two sectors (textile and clothing/apparel) representing 70% of its exports (see Annex  
6). Furthermore, it has a duty-free access to Europe, but its exports towards USA, Canada, 
Australia/New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are still highly taxed. This structure 
of protection and specialization explain such an increase in export performance, but at the 
same time, trade reform has two negative consequences for this country: first, it faces an 
increased competition on its exports towards Europe (44% of total exports), which in turn, 
decreases the prices of these exports; second, it is a net food importing country and its 
import prices are raised.  
Table 7 indicates the impact of full trade liberalization on factor remunerations in 
real terms. As demonstrated by the international trade theory, trade openness affects more 
the real remuneration of less mobile factors. Moreover, as distortions are initially 
concentrated in the agricultural sector, full trade liberalization has a prominent impact on 
world prices and activities in this sector. This explains why on one side the remuneration of 
                                                
25 This point will be confirmed later on, through a sensitivity analysis. If the same model is conducted under 
perfect competition in all sectors, Argentina, for example, gets a large increase in welfare.    47
land and natural resources is significantly modified by full trade liberalization, while on the 
other side, capital and skilled labor are much less affected. The real remuneration of land is 
much reduced by liberalization in the EFTA, the European Union and Developed Asia
26. It 
results from this table that gains from liberalization have to be shared between several 
productive factors while losses are concentrated on one or two factors. This may imply 
strong resistance and weak support for liberalization 
Table 7—Impact of full trade liberalization: Remuneration of production factors for 
           2015 – rate of change (%) – real terms 
Agr Unskilled real wages
Ind Unskilled real wages
Real return to capital
Real return to land
Real return to natural resources
Skilled real wages
Australia/New Zealand 10.3 2.1 -0.7 3.9 -4.4 1.2
Canada -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -24.2 4.0 -0.2
Developed Asia -2.7 1.9 1.4 -30.9 -6.0 2.3
European Union - 25 0.1 0.3 -0.8 -41.6 -3.8 -0.1
Rest of OECD -4.9 0.9 1.0 -50.1 5.5 1.2
USA 0.8 0.1 -0.3 -17.0 2.3 0.0
Argentina 5.8 1.5 -1.4 3.0 -6.1 -1.4
Brazil 7.1 1.6 -0.8 4.8 -6.9 0.3
China -0.7 2.3 -1.7 -7.3 -18.7 4.3
Developing Asia 0.8 1.2 -0.4 -5.3 -16.2 0.9
India -1.6 1.8 0.1 -4.7 -25.5 4.2
Mexico -4.4 0.3 0.4 -23.1 -23.1 -2.0
Rest of America 4.2 1.4 -1.1 7.3 -14.2 0.0
Rest of Middle East and North Africa -2.3 1.0 1.2 -7.4 -11.2 1.3
Rest of the World -1.1 2.1 -2.3 -5.7 12.4 0.0
Southern Africa Custom Union 4.8 0.8 -1.7 12.7 8.8 -0.3
Tunisia 1.0 1.1 0.6 -1.0 -7.5 0.3
Bangladesh 1.5 1.3 1.0 1.9 -6.5 0.6
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 0.3 1.6 -0.8 -0.4 -4.5 1.5
Zambia -4.1 -1.0 1.8 -9.0 -22.7 0.6  
Source: author’s calculation. 
What is the potential impact of trade liberalization on poverty? It cannot be 
measured under this version of the MIRAGE model
27. Nevertheless, Table 7 can give some 
insights into this potential effect. In developing countries, poor people are mostly endowed 
                                                
26 These three zones were the main contenders of agricultural liberalization during the negotiation of the Doha 
Agenda.  
27 It cannot be measured as far as we do not utilize poverty elasticities. We will explain why later.   48
with unskilled labor. Thus, Table 7 points out that full trade liberalization could have a very 
positive impact on poverty in South America, SACU, Bangladesh, Developing Asia, 
Tunisia and Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. It has clearly a contrasting effect on urban/rural 
poverty in China, India, Mexico, Rest of Middle East and North Africa, where it increases 
remuneration of urban households and decreases that of rural households. Finally, it has an 
unambiguously negative effect in the case of Zambia. 
3.5.3  Trade liberalization and world income distribution 
The potential impact of full trade liberalization on world inequality can also be 
measured. Recent studies (Bourguignon, Levin and Rosenblatt, 2004; Milanovic, 2005) 
focus on comparison of GDP per capita concluding on decreasing world inequality during 
the nineties due to rapid growth in China and India
28. A similar assessment might be done 
here, but in a prospective way. Although some countries are aggregated in a single set, this 
calculation gives some insights on the size and the direction of the redistribution associated 
with trade reform. 
Does full trade liberalization reduce world inequality? The answer is yes (although 
it may not be clear-cut), but the resulting redistribution is of limited extent. This is shown 
in Table 8
29. Using results on real income from the above modeling exercise, it is possible 
to calculate real income per capita, with and without full trade liberalization: in Table 8, 
countries are ranked in increasing order according to their real income per capita. Lorenz 
curves can be constructed using cumulated population (in %) and cumulated real income 
(in %). Full trade liberalization implies only a slight move of Lorenz curve so that only one 
curve for the two income distributions appears in Figure 8. 
 
                                                
28 Let us notice the exceptional work by Milanovic (2005) who takes into account domestic distribution of 
income with the use of households’ survey; his conclusions are less clear-cut. 
29 Data on expected population in 2015 come from the World Development Indicators 2004.   49
Table 8—World redistribution associated with full trade liberalization 
Population (Mios)
Share in world population %
Population % Cumulated
Real income ($ bln)
Real income head (1,000$)
Real Income %
Real Income Cumulated
Real income ($ bln)




Without Full trade Liberalization With Full trade Liberalization
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 815.8 11.5% 11.5% 220.05 0.26973523 0.72% 0.72% 221.413 0.27140598 0.72% 0.72%
Zambia 11.9 0.2% 11.7% 3.731 0.31352941 0.01% 0.73% 3.743 0.31453782 0.01% 0.74%
Bangladesh 166 2.3% 14.0% 53.432 0.32187952 0.18% 0.91% 54.242 0.32675904 0.18% 0.91%
India 1231.6 17.4% 31.4% 563.647 0.45765427 1.85% 2.76% 567.328 0.46064307 1.86% 2.77%
Rest of the World 840.65 11.9% 43.2% 494.929 0.58874561 1.62% 4.38% 495.592 0.58953429 1.62% 4.39%
China 1389.5 19.6% 62.8% 1145.103 0.82411155 3.76% 8.14% 1152.263 0.82926448 3.77% 8.16%
Developing Asia 728.9 10.3% 73.1% 787.877 1.08091233 2.59% 10.73% 791.194 1.08546303 2.59% 10.75%
Tunisia 11.5 0.2% 73.3% 19.391 1.68617391 0.06% 10.79% 19.46 1.69217391 0.06% 10.81%
Southern Africa Custom Union 54.4 0.8% 74.0% 111.224 2.04455882 0.36% 11.15% 110.997 2.04038603 0.36% 11.17%
Brazil 201 2.8% 76.9% 559.103 2.78160697 1.83% 12.99% 560.388 2.788 1.83% 13.01%
Rest of America 254.9 3.6% 80.5% 721.627 2.83102001 2.37% 15.36% 721.97 2.83236563 2.36% 15.37%
Mexico 120.6 1.7% 82.2% 653 5.4145937 2.14% 17.500% 650.889 5.39708955 2.13% 17.497%
Argentina 42.9 0.6% 82.8% 290.751 6.77741259 0.95% 18.454% 290.374 6.76862471 0.95% 18.446%
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 162.2 2.3% 85.1% 1116.153 6.88133785 3.66% 22.12% 1126.301 6.94390259 3.68% 22.13%
Australia/New Zealand 26.1 0.4% 85.4% 383.195 14.6818008 1.26% 23.37% 386.78 14.8191571 1.27% 23.40%
European Union - 25 463.2 6.5% 92.0% 7724.054 16.6754188 25.35% 48.72% 7713.922 16.6535449 25.23% 48.62%
Canada 33.5 0.5% 92.4% 644.39 19.2355224 2.11% 50.83% 643.991 19.2236119 2.11% 50.73%
Developed Asia 203.6 2.9% 95.3% 4278.685 21.0151523 14.04% 64.87% 4340.462 21.3185756 14.20% 64.93%
Rest of OECD 12.55 0.2% 95.5% 367.598 29.2906773 1.21% 66.08% 371.353 29.5898805 1.21% 66.14%
USA 319.9 4.5% 100.0% 10337.052 32.3133854 33.92% 100.00% 10351.896 32.3597874 33.86% 100.00%  
Source: author’s calculation. 
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Source: author’s calculation.   50
Full trade liberalization entails an upward move of the Lorenz curve except on four 
points: Mexico, Argentina, Canada, and the European Union. The Gini coefficient is 
reduced from 0.73993 down to 0.73981. Globally, free trade means less inequality in the 
world (with the above limitations) but the impact is minor: this trade reform does not 
change the fact that 63% of world population gets only 8% of world income. 
This trade reform implies a redistribution of the world agricultural production. The 
USA, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand, Developing Asia, Argentina, and SACU increase 
their net trade balance in these commodities (see Figure 9) while the trade deficit in 
agricultural and food products of Developed Asia, the European Union, North Africa and 
Middle East, India and the EFTA worsens.  
 
Figure 9—Impact of full trade liberalization on net agricultural exports 
Variation in net exports of agricultural and food products ($ bln)






















Source: author’s calculation.   51
3.5.4  Decomposing trade reform 
Decomposing trade reform by sources allows for a better understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms. The decomposition technique which is usually adopted (see 
Harrison, Horridge and Pearson, 2000) is not used here, however, as trade shocks are not 
considered to be additive. Therefore, only one part of the shock is simulated:  
•  full trade liberalization in the North, then in the South;  
•  Agricultural liberalization, then industrial liberalization;  
•  Elimination of import tariffs, then domestic support, then export subsidies. 
Doing so, conclusions that emerge from the literature are confirmed. First, 
developing countries’ own trade reform matters a lot; second, agriculture provides the 
greatest welfare gains; third, tariffs, by far, are the main source of distortions. 
In the next subsections full trade reform is decomposed successively by liberalizing 
region (North/South), then by liberalized activities (agriculture/industry), finally by 
instruments (tariffs/domestic support/export subsidies.) Detailed results are provided in 
Annex  8, Annex  9, and Annex  10. 
Decomposition by liberalizing region 
Figure 10 represents welfare gains by country coming from full trade liberalization 
in the North and it decomposes such gains between efficiency gains and terms of trade 
gains
30. Figure 11 provides the same data in the case of full trade liberalization in the 
South. Liberalization in the North implies the greatest welfare gain (+0.11%), but trade 
reform in developing countries also matters (+0.06%). Although the average protection is 
higher in the South, it is more dispersed across sectors in rich countries and thus more 
distorting. Furthermore, liberalizing access in developed countries creates more trade as 
they are richer.  
                                                
30 In this section all figures have been drawn using the same scale in order to allow visual comparisons.   52
The origins of these welfare gains are quite different. Efficiency gains are high for 
the countries which carry out the reform. In the case of Northern liberalization (see Figure 
10) efficiency gains are large for developed countries, small for developing countries, 
while the opposite is true when liberalization takes place in the South
31.  
 


























































































































































Welfare Allocation efficiency gains Terms of trade gains
 
Source: author’s calculation.
                                                
31 Exceptions are coming from variations in fiscal base while tax/subsidy rate is unchanged. For example if 
import duties are unchanged but imports increased, efficiency loss are augmented. In Figure 10 China is 
affected by a substantial efficiency loss while liberalization only takes place in the North. It comes from high 
taxes, especially on production, implemented in China. As Northern trades liberalization entails variation in 
Chinese production, it causes efficiency losses even if Chinese policies is not modified.    53

















































































































































































































































































Welfare Allocation efficiency gains Terms of trade gains
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
Terms of trade gains are generally positive for developing countries when 
developed countries carry out trade liberalization. It stems from the positive impact that the 
Northern trade reform has on improved market access and on world prices of agricultural 
goods and textile/clothing goods in which developing countries have a comparative 
advantage.  
Exceptions to this scheme are Tunisia and Mexico whose preferential access to the 
European Union and USA, respectively, is eroded by multilateral liberalization: more 
competition in the destination of their exports means reduced export prices. The benefits 
from Northern liberalization for Argentinean exports are mitigated by an initial geographic 
concentration on middle income countries (see Figure 4).  
The cases of Zambia and ‘Rest of MENA’ are of great interest as Northern 
liberalization for these two zones is negative in terms of real income. Concerning their 
exports they do not profit from improvement of terms of trade or market access. This is the   54
case as they either export mainly untaxed products (oil, petroleum, copper) or their 
preferential access is eroded. Furthermore, they lose from raising world agricultural prices. 
On the contrary, reforming their own trade policies brings these two countries significant 
allocative efficiency gains (see Figure 11) and reinforces South-South trade.   
On average, terms of trade of developing countries are worsened when carrying out 
their own trade reform even if this deterioration is marginal in most cases. For specific 
countries the extent to which their terms of trade are worsening might be large (see India, 
Bangladesh, and Zambia). 
In a nutshell, in general trade reforms in both North and South matter for 
developing countries, but while on average Northern trade reform implies improvement of 
foreign markets access and increased export prices, Southern trade reform is beneficial as it 
entails a reallocation of productive factors to competitive sectors. Nevertheless, Northern 
trade liberalization can generate welfare losses for developing countries due to 
deterioration of terms of trade.  
Decomposition by liberalized activity 
Consider two case scenarios: one where only agriculture is fully liberalized (see 
Figure 12) and the other where only trade in industry is freed (see Figure 13). Agriculture is 
by far the main source of welfare gains: +0.18% while industrial liberalization entails a 
minor increase in world welfare. This reflects the concentration of distortions in 
agriculture. While on average world protection is 19.1%, in this activity it is only 4.2% in 
industry (but 10.5% in textile and apparel – see Bouët, Decreux, Fontagne, Jean and 
Laborde; 2005a). Furthermore, domestic support and export subsidies are concentrated in 
the agricultural sector while they are very rare in industry. 
In the same line, from Figure 12 and Figure 13, it clearly appears that the level of 
efficiency gains reflects the initial pattern of protection. In the case of full agricultural 
liberalization, they are high in Developed Asia, Rest of OECD, India, Rest of Middle East 
and North Africa, and Rest of Sub – Saharan Africa. On the industrial side, efficiency gains   55
are large in India, Mexico, Bangladesh, Zambia, Rest of Middle East and North Africa, 
Rest of Sub – Saharan Africa, that is to say where protection is initially high.   





















































































































































































































































































Welfare Allocation efficiency gains Terms of trade gains
 
Source: author’s calculation. 

















































































































































































































































































Welfare Allocation efficiency gains Terms of trade gains
Source: author’s calculation.  56
As far as terms of trade gains are concerned, as already mentioned and explained, 
agricultural liberalization entails a substantial rise in world prices of agricultural 
commodities. It is beneficial for countries which were initially net exporters of agricultural 
and food products. Others lose from augmented world agricultural prices, while Mexico 
and Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa cope with more competition on their main export 
destination on which they lose preferential access.  
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Rest of Sub – Saharan Africa have contrasting 
interests in full trade liberalization as they are winners from agricultural liberalization, but 
are loosing from industrial liberalization. In the case of Argentina, liberalization of only 
industrial sector increases the relative price of industrial goods. This implies deterioration 
of terms of trade. Furthermore, industrial sectors attract productive factors and the 
remuneration of land is reduced. The land supply decreases affecting negatively the agro-
food sector and domestic activity, as a prominent sector in the economy. This means that 
agricultural reform is a key issue for Argentina.  
Except China and Zambia which are negatively affected — though marginally—
welfare of developing countries increases with agricultural full trade liberalization, whereas 
liberalized trade in industry has much more contrasting effects. 
Decomposition by instrument of intervention 
It is important to note the impact of each distorting instrument. Figure 14, Figure 
15, and Figure 16 indicate the impact of fully eliminating border protection, export 
subsidies, and domestic support respectively.    57

















































































































































































































































































Welfare Allocation efficiency gains Terms of trade gains
 
Source: author’s calculation. 





















































































































































































































































































Welfare Allocation efficiency gains Terms of trade gains
 
Source: author’s calculation.  58
















































































































































































































































































Welfare Allocation Efficiency gains Terms of trade
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
Tariff is by far the main source of distortions. Complete elimination of this 
instrument increases world welfare by 0.23%. Elimination of domestic support and export 
subsidies has a small negative effect on world welfare
32.  
Exports subsidies are initially substantial for milk in the European Union, USA and 
Rest of OECD, for rice, sugar, and meat in the European Union, and for Vegetable and 
Fruit in Rest of OECD. In industry, export subsidies are only significant in the rest of Latin 
America zone, whereas for textile and for apparel industries they are significant in the 
Southern African Custom Union..  
Eliminating tariffs creates positive efficiency gains in countries where protection is 
initially high (India, Bangladesh, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa) or exhibits peaks (Developed 
Asia, rest of OECD). Tariff is a discriminatory instrument: its elimination has positive 
                                                
32 This conclusion is quite conform to the issue raised by Panagarya (2005).   59
terms of trade effects on Australia/New Zealand, SACU, Argentina, and Brazil, while it 
entails loss of preferential access for Zambia, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, and Mexico. 
In rich countries, domestic support is great in plant-based fibers, wheat and ‘Other 
agricultural products’ activities. The elimination of this program causes a large increase in 
world prices of these commodities. It is quite beneficial to their main exporters (Rest of 
Sub-Saharan Africa) 
As a matter of conclusion, full trade liberalization is welfare–improving and 
development–friendly as welfare augmentations are greater for developing countries and 
especially for Least Developed Countries. Nevertheless, some topics require further 
consideration:  
•  Full liberalization can have adverse effects on individual countries because of terms 
of trade losses; either they are net food importing countries and increased 
agricultural prices cut their real income, or they have a preferential access which is 
eroded by multilateral liberalization. Furthermore trade liberalization does not 
significantly improve access to foreign markets in the case of countries which 
mainly export oil, petroleum, and mineral products.  
•  Results from the simulation imply a supplementary question: is specialization in 
agricultural activities a good strategy for development? The simulation points out 
that stimulating agricultural specialization entails a smaller expansion of industrial 
activity, that is to say less economies of scale and fewer varieties. This conclusion 
has already been emphasized in the literature (Francois, Von Meijl and Tongeren, 
2005) and has not been discussed at the political level. After all, economic history 
does not provide many experiences of countries extremely specialized in agriculture 
and having supported a high and lasting economic growth.  
This study might have led to a slight underestimation of expected benefits. At least 
three reasons justify this statement. First, they are founded on a database on market access 
that fully includes regional agreements and preferential schemes. Implicitly, it means that   60
full utilization of this preferential access is supposed. Even if this methodology is better 
than no inclusion of preferences, it has been demonstrated that these preferences are not 
fully utilized. This implies that expected benefits for countries receiving – preferences, 
which are mostly developing countries, are underestimated. Second, simulation is based on 
low trade elasticities. This choice can be justified. Recent econometric work by Hertel, 
Ivanic, Preckel, and Cranfield, 2000, gives a scientific basis for using these behavioral 
parameters. But this element must be kept in mind. 
Third, our estimation is founded on a 17 sectors * in 20 geographic zones. This is a 
quite representative choice as compared to the literature and is also justified by the 
theoretical features. The model accounts for imperfect competition, horizontal and vertical 
differentiation, imperfect mobility of unskilled labor between agricultural and non – 
agricultural activities, and it is dynamic. Thus, increasing the number of products and 
regions would have also augmented the number of equations and the calculation time. But 
this disaggregation inevitably underestimates the distortions created by protection as tariffs 
are unevenly distributed across products and regions. 
Obviously, it is necessary to have an idea of the extent to which expected benefits 
from trade liberalization can be underestimated. Simultaneously, a review of the literature 
has to be undertaken to verify if the results provided here are not ‘outliers’.   61
4. MODELING  TRADE  LIBERALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT UNDER 
CGEM: A SURVEY 
CGEM assessments of trade liberalization have multiplied. There are several 
explanations for that such as, increased access to economic data, increased efficiency in 
calculation time, development of the GTAP network, and so forth. What is most surprising, 
however, CGEM’s quantitative conclusions diverge.   
4.1  DIVERGENCES AMONG ASSESSMENTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
 UNDER  CGEM 
Without being exhaustive, our survey has recorded nineteen CGEM assessments of 
the impact of full trade liberalization on the world during the last 6 years
33, and nine 
assessments of the impact of a potential Doha agreement. Annex  11 provides a synoptic 
table on the assessments of full trade liberalization on world welfare and poverty
34. Annex  
13 gives the same information for the Doha Development Agenda.  
4.1.1  Trade pessimism?  
These two tables reveal a major divergence in CGEM assessments. As far as full 
trade liberalization is concerned, the increase in world welfare ranges from 0.2 to 3.1% 
(that is to say a range from 1 to more than 15!). The impact on poverty headcount is also 
divergent as the number of people lifted out from poverty ranges from 72 mln to 440 mln (a 
                                                
33 The assessment carried out in the previous section is included. 
34 In the case of the GEP 2004 (see Annex  12), it is a pro-poor scenario which would imply elimination of 
export subsidies, decoupling all domestic support and a significant cut in tariffs: rich countries would be 
subject to a maximum tariff of 10% in agriculture (5% in industry), with an average target of 5% (1%). For 
developing countries, the caps would be 15 and 10% with average of 10 and 5%.   62
ratio of 1 to 6.1!) with an average of 219 mln
35. This is a rather contrasting picture of the 
effects of trade liberalization (
36).  
Figure 17 ranks the estimations of world benefits from full trade liberalization in 
chronological order
37: on average the expected world welfare gain experiences continuous 
decrease
38. For example, from an average world welfare increase of 1.7% in 1999, the 
average estimate is 1.5% in 2002, 1.3% in 2004, and 0.5% in 2005. Is the trade pessimism 
amongst trade economists getting ever stronger? If yes, is this conclusion justified? 
Figure 17—Trade pessimism? - Impact of full trade liberalization on world welfare  
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Source: author’s calculation. 
                                                
35 In 2003, the number of people in poverty (2$ per day definition) is estimated at 2.8 bln (World 
Development Indicators, 2004). It means that full trade liberalization could decrease world poverty by a 
percentage of 2.9% to 19.1%, with an average of 9.4%.  
36 In this survey we do not include assessments of expected benefits from trade liberalization in services or 
from trade facilitation. These studies are rare and while shedding light on a fundamental topic the 
methodology needs further refinements. On the contrary we included trade liberalization only in agriculture, 
as studied by the USDA – ERS (2001), but we did not give the results from Diao, Diaz- Bonilla, Robinson 
and Orden (2005) as they only account for consequences on developing countries. 
37 We excluded from this graphic the USDA-ERS which only focused on agricultural liberalization. 
38 More precisely the trend, calculated according to a linear regression, exhibits a decreasing slope.   63
Obviously, these results are not totally comparable. Real incomes can be defined 
either in the dollar value of 1997 or in the dollar value of 2001. Furthermore, models can be 
static or dynamic. In case of a dynamic model, the increase in supplies of productive 
factors are (endogenously or exogenously) taken into account, and in some simulations 
even technical progress and related changes in factor productivity are included. Thus, the 
same rate of increase in real income, entailed by trade reform and applied to different 
bases, gives birth to different levels of assessments: comparing studies by rate of change in 
real income is more appropriate. It is even more reliable to compare results coming from 
the same model: Hertel and Keeney (2005) to Hertel (2000) or Anderson, Martin and Van 
der Mensbrugghe (2005a) to the World Bank’s GEP in 2002 and 2004. It brings a more 
accurate picture, but the main conclusion is the same: results are divergent and the general 
trend is less trade optimism. 
Figure 18 shows the impact of trade reform on poverty headcount. In 2004 Cline 
carried out two estimations, the second one being especially optimistic. Putting aside this 
second estimation, trade pessimism is rather confirmed. 
Finally, Table 9 indicates if the assessments conclude on welfare losses for some 
regions or countries. Until 2000 most studies have concluded on the absence of losers from 
trade liberalization at the national level, highlighting a kind of “Mondialisation 
heureuse”
39. From Dee and Hanslow (2000) more and more studies are concluding on 
welfare losses for countries. It is noteworthy that these are nearly all developing countries 
(with the exception of Canada based on an assessment conducted in 2000). 
The potential implications of Doha Development Agenda have been also 
scrutinized. This is laid out in Annex  13. A comparison of Annex  11 and Annex  13 leads 
to the conclusion that the potential impact of the Doha Agenda is much smaller than the 
                                                
39 French expression for “fortunate globalization”; this qualification is famous in France since an article from 
Alain Minc in the daily newspaper Le Monde in August 2001. It was a tentative description of globalization 
as a wonderful process giving benefits to everybody in all countries throughout the world.    64
one resulting from full trade liberalization. This is one of the main conclusions of all these 
studies.  
 
Figure 18—Trade pessimism? Impact of full trade liberalization on poverty    
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Source: author’s calculation. 
 
                                                
40 TWB: The World Bank; FL: Full liberalization; PPS: pro-poor scenario; AMVdM: Anderson, Martin and 
Van der Mensbrugghe.   65
Table 9—Trade pessimism? Potential losers from full trade liberalization 
Dessus et alii (1999)
Dee and Hanslow (March 2000)
Hertel (July:August 2000)
USDA - ERS (2001) 1
USDA - ERS (2001) 2
The World Bank (GEP 2002) 1
The World Bank (GEP 2002) 2
The World Bank (GEP 2004) 1
The World Bank (GEP 2004) 2
Cline, 2004 1
Cline, 2004 2
Beghin and Van der Mensbrugghe, 2004
Anderson, Van der Mensbrugghe and Martin, 200
Francois, Von Meijl and Tongeren, 2005
Hertel and Keeney, 2005
Bouet, Mevel and Orden (2005)
Bouet, 2006
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Assessing the impact of a Doha Agenda under CGEM gives also birth to 
divergences (see Figure 19) The range of welfare variations for an Agricultural Doha 
Round is from 0.08% (Bouet, Bureau, Decreux and Jean, 2005) to 0.18% (Anderson, 
Martin and Van der Mensbrugghe, 2005, 1) and from 0.17% (Bouet, Mevel and Orden, 
2005) to 0.51% for a complete Round (Fontagne, Guerin and Jean, 2005).  
Figure 19—Trade uncertainty: Assessments of the Doha Agenda in 2005 ($ bln) 
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Source: author’s calculation 
4.1.2 Convergent  conclusions 
Before explaining the source of divergences, and the fading optimism, it is 
worthwhile to put an emphasis on convergent conclusions of all these studies (see Table 
10): 
(i)  Full liberalization is beneficial. At the world level it increases welfare. 
This does not mean that all countries or all economic agents are better off.   67
Liberalizing trade gives birth to a “larger cake” but some can get smaller 
parts than others; if efficient redistribution mechanisms are put in place all 
agents could get increased welfare.  
(ii)  Liberalizing agriculture is the main source of expected gains, accounting 
for about two thirds of global gains. It stems from the fact that this sector 
contains a major part of current trade barriers. Furthermore, nearly all 
export subsidies and domestic support goes to agriculture
41.  
(iii)  Tariffs are by far the main source of distortions. They account for more 
than 90% of expected benefits in case of full liberalization. This major 
political issue is confirmed by the assessment of the Doha Agenda. It 
prioritizes the elimination of export subsidies and a cut in domestic 
support, while pursuing modest objectives in terms of market access. This 
is obviously the reason why Annex  13 indicates only small welfare 
increases.  
(iv)  Developing countries could be large beneficiaries of these reforms. As 
their GDP is lower, it would even imply a higher rate of increase in their 
real income. In this sense, trade reform is a progressive reform as far as it 
increases real income of poor countries.  
(v)  Liberalizing trade policies of developing countries is a major stake. It 
contributes for about half of expected benefits. This is of course one 
supplementary criticism addressed to the Doha Agenda as a Special and 
Differentiated Treatment could allow developing countries to liberalize 
less and Least Developed countries to keep their trade policies unchanged.  
These convergent conclusions are extremely important. Even if the picture drawn 
by these models is not as favorable as the one that emerged a few years ago, it remains 
                                                
41 Large gains in world welfare are expected from liberalization in services but these estimates are subject 
to a great caution.   68
that the global net expected effect is positive: trade liberalization has to be done even if 
parallel policies have to be implemented simultaneously. The other points detail the 
contents of positive world trade reform: it has to focus on agriculture and market access, 
and developing countries have to reform their own economies too.  
Nevertheless, divergences between these assessments and stronger trade 
pessimism require further examination. From the short representation of a CGEM in 
Figure 1, it is easy to identify the potential sources of these divergences. Studies can 
differ by: 
i.  economic data  
ii.  behavioral parameters  
iii.  theoretical features of the model 
iv.  experiment which is conducted  
The following subsection examines each of these explanations. 
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Table 10—CGEM assessments of full trade liberalization: Convergent conclusions   
Dessus et alii (1999)
Dessus et alii (1999)
Anderson, Francois, Hertel, Hoekman and Martin (2000
USDA - ERS (2001) 1
USDA - ERS (2001) 2
The World Bank (GEP 2002) 1
The World Bank (GEP 2002) 2
The World Bank (GEP 2004) 1
The World Bank (GEP 2004) 2
Cline, 2004 1
Cline, 2004 2
Beghin and Van der Mensbrugghe, 2004
Anderson, Van der Mensbrugghe and Martin, 2005
Francois, Von Meijl and Tongeren, 2005
Hertel and Keeney, 2005
Role of agric; na na 65% na na 69% 71% 66% 69% 57% na 69% 63% 65% 66%
Role of tariffs na na na na na na na na na na na 99% 93% 91% 95%
Share of Dvg countries in benefits 22% 38% 43% 8% 38% 52% 65% 55% 67% 38% 47% 56% 30% 8% 26%
Role of Dvg countries policies na na 45% na na 55% 66% 62% 62% 44% na na 45% 58% na    70
4.2  WHY DO CGEM ASSESSMENTS DIVERGE SO MUCH?  
There are four explanations for these divergences which concern experiments, 
data, theoretical assumptions, and elasticities. 
4.2.1   Experiments are not the same 
The first explanation concerns the experiments. It does not only consider designed 
scenario, but also the conduct of a pre-experiment and the offsetting of fiscal policies.  
Full liberalization vs. Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
Annex  12 considers only assessments of complete (in agriculture and in industry) 
and full liberalization, with the exception of the study done by the USDA – ERS which 
assesses implications of liberalizing only agriculture. Experiments in Annex  13 are 
tentative representations of a Doha Development Agenda only in industry as examined by 
Bchir, Fontagne and Jean (2005), or in agriculture as examined by Bouet, Bureau, 
Decreux and Jean (2005), or by Anderson, Martin and Van der Mensbrugghe (2005 - 
scenarios 1 and 2).  
Obviously, DDA experiments might diverge as at the time when they were done, 
no study had complete and definitive information on the conclusion of this agenda. Most 
of these studies utilize the “Harbinson” proposal of May 2003 in agriculture; some use 
the Girard formula in industry. The reason is that for more than two years they were the 
only quantitative proposals put forward by an official negotiator.  
The Harbinson proposal is explained in Table 11. It defines several tiers with 
increased reduction rates when applied to initial tariffs
42. As far as developed countrie 
                                                
42 Let us recall that these reduction rates are applied to bound duties.    71
are concerned
43, for example, tariffs higher than 90% must be reduced by a rate of 60%.  
Table 11—The “Harbinson” proposal 
Developed countries  Developing countries 
Initial tariffs  Reduction rate  Initial tariffs  Reduction rate 
t>90% 60%  t>120%  40% 
t=<90% and t>15%  50%  t=<120% and t>60%  35% 
t=<15%  40%  t=<60% and t>20%  30% 
   t=<20%  25% 
 
Nevertheless, the usage of this formula is subject to criticism. As noted by Jean, 
Laborde and Martin (2005), it contains discontinuities: while a 91% bound tariff initially 
adopted by a developed country is going to be reduced at 36.4%, a 90% duty will be set 
at 45%. Although it may be easy to come up with corrections of these discontinuities 
(Jean, Laborde and Martin apply marginally reduction rates, like in an income tax 
schedule) this formula continues to be a source of divergence in assessments.  
In trade negotiations, it often appears that “devils are in the details”. In other 
words, an ambitious package can be announced, but as it includes detailed and 
complicated clauses its final impact on market access might be far from the one 
proclaimed. Three examples can illustrate this point.  
i) Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) have been implemented during the Uruguay Round in 
order to guarantee minimum access and to safeguard exports of some developing 
countries. There have been 1371 TRQs implemented (see de Gorter and Sheldon, 2000 
and Matthews and Laroche, 2001, for a complete presentation).  
A TRQ is composed of two tariffs (the Inside Quota Tariff Rate – IQTR- and the 
Outside Quota Tariff Rate – OQTR) and a quota. It is already difficult to ascertain the 
protective impact of a TRQ, but it is even more hazardous to anticipate the way TRQs 
                                                
43 Let us recall that this is a WTO definition of developing/developed countries, that is to say “there are no 
WTO definitions of “developed” and “developing” countries. Members announce for themselves whether 
they are “developed” or “developing” countries”( 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm).     72
will be liberalized and the method in which countries will implement this reform. Trade 
negotiators could indeed decide to decrease Tariff Quota Rates, to expand quotas or a 
combination of the two. At the national level, a government could modify the way quotas 
are administered
44 and this could have significant consequences on some developing 
countries.  
ii) The Geneva framework agreement, concluded on July 2004, includes a 
sensitive products clause:  
“Without undermining the overall objective of the tiered approach, 
members may designate an appropriate number, to be negotiated, of tariff 
lines to be treated as sensitive, taking account of existing commitments for 
these products” (see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e 
/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm). 
This clause is so ambiguous that it is difficult to ascertain its consequences. Self–
selection of tariff lines may imply that more protected products will be exempted from 
liberalization. Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a) demonstrated that 
even in the case of a low percentage of tariff lines admitted as sensitive products, it could 
considerably reduce the effects of liberalization. In Annex 13 the only difference between 
scenarios 1 and 2 carried out by Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe (2005) is 
the inclusion of the sensitive and special products clause on 2% of tariff lines. The 
associated world welfare gain is cut from $75bln to $17bln. 
The importance of such a clause comes from the convex form of tariff 
distributions in OECD countries. Graph 20 illustrates this point, showing an increasingly 
ranked distribution of bound tariffs in Switzerland. In Switzerland, like in Norway, 
Iceland, Japan and European Union, protection is highly concentrated on a few products. 
Exempting a few lines of liberalization may have significant consequences. In 2001, the 
                                                
44 Quotas can be administered according to several ways: on an historical basis, on a “first arrived, first 
served” basis…   73
average Swiss bound duty in agriculture is 81.6%
45. When applying the “Harbinson 
proposal” without sensitive products clause, this average falls down to 34.1%. If, on the 
contrary, a sensitive products clause is applied exempting 2% of tariff lines from 
liberalization, and if in Switzerland, this room for maneuver is utilized on the highest 
duties in agriculture, the new bound duty average is 64.8%!   







Source: MacMap-HS6 and author’s calculation 
iii) Specific tariffs are numerous in rich countries’ agricultural sector. According 
to the MacMap-HS6 database, this trade barrier represents the totality of agricultural 
protection in Switzerland, and about three quarters in the European Union and Japan (see 
Bouët, Decreux, Fontagne, Jean and Laborde, 2005b).  
If a proportional formula were to be applied, the existence of specific tariffs 
would not be a source of divergence. But it is all the more plausible that a progressive 
formula will be applied: larger cuts for higher initial tariffs, either by the previously 
exposed Harbinson proposal or by a Swiss formula. It is, therefore, necessary to evaluate 
                                                
45 This average duty is here especially high as ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs, by far the most 
prominent instrument of protection in Switzerland, is calculated by dividing duties by world unit values, 
that is to say relatively low unit values as compared to national unit values of imports.    74
the Ad Valorem Equivalent (AVE) of a specific tariff. In the case of a tiered approach, 
this assessment is aimed at finding out which coefficient has to be applied. The 
transformation is also necessary in the case of a Swiss formula, as this approach only 
makes sense when applied to ad valorem duties.  
Calculating AVE of specific tariffs could seem straightforward as it is only 
necessary to divide the specific duty by a unit value. The question remains, however, 
about which unit value has to be utilized. For one product defined at the HS6 level, unit 
values of trade flows may greatly diverge depending whether they are taken at the 
national or the world level. The European Commission (see MAP – Brief, 2005) gives the 
example of fresh sausages, of which the unit value of European imports is 8 euros by kg, 
while the world unit value is 2 euros. The tariff applied by the European Union is 1.5 
euros per kg; the AVE is either 19% (from the European unit value) or 75% (from the 
world unit value). As developed countries mostly import products of high quality, using a 
world unit value to calculate AVE systematically inflates the rate of liberalization. The 
construction of the MacMap-HS6 database has clearly highlighted that this is a major 
issue (see Bouët, Decreux, Fontagné, Jean and Laborde, 2005). This has even been the 
main source of contention for trade negotiators during the first part of 2005.  
From the above discussion it clearly appears that a good assessment of the impact 
of DDA must include consideration of not only the final agreement, but the detailed way 
in which the agreement is implemented by each WTO member. Of course, it could be 
stated that in case of full liberalization, this source of divergence disappears. 
Nevertheless, the need to define what full liberalization is and which distortions have to 
be eliminated remains. It may concern border measures (import duties, export subsidies) 
or domestic distortions; in the latter case the definition is less obvious. One can choose 
measures to be eliminated on an institutional criterion, for example those forbidden by 
the WTO. But it is also possible to include other programs which could have sensible 
effects, contrary to what is expected from trade liberalization: for example the 
elimination of the European land-set aside program and the US CRP (Conservation   75
Reserve Program) could contribute to a major expansion of land supply in these two 
countries and a substantial increase in their agricultural production. 
There are other issues that may explain why experiments are not the same among 
different assessments of the effects of full trade liberalization.  
The “pre-experiment” issue  
Almost all studies use the GTAP database. The last available version (GTAP-6) is 
for 2001 and provides social accounting matrixes and trade flows for up to 87 countries 
(or geographic zones) and 57 activities. Previous assessments used the GTAP database-5, 
for 1997.  
When studying trade liberalization the reviewed studies usually suppose that it 
takes place in 2005 or 2006, implying an 8/9-years delay under GTAP-5 version and a 
4/5-years delay in GTAP-6. Whatever the effective date of liberalization , trade barriers 
have been reduced since 1997 or since 2001: the Uruguay Round has been definitively 
implemented with the phasing out of the Multi – Fiber Arrangement, some countries have 
entered the WTO and consequently reduced their tariff barriers (China), some preferences 
have been granted to developing countries (Everything But Arms, African Growth 
Opportunity Act, etc.), and new regional agreements have been negotiated (USA – 
Morocco, Chile-Mexico, etc.) or modified (enlargement of the European Union to 25 
countries).  
Applying a trade shock on a dataset which does not include all this information 
overstates the impact of full trade liberalization on trade flows, economic activity, and 
welfare. This is the reason why in most studies (Beghin and Van der Mensbrugghe, 2004; 
Bchir, Fontagne and Jean, 2005; Anderson, Martin and Van der Mensbrugghe, 2005; 
Hertel and Keeney, 2005, for example) a pre-experiment is conducted. Several trade 
agreements, enforced during this transition, are simulated and applied to the initial 
database: this is called a “pre-experiment”. Then the designed experiment involves 
simulating either full trade liberalization or Doha Agenda on this modified database.   76
While concluding that full trade liberalization would imply a world welfare gain of 
$287bln, Anderson, Martin and Van der Mensbrugghe (2005) demonstrate that the 
liberalization process that took place between 2001 and 2005 (the last implementation of 
the Uruguay Round, the end of the MFA, the access of China to WTO, the enlargement 
of the European Union to 10 countries from Eastern and Central Europe, the setting up of 
EBA and AGOA, etc.) has increased world welfare by $54bln —that is to say an 
increased gain of about 19%.   
When modeling is done under recursive dynamics a benchmark is constituted: if 
the trade shock is applied over a period of ten years for example, the evolution of the 
world economy is simulated without any trade reform during these ten consecutive years, 
but with investment increasing the stock of capital, and increase in labor supplies either 
exogenous (given a projected rate for that period) or endogenous (labor supply depending 
on its real remuneration)
46. Under different benchmarks, however, the same trade reform 
will lead to different welfare gains. This is why comparing studies by rate of change (in 
%) is more appropriate. 
Compensatory fiscal policies 
Alongside the elimination of trade distortions, fiscal policies are frequently 
implemented in these assessments which could lead to divergent conclusions. Two 
reasons may be invoked for including fiscal reforms simultaneously to trade reforms in 
liberalization assessments. 
(i) The fiscal issue is a major concern in developing countries, where corruption 
and tax evasion are prominent. As income and sale taxes do not yield sufficient public 
receipts, taxing imports has become a key source of revenue for the public sector. Annex  
14 indicates the importance of import taxes in proportion of GDP in the 85 
countries/zones of the GTAP-6 database. In developing countries these taxes represent 
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from 0.4% of the domestic GDP in Botswana up to 4.3% in Tunisia. When implementing 
full trade liberalization, it may be unrealistic not to consider offsetting fiscal instrument 
(which can be more or less distorting). Even the implementation of a DDA could reduce 
fiscal receipts.  
(ii) For more than 60 years (the Stolper-Samuelson theorem has been published in 
1941) liberalizing trade has been considered to affect the income distribution inside a 
country. Thus, it can be argued that reducing trade barriers increases economic efficiency 
(it increases the size of the cake) but it also modifies the way in which income is 
distributed (the way the cake is split). As a matter of fact, it could be argued that the 
effects of free trade have to be corrected by a fiscal policy. This issue is all the more 
important now as the current round of negotiation has been placed under the objective of 
poverty alleviation. Poverty comes from low factor remuneration and/or high consumer 
prices. If prices of commodities, the production of which requires an intensive utilization 
of unskilled labor, are increased, the activity in this sector is enhanced and the demand 
for and remuneration of this factor is elevated; this finally contributes to poverty 
alleviation. On the other hand, augmented consumer prices have adverse effects on poor 
people who buy these commodities. A way of tackling this issue is using the fiscal 
instrument.    
The idea that trade liberalization has to be accompanied by a fiscal policy is 
consistent. But it represents yet another source of divergence amongst assessments of 
expected benefits.   
4.2.2  Data are not the same 
The utilization of different data leads logically to different assessments. Nearly all 
assessments are using the GTAP database on consumption, production, and international 
trade. But divergences may stem from the utilization of different databases on market 
access and domestic support even if today modelers are progressively using the same 
information.    78
Data on market access 
Data on market access have greatly evolved within a few years. It might be one of 
the major sources of reduced optimism about the expected benefits from trade 
liberalization. Three improvements are significant: 
•  The main databases take into account trade preferences and regional 
agreements; 
•  Ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs and tariff rate quotas are calculated;  
•  Simulation of multilateral trade negotiation accounts for the interaction of 
bound and applied duties.  
MacMap is a 4-dimensional database on market access (importing country, 
products, exporting country, and instrument of protection). It includes all preferential 
schemes and regional agreements between different countries
47. The base period for 
MacMap is 2001 and the commodity coverage includes 5,111 products (Harmonized 
System at the 6 digit level, HS6). It includes ad valorem duties, specific duties, 
compound duties, TRQs and anti-dumping duties, and calculates ad valorem equivalent 
of all these protective instruments. It measures market access to 163 countries by 208 
partners.  
The objective of global trade negotiations are the reduction of bound duties. Thus, 
an accurate assessment of the impact of a multilateral trade reform must take into account 
the interplay between bound, MFN applied, and preferential duties. To complement 
MacMap, the CEPII has recently constructed a dataset on bound duties, for 2001
                                                
47 For a complete presentation of the MacMap-HS6 database, see Bouet, Decreux, Fontagne, Jean and 
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The data on market access from MacMap have been included in the GTAP database
48.  
The MacMap_HS6 database is now the main reference for measuring market 
access in general equilibrium analysis; it has resulted in a downwards assessment of the 
level of protection throughout the world as it includes all preferential schemes and 
regional agreements, instead of basing border protection uniquely on MFN tariffs. 
Obviously, this methodology implies that trade preferences are fully utilized, while 
clearly, such preferential schemes (and in a lesser extent, free trade agreements) have 
been frequently criticized because of their lack of efficiency. These agreements always 
include rules of origin in order to avoid trade deflection. The stringency of these rules has 
been pointed out. First empirical assessments have been very pessimistic about the rate of 
utilization of these schemes (Brenton, 2003; Brenton and Manchin, 2003; Brenton and 
Ikezuki, 2004), but new methodologies and studies have recently demonstrated that these 
preferences are rather well utilized by exporters from developing countries, especially in 
agriculture (Wainio and Gibson, 2003; Candau, Fontagne and Jean, 2004; Candau and 
Jean, 2005).  
Assessing the impact of trade liberalization requires taking into account the 
interplay between MFN duties and preferential duties and, as far as a Development 
Agenda is concerned, the one between these duties and bound tariffs. This consideration 
results in a downwards estimation of the expected benefits of liberalization. Jean, 
Laborde and Martin (2005) calculate that taking into account applied tariff instead of 
MFN tariffs in agriculture decreases border protection by 30% (= (24-17)/24; see Figure 
21) while the binding overhang is greater than 13 basis point. Preferences (difference 
between MFN applied and applied) are large in developed countries, whereas very small 
                                                
48 The GTAP data on protection are based on MacMap data at the HS6 level but the way data are 
aggregated up to the GTAP disaggregation level is different from the MacMap methodology. GTAP uses a 
national imports system of weights while MacMap weighing system is based on imports from a reference 
group. Doing so GTAP understates the actual level of protection but includes consistent data with respect to 
tariff receipts. This is of course another source of divergence between assessments using the GTAP method 
of tariff aggregation (Hertel and Keeney, 2005; Anderson, Martin and Van der Mensbrugghe, 2005) and 
evaluation using the MacMap method (Bouet, Bureau, Decreux and Jean, 2005).   80
in LDCs. On the contrary, the gap between bound and MFN duties is large in the latter 
and small in the former (it is even larger in LDCs than in Middle Income Countries). 












Developed Developing LDCs WORLD
Bound tariff MFN tariff Applied tariff
  
Source: Jean, Laborde and Martin; 2005. 
Data on domestic support 
Data on domestic support can also greatly differ across studies. Domestic support 
is a distortion the definition and economic impact of which varies much more than that of 
tariffs: it can act on production, on intermediate consumption, on farmers’ income, on 
capital or land, and so forth; it can have a direct or indirect effect on production (coupled 
or decoupled); it can be bound or not.  
Bouet, Bureau, Decreux, and Jean (2005) distinguish market price support, output 
subsidies, capital subsidies, variable input subsidies, land subsidies, and decoupled 
subsidies in OECD countries and China. Even if decoupled subsidies are modeled to have 
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reduces the impact of liberalization on world prices. Some programs have even a negative 
impact on production (land set-aside program in Europe, CRP in USA) so that their 
elimination would entail an increase in domestic production. 
Recent research has also pointed to a “binding overhang” phenomenon in 
domestic support programs as developed countries’ governments have consolidated these 
measures and effective subsidies are deemed inferior. Anderson, Martin and Van der 
Mensbrugghe (2005a and 2005b) demonstrated that very large reduction in bound 
support is needed before any reduction in actual support would take place.  
Different decomposition by sectors and trading zones 
CGEMs are sophisticated representations of the world economy. Modeling 
consumption, production, and trade of several products in several trading zones requires 
solving a very large system of equations. Thus, it is necessary to identify a limited 
number of sectors and trading zones as the number of equations increases exponentially 
when these parameters are increased: some equations have up to four dimensions.  
But reducing the number of sectors and trading zones is costly: if the size of the 
distortion differs from one sector to the other or from one trading zone to the other, it 
decreases the cost of protection as this cost is proportional to the square of the tariff. It 
means that two studies assessing the impact of the same trade reform with the same 
model and the same data, but with different product and geographic decomposition will 
produce different welfare results.  
4.2.3  Behavioral parameters are not the same 
Welfare effects created by liberalization depend crucially on trade elasticities (or 
more precisely the price elasticities of exports).  
Let us consider first the case of unilateral liberalization. This is modeled in a 
partial equilibrium analysis in Figure 22. On the left side of the figure, domestic supply   82
and demand are represented. Initially, the world price is π1 and this country imposes an 
ad valorem import duty t1. The domestic price is therefore π1.(1+t1) leading to a domestic 
supply 01 and a domestic demand D1. This gap (D1-01) creates imports, represented on the 
right side where initial equilibrium is in A, intersection of imports demand for a t1 tariff - 
M(t1) – and export supply X.  
Figure 22—A partial equilibrium representation of unilateral liberalization 
 
Cutting import tariff implies an upwards shift in imports demand – M (t2). The 
new equilibrium is in B. The net effect is evaluated by the difference between the grey 
area (allocative efficiency gains) and the black area in the figure (terms of trade loss – in 
that case this is a terms of trade loss as imports price is raised). On Figure 22, due to a 
very elastic export supply, the world price increases little. This is very beneficial, as the 
negative impact of liberalization for this country is little. Initial imports are paid by the 
country at a higher price: this is a loss assessed by the black area (π2-π1)*(D1-01).    83
Let us consider the case of a decrease in trade elasticity. In Figure 22, if X points 
more vertically, domestic liberalization implies a smaller increase in imports and a higher 
increase in world price. Gain in domestic welfare is smaller.  
So in case of unilateral liberalization, effects on welfare are twofold. First, they 
are caused by an increase in domestic imports which reflects that domestic production is 
replaced by more competitive foreign supply, and domestic consumption is profiting 
from lower consumption prices; simultaneously tariff revenue is modified by an increase 
in imports (positive effect) and a decrease of the taxation rate (negative). Second, they are 
a result of the change in the world price; when a commodity is imported a cut in tariff 
increases the world price leading to negative welfare effects. For the same change in 
imports, high trade elasticity implies a smaller augmentation of world price, and thus, 
larger welfare effects.  
In case of multilateral liberalization, terms of trade effect can be obtained on 
exports as access to foreign markets is modified. Figure 22 shows that foreign exporters 
clearly get a higher price on their exports due to liberalization of the domestic economy. 
This is of course a positive terms of trade evolution. But, liberalization can decrease 
export prices: for example, if initially preferences have been granted on a market to 
specific countries, erosion of these preferences implies lower export prices for these 
initially preferred exporters due to increased competition.  
Finally, at the world level, terms of trade effects are eliminating each other and 
welfare effects only come from elimination of domestic distortions (in a perfect 
competition framework). Eliminating distortions have large welfare effects when import 
demands are very elastic.  
As a conclusion of this subsection, trade elasticities are key parameters in global 
trade modeling. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on their value; moreover, they vary 
with the level of product disaggregation. On average, the GTAP network provides 
relatively low trade elasticities even if recent developments have provided higher   84
estimation of these parameters (see Hertel, Hummels, Ivanic and Keeney, 2004). On the 
contrary, Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (henceforth the HRT model, see for example 
Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr, 1997 and 2001) utilize much higher trade elasticities than 
the GTAP (see for example Tarr et alii, 2001) while LINKAGE elasticities are 
intermediate: on average they are 35% higher than the GTAP ones, but 75% higher in 
agriculture. This point is a direct and important explanation of the divergences 
highlighted in Annex 1 and Annex 2. Cline’s study uses the HRT model and obtains, 
therefore, higher welfare effects from full trade liberalization. Anderson, Martin and Van 
der Mensbrugghe (2005a and 2005b) obtain intermediate results; using GTAP elasticities, 
they even demonstrate that this is the main explanation of differences in assessing 
welfare effects. 
4.2.4 Theoretical  assumptions are not the same 
The final source of divergence concerns theoretical features of the model. It is 
nearly impossible to be exhaustive on this topic as modelers have to make numerous 
theoretical choices. This subsection focuses on the main theoretical assumptions in 
assessing the impact of trade liberalization. 
Perfect vs. imperfect competition 
CGEM could adopt either a perfect or imperfect competition framework, or these 
two features in different productive sectors. In the latter case, industry and services are 
very often characterized by imperfect competition while in agriculture it is perfect.  
In perfect competition, there is no fixed cost and as all producers are price-takers, 
the equilibrium price is equal to the marginal cost of production. When competition is 
imperfect there is a fixed cost so that average cost is decreasing. In most models under 
imperfect competition products are differentiated horizontally (varieties). Two rules 
guide competition in such sectors: in the short/medium term, firms maximize their profits 
by equating marginal cost and marginal revenue; this gives birth to a mark-up inversely   85
related to the price – elasticity of demand and positive profits. This is a monopolistic 
power coming from differentiating products. Positive profits attract new firms which as a 
result produce new varieties (product differentiation is increasing): in the medium/long 
term, profits are annulled and price is equal to average cost.  
Imperfect competition implies new sources of welfare gain from trade 
liberalization. Selling on a larger market, economies of scale are better utilized. Prices 
decrease. Furthermore there are more varieties in a larger market, meaning that 
consumers are better off. Nevertheless, imperfect competition is more difficult to model. 
First, when using the traditional CES (constant Elasticity of Substitution) function, price 
– elasticity of demand is not constant and specifications of mark-up are complex. Second, 
imperfect competition with horizontal product differentiation requires a lot of 
information, and particularly product substitutability, scale economies and competition 
intensity. Since these parameters are linked by the zero – profit condition in each sector, 
only two of these parameters are required from external source, the third one being 
calibrated. It nevertheless demands detailed information about the economic structure in a 
multi-country multi-product model. It explains why this feature is not systematically 
adopted in all CGEM though it is clearly more realistic.  
Imperfect competition brings new sources of welfare: economies of scale which 
decreases prices when expanding output, and horizontal differentiation. It is generally 
supposed that consumers are variety – lovers and that expanded market implies more 
varieties. 
Modeling the factor market 
A key feature of CGEM is assumptions attached to the productive factor markets. 
In a model designed to describe short-term consequences of trade liberalization factors 
are often supposed to be immobile across sectors. When, conversely, the long-term 
consequences of openness are assessed, perfect mobility is often assumed. Outside these 
two options numerous assumptions are feasible: some primary factors (land, natural   86
resources) are naturally less mobile than others but even in this respect assumptions can 
differ across studies as one can suppose either complete sector immobility of land or 
mobility across agricultural activities.  
A key issue is labor mobility: it can be supposed that labor is either perfectly 
mobile (only one price of labor in the entire economy) or perfectly immobile (as many 
wages as the number of sectors in the economy), or that there is an imperfect mobility of 
labor between agricultural and non agricultural activities
49, but that mobility is perfect 
within each activity.  
Trade liberalization implies a change in relative prices of goods for an economy. 
Thus, it must entail a reallocation of productive factors from sectors relative prices of 
which are declining to sectors where their prices are increasing. In doing so, the economy 
is being specialized in activities where it has a comparative advantage—it increases its 
real income. This reallocation is all the more efficient as factors are mobile. So, studies 
with different assumptions on productive factor markets are giving different results on 
welfare and real income augmentations.  
Static vs. dynamic modeling 
A central feature that distinguishes CGEMs is their static vs. dynamic nature. 
When modeling dynamic mechanism, trade liberalization might affect income, saving 
and investment, and capital (or other primary factors – skilled labor, land) accumulation 
rate. The rate in which these factors grow can be exogenously determined, or this 
mechanism can be endogenously defined: the split of active population between skilled 
and unskilled can be determined, for example, by the ratio of real remunerations, or can 
be fixed by simple extrapolation. The technical progress can be accounted for; factor 
productivity can increase exogenously or total factor productivity can depend on specific 
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between these different types of activities. It means that labor is allocated amongst the different activities 
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variables (trade openness), etc. Finally, either the dynamics can be recursive (the model is 
solved for different consecutive periods, the value of each variable being included as 
initial value of the next period) or it can be fully dynamic with inter-temporal 
specifications.  
In a dynamic CGEM a baseline is simulated: the model is solved without any 
trade reform for the chosen number of periods, with accumulation of production factors. 
Then the trade reform is simulated: trade reform is assessed by comparison between the 
baseline and the simulation.  
Dynamic modeling can greatly affect the way trade liberalization is assessed. 
First, it is a supplementary reason to compare rate of changes in welfare between several 
studies and not monetary amounts as the dynamic mechanism has increased the size of 
the world economy. Second, trade reform may have a direct effect on the accumulation of 
productive factors. Traditionally, investment is determined by savings. The saving rate 
can be fixed, in which case, investment increases when real income increases. This is a 
positive effect of trade reform on capital accumulation and welfare. The savings rate can 
otherwise be determined by the real remuneration of capital. In this case trade reform has 
a magnified impact on economies where this remuneration is augmented either by a 
specialization effect in capital – intensive sectors or by an increased profitability due to a 
better exploitation of scale economies. Otherwise, trade liberalization can affect the real 
remuneration of land and thus the land supply (LINKAGE, MIRAGE) and the ratio 
skilled wage/unskilled wage and thus the split of active population between skilled and 
unskilled labor. 
A key assumption explaining divergence across studies (highlighted in Annex  11 
and Annex  13) certainly comes from the relation between total factor productivity and 
trade openness. To recall specification adopted in the World Bank’s Global Economic 
Prospect (2002 and 2004), in Dessus, Fukasaku and Safadi (1999), let γ
e
i be the growth in 
the sector’s productivity due to the change in openness, Ei is exports of sector i and Xi 




















i is calibrated under a specific rule 
50 and ηi is the elasticity. This relation 
mechanically amplifies the expected benefits of trade liberalization. 
Several potential channels are supposed to operate positively on factor 
productivity when an economy is progressively exposed to international competition. As 
firms export more, they are supposed to learn new technologies through comparison with 
foreign competitors and improve their production process to match international 
standards. Moreover, firms can react to more competition by increased Research and 
Development (RD) which affects positively all factors’ productivity.  
Are these assumptions pertinent and is it reasonable to include them in global 
trade modeling? In fact, the previously exposed channels really make sense. Increased 
competition reduces X – inefficiency and might be a direct incentive to do more RD. 
Comparison of different production processes is a good way of improving efficiency. So 
trade openness should increase factor productivity. But the way in which this relation has 
been introduced in CGEM may be subject to criticism for several reasons.  
First, equation (34) has no microeconomic foundations as opposed to all other 
elements in a CGEM. Microeconomic models of international trade under oligopolistic 
competition can imply adverse effects: for example Reitzes (1991) and Bouët (2001) 
demonstrate that protectionism can increase domestic Research & Development, 
depending on the instrument utilized (tariff vs. quota). 
Second, it can be considered as an ad hoc element introduced in a CGEM which 
studies the impact of trade liberalization. Obviously, introducing a function, which is not 
micro - economically founded, in such an evaluation leads to increasing factor 
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40% of total factor productivity growth.    89
productivity with trade openness, and automatically amplifies the efficiency effect of 
trade openness.  
Third, this ad hoc relation brings no conclusion on which countries, sectors or 
productive factors could be the first beneficiaries of trade liberalization and of a 
potentially positive impact on productivity. After all, if greater openness increases factor 
productivity, it makes sense that this relation is not as strong in all countries, in all sectors 
and for all factors.  
A CGEM studying the impact of trade liberalization delivers plenty of 
information. Of course, information on world or national welfare is important, but it 
could be argued that this kind of evaluation is much more important when it details the 
impact on factor, or sector. In most cases trade liberalization is beneficial, but there are a 
few elements which require the attention of economists using a CGEM: 
(i.)  Traditionally, with models under perfect competition, expected benefits from 
trade liberalization are the sum of allocation efficiency gains (always positive 
when liberalizing) and term of trade effects. Individual countries may lose 
because of deterioration in their terms of trade. Thus, if a (developing) country 
does not eliminate its trade barriers (due to Special and Differentiated Treatment 
for example), but sees its terms of trade worsened (due to eroded preferences or a 
rise in the world prices of agricultural commodities of which the country is a net 
importer) it is quite normal that its welfare to decrease.  
(ii.)  Today, CGEM constitutes additional effects which provide a more realistic 
picture of liberalization — these effects can be positive or negative. Trade 
liberalization can increase economies of scale and available varieties. On the other 
hand, if liberalization implies that a country will have less activity in those sectors 
featured by decreasing average cost and horizontal differentiation, it means that 
liberalization can have a negative impact on it. The same contrasting effect from 
this process can be obtained when considering the impact of factor remuneration   90
on factor accumulation. Furthermore, when products are differentiated by 
originating countries (as it is specified in the Armington hypothesis) a country has 
a monopoly power, which implies that its optimum tariff is not zero
51.  
(iii.)  Finally, trade liberalization has contrasting effects on productive factors as it 
increases real remuneration of abundant factors while having an adverse effect for 
scarce factors.   
These mechanisms (and their interplay) represent the most interesting relations in 
a CGEM. On this topic, equation (34) does not bring information as it does not include 
any contrasting effect or differentiated impact of trade openness on factor productivity. 
Furthermore, it can be sufficiently strong to offset all negative mechanisms previously 
quoted. 
Another way of modeling dynamic effects is the Steady State version of the 
Harrison – Rutherford – Tarr model (see Cline, 2004). The idea is to increase the stock of 
capital until the rate of return is back to its pre – liberalization level. This can be justified 
by the following idea. In the long term firms are supposed to benefit from the new 
opportunities created by a much larger market so that they invest until the rate of return 
comes back to a normal level. This idea makes sense but, obviously, augmented capital 
creates more activity and increases real remuneration of all other factors. It automatically 
amplifies expected benefits from liberalization and the microeconomic behavior of firms 
is not explicitly modeled.  
4.3  EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON POVERTY 
Evaluating the potential impact of trade liberalization on poverty has been done 
according to alternative methodologies.  
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The first method is the one referenced in the GEP (2002 and 2004) and in Cline 
(2004) as it allows for world-wide assessments of impact on poverty. It estimates (or 
uses) a parameter known as poverty elasticity. For example, the World Bank assessments 
utilize results from the CGEM to calculate an index representative of the poor people’ 
real income; it is the remuneration of unskilled labor deflated by a consumption price 
index composed by food products and clothing. At the world level, the same elasticity is 
applied to calculate the impact on poverty headcount.  
For example, the Global Economic Prospects 2002 evaluated that full trade 
liberalization would imply an increase of x=8.4% in the real wage of unskilled labor in 
Sub – Saharan Africa. As the poverty elasticity is -2, the report concluded that the 
poverty headcount in this region would decrease by 16.8%=-2x% if full trade 
liberalization was applied.  
This framework can only approximate the relation existing between trade 
liberalization and poverty:  
i)  Income of poor people is affected not only by remuneration of unskilled labor, but 
also by remuneration of skilled labor, capital, land, natural resources, and 
transfers. 
ii)  Applying the same elasticity at the world level is questionable. The relation 
between trade reform and poverty depends on the distribution of income amongst 
the population, the source of income at different levels of income, the reaction of 
economic agents to trade shocks, and so forth. Each of these relations is country – 
specific. This criticism has been taken into account by the World Bank which is 
now using country – specific poverty elasticity to assess the impact. It explains 
partially why recent assessment by Anderson, Martin and Van der Mensbrugghe 
(2005) is less optimistic in terms of poverty alleviation (see 0).   92
iii)  As variation in the real wage of unskilled labor is calculated for every trading 
region of the CGEM, these regions have to be defined carefully so that they are 
homogenous as far as this relation is concerned.  
Furthermore, applying the poverty elasticity gives the impression that the relation 
between trade openness and poverty alleviation is mechanical. According to this scheme, 
once liberalization is implemented, an increase in the real remuneration of unskilled labor 
occurs and poverty is reduced to an extent which depends only on the strength of the 
shock.  
Evidently, this is not the case. Trade openness has contrasting distributive 
effects
52. Traditionally, it increases real remuneration of unskilled labor in developing 
countries as their endowment of this factor is abundant. But other components of poor 
people’s income can be negatively affected, particularly transfers due to shrinking tariff 
receipts. Furthermore, factors are not, especially in the short term, perfectly mobile across 
sectors. For example, unskilled labor can be imperfectly (or not at all) mobile between 
agricultural and non agricultural activities. It gives birth to different remuneration of 
unskilled labor in a developing country. In this case, trade liberalization may have 
adverse effects on unskilled labor depending on the sector where it is utilized. For 
example, Cororaton and Cockburn (2004) demonstrate that opening Philippines to world 
competition can be beneficial to urban poor households and harmful for rural poor 
households. 
Finally, stating that x million of people are lifted out of poverty could be 
understood as a quantitative and qualitative statement. For the latter, the end of poverty 
might mean a profound change in the way of life. Even if the construction of statistical 
indicators needs definition of arbitrary thresholds, the reader has to keep in mind that this 
                                                
52 This is a well-known and traditional result as it has been firstly demonstrated by Wolfgang Stolper and 
Paul Samuelson in 1941. It obviously proves that everybody is not better off after full implementation of 
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qualitative aspect might be neglected for people whose income just passes over this 
threshold.  
Cline (2004) utilizes a marginally improved methodology aimed at evaluating 
country – specific poverty elasticities. He supposes that: 
•  In all developing countries the income distribution is log – normal.  
•  Full trade liberalization implies economic growth which is neutral from the point 
of view of the income distribution: it changes the average income but it has no 
effect on income dispersion. 
•  Poor people’ income is composed of 90% remuneration of unskilled labor and 
10% transfers. 
•  The evolution of transfers is strictly parallel to the evolution of domestic welfare.  
•  Poor people have the same consumption basket as total population. 
The first two hypotheses imply that the share of poor people in a population can 
be expressed as a function of the ratio of poor people’s income on the average income 
and of the dispersion parameter (which is constant). The three last assumptions provide 
an expression of this ratio.  
It is important to note that economic growth changes income inequality
53, and 
poor people’s income is also affected by change in the remuneration of capital, land, 
natural resources, and skilled labor. Furthermore, there is no systematic reason to think 
that evolution of transfers is parallel to the evolution of national welfare, and 
consumption baskets depend on income levels: assumptions (iv) and (v) are not justified. 
Finally, like for the GEP, Cline’s method also offers a picture of a mechanical relation 
between trade openness and poverty. 
                                                
53 A famous empirical demonstration of this point is the Kuznets curve (1955).   94
The steady state model used by Cline (2004) automatically amplifies the impact 
of trade liberalization on poverty. As capital is raised, real remuneration of all other 
productive factors is simultaneously augmented and in particular the unskilled labor’s 
wage. Given that unskilled labor’s wage represents 90% of poor people’s income, the 
effect on poverty in this case is greatly reinforced. 
There are other ways in which CGEM can be utilized to study the relationship 
between trade liberalization and poverty. Traditionally, in order to obtain information on 
final consumption, CGEM studied the behavior of a single household. Household 
disaggregation allows for studying how income distribution is affected by (trade) reform. 
The simplest way to do this is to model the behavior of several households featured by an 
exogenous variable: Kahn (1997) prioritizes a rural/urban distinction while Hertel, Ivanic 
Preckel, and Cranfield (2001) emphasize the main source of income (unskilled labor, 
skilled labor, capital). Traditionally, the number of households is limited, from 10 (Levin, 
2000) to 24 (Devarajan and Van der Mensbrugghe, 2000) and a distribution of income for 
each representative household is postulated. The mean and total income of a household 
group is explained by the model, while dispersion is supposed to be constant. The 
adopted distribution functions are usually the lognormal or the Paretian distributions even 
if they received little empirical value.  
Recent developments have prioritized two dimensions: 
•  Thousands of households may be introduced in a CGEM (Cogneau and 
Robilliard, 2000; Cockburn, 2001; Cororaton and Cockburn, 2005). This allows 
keeping all information from household surveys and preventing theoretical 
simplification as constant within - group income dispersion. But CGE - 
microsimulation is often done at the cost of other simplifications — like a reduced 
number of sectors. 
•  Hertel, Preckel, Cranfield and Ivanic (2001) utilize results coming from a multi – 
country CGEM on commodity and factor prices to feed a post – simulation   95
framework, which keeps all the information on income levels and simulates the 
demand response to the change in prices and incomes. These simulation 
techniques are very useful as they account for a multi – sector, multi – factor 
framework where agents’ reaction to reform is simulated and general equilibrium 
effect is taken into account. Furthermore, a policy study can be designed to 
describe the conditions under which losers can be compensated (see for example, 
Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr, 2001).  
These studies show that trade liberalization might have a positive effect on 
national welfare while entailing a contrasting impact on agents. Trade liberalization 
might alleviate poverty, but in several cases it increases it. Hertel, Ivanic, Preckel and 
Cranfield (2001), for example, show that if multilateral trade liberalization decreases 
poverty in several developing countries, it has the opposite effect in Brazil, Chile, and 
Thailand. Unfortunately, they cannot provide a world-wide estimation of the impact of 
full trade liberalization on poverty, unless results are extrapolated across developing 
countries.  
Thus, four explanations of divergences on how trade liberalization increases 
world real income have been presented. Pre experiments are now systematically 
integrated and the measurement of market access accounts for preferential schemes and 
regional agreements. Two methodological choices —sources of major divergence—
remain: the level of Armington elasticities and the integration of a dynamic relationship 
between trade openness and total factor productivity. There may be other sources of 
divergence, but with a smaller impact. In order to test the previous explanations on 
diverging results, a sensitivity analysis is carried out using the CGEM framework of 
section 3. 
4.4  A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
This section tests the plausibility of the four rationales presented in this paper to 
explain why literature on the impact of trade liberalization produces divergent   96
conclusions. These rationales have already been discussed in detail and they are: (i) 
experiments are not the same; (ii) data are not the same; (iii) behavioral parameters are 
not the same; and (iv) theoretical features are not the same. To test these rationales, the 
section provides new simulations of full trade liberalization, each time with one included 
modification.  
Figure 23 gives the main conclusion of this section. The central experiment, as 
simulated in the previous section, concluded that full trade liberalization would entail a 
0.33% increase in world real income. If the pre – experiment had not been accounted for 
(that is to say, if the trade liberalization that occurred from 2001 to 2005 had not been 
taken into account before testing the impact of full trade liberalization), this rate of 
change would have been raised by 36%. The utilization of LINKAGE trade elasticities 
would have given about the same results (+33%). If the simulations were based on a 
database with no preferential schemes, the result would have suggested a 24% higher 
increase in the world welfare. Finally, including a positive relation between trade 
openness and total factor productivity would have given a rate of change in the world 
welfare 79% higher.  
Though other theoretical features (exogenous or endogenous land supply, 
imperfect or perfect competition) or empirical choices (different database on distortions, 
different product and sector disaggregations) may also have an impact, these four 
explanations obviously play a major role.  
Annexes 12 to 19 contain detailed information about the results obtained through 
these alternative simulations 
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Figure 23— Why do global trade models differ so much? The rate of change in the  

















Source: author’s calculation. 
4.4.1  Different experiments: no pre-experiment 
If a pre-experiment had not been implemented in the central experiment, the result 
would have been a 0.45% augmentation in world real income. Figure 24 highlights the 
welfare gains/losses by region. The broad picture is unchanged; nevertheless, taking into 
account the end of the Uruguay Round raises allocation efficiency gains in numerous 
countries (Canada, Argentina, India). The main difference comes from China’s WTO 
accession, which implies a significant cut in Chinese protection and large allocation 
efficiency gains (+1.6% instead of 0.8%). Furthermore, the end of the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement opens access to European, American, and Canadian markets. It entails a 
reduction in export prices for countries which were beneficiaries of preferential access in 
the textile / apparel sectors; this phenomenon is significant for Tunisia where the 
deterioration in terms of trade is 1% instead of 0.4%.    98
As the reduction in tariff protection is larger, the increase in world agricultural 
prices is higher. This causes more contrasting variations in terms of trade, with larger 
gains some (Australia/New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil) and larger losses for others 
(India, Zambia). 
The central experiment shows a clear increase in unskilled labor remuneration in 
numerous developing countries (which is in favor of poverty alleviation). It is confirmed, 
even enhanced for Argentina, Brazil, SACU and the rest of Sub – Saharan Africa; in the 
case of Zambia, Bangladesh and especially Tunisia, the change in this factor’s 
remuneration is less favorable.   





















































































































































































































































































Welfare Allocation efficiency gains Terms of trade gains
 
Source: author’s calculation.   99
4.4.2  Different data: MFN vs. preferential duties  
The second sensitivity analysis measures the extent to which the complete 
inclusion of preferential schemes modifies expected benefits. In order to study this 
element, tariffs are changed in the initial database so that non-reciprocal preferences 
given by USA, Europe, Developed Asia, Canada and the rest of OECD to developing 
countries are withdrawn. In other words, only regional agreements and MFN tariffs are 
kept. 
As it was expected, positive impact on world welfare is bolstered up (from 
+0.33% to 0.41%). Developing countries are the main beneficiaries (see Figure 25).  This 
gain is large in the case of Tunisia (which has a preferential access on the European 
market in industry) and Sub – Saharan Africa (SACU and Zambia included.)  
Figure 25— Welfare gains by region (%) – Full trade liberalization without non- 




















































































































































































































































































Welfare Allocation efficiency gains Terms of trade gains
 
Source: author’s calculation.   100
Why? As previously explained, eroded preferences mean deterioration in terms of 
trade. On the contrary, in the absence of preferences these countries profit from terms of 
trade gains or reduced deterioration (see the cases of Brazil, Mexico, SACU, Bangladesh, 
the rest of Sub – Saharan Africa zone and Zambia by comparing Table 5 and Annex 
Table 16.2 in Annex 16.) 
In the case of Tunisia, allocation efficiency gains and welfare increase are much 
larger. When the Euro–Mediterranean partnership is not taken into account full 
liberalization entails a significant increase in textile and clothing/apparel exports to 
Europe. Reallocation of productive factors is needed in order to carry out this augmented 
industrial production, while the real exchange rate is appreciated. Domestic agricultural 
liberalization completes this picture and increases in domestic agro – food imports are 
much larger than in the case of the central experiment. This means more allocation 
efficiency gains for the same tariff elimination
54. Furthermore, the Tunisian economy 
experiments more specialization in industry, that is to say more economies of scale and 
more varieties.  
When accounting for the impact on factor remuneration similar conclusions 
emerge. Starting from an initial world, without any non reciprocal preferences, the impact 
on unskilled labor would be more positive in numerous developing countries (especially 
Sub – Saharan African countries, but also India and Bangladesh). But supplementary 
gains might be captured by capital and skilled labor (Brazil, Tunisia.) It is noteworthy 
that in the case of Tunisia, specialization of its economy in industrial activity has 
contrasting effects on unskilled labor remuneration and is susceptible to alleviate urban 
poverty while increasing rural poverty.   
The only developing countries which now lose from full trade liberalization are 
Argentina — due to over-specialization in agriculture — and Mexico whose preferential 
access to USA is still eroded (NAFTA is a reciprocal agreement.)  
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Preferential duties are partially utilized. That is the reason why this scenario 
represents an overstatement of the impact of full liberalization on trade and expected 
benefits in terms of real income. On the contrary, the central experiment understates the 
same impact. This supplementary world real income would mainly benefit poor 
countries. 
4.4.3  Different behavioral parameters: trade elasticities 
The utilization of Linkage trade elasticities, instead of GTAP elasticities has a 
very positive impact on trade (see Figure 26): for example, international trade of 
agricultural products is augmented by 57% with Linkage, instead of 34% with GTAP 
trade elasticities. Consequently, the rate of increase in world welfare is 0.44% vs. 0.33% 
in the central experiment (world welfare gains depend directly on trade increase).  
Figure 26—Welfare gains by region (%) – Full trade liberalization with Linkage  
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Source: author’s calculation.   102
Is this beneficial for developing countries? Yes, as all developing zones benefits 
from a higher welfare gain except Tunisia, the welfare of which increases by 0.3%, 
instead of 0.4%. The gain is impressive for the rest of Sub Saharan Africa and rest of 
Middle East and North Africa zones, and for Zambia.  
4.4.4  Different modeling features: if trade increases global factor productivity… 
As discussed in section 3, trade openness may have a positive impact on total 
factor productivity. This relation can be presented in a simplistic way in a computable 
general equilibrium model. Equation (34) is used in this case, which links directly total 
factor productivity in a sector to the ratio between sector exports and sector output. This 
is implemented in the MIRAGE model in all sectors and all countries. The constant 
elasticity is fixed at 0.055 which is comparable to the LINKAGE’s elasticity, but inferior 
to the one adopted by Dessus et al (1999). This relation is equally applied to all sectors, 
agriculture included: Martin and Mitra (2001) show that this relation is even higher in 
agriculture. 
With this relation between trade openness and total factor productivity, expected 
benefits of full trade liberalization are much amplified, even more than those resulting 
from the other three sensitivity analyses. The gain in world welfare is now +0.59%, 
which represents an augmentation by nearly 80% as compared to the central experiment.  
The issue remains on how liberalization benefits are distributed. When compared 
to the central experiment, the welfare change is smaller for Australia/New Zealand, 
Brazil and Argentina (the loss is larger in the Argentinean case while Brazil has a small 
loss instead of a small gain) while China, India, Bangladesh, Rest of Sub Saharan Africa, 
and Mexico are supporting a higher rate of growth (see Figure 27).    103
Figure 27—Welfare gains by region (%) – Full trade liberalization under a positive  





















































































































































































































































































Welfare Allocation efficiency gains Terms of trade gains
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
In this matter agricultural countries could clearly be distinguished from industrial 
countries. Agricultural specialization is costly due to absence of economies of scale and 
horizontal differentiation in this sector. The positive relation linking openness and factor 
productivity amplifies the opportunity cost. In these three agricultural countries, under 
full trade liberalization, the ratio exports on output calculated at the sector level, increases 
more in agricultural sectors, thus amplifying the country specialization in this activity due 
to increased factor productivity and higher competitiveness. The global disengagement of 
these economies from industry is more pronounced and the opportunity cost in terms of 
economies of scale and varieties is higher. The opposite process works in countries 
comparative advantage of which is in industry: it explains higher welfare gains for China, 
India, Bangladesh and Rest of Sub – Saharan Africa.    104
The impact on factor remunerations is described in Annex Table 18.3. The 
liberalization effects are amplified, especially on unskilled labor in the four previously 
mentioned countries. The impact on industrial unskilled labor in China and India is now 
high, so that consequences on world poverty can be significant.  
4.4.5 Different  modeling  features 
As a multi-country multi-sector trade model requires numerous theoretical 
choices, this sensitivity analysis might be extended much further. We limit this extension, 
however, to three theoretical variations.  
The first one is implementing perfect competition in industry and services instead 
of an imperfect one; the second, eliminates the North/South distinction in the model, that 
is to say the vertical differentiation; the third, assumes perfect mobility of unskilled labor 
between agricultural and industrial activities. 
While the last two sensitivity analyses do not change the picture, the assumption 
of a perfect competition increases substantially the rate of change in world welfare (from 
0.33% up to 0.44%). Furthermore, the distribution of the cake is modified.  
In fact, under imperfect competition in industry and services, the world real 
income appears to move upward for 10 years, both under the baseline scenario and under 
full trade liberalization. Perfect competition in the baseline scenario, however, pulls down 
to a larger extent the world economy’s path as it is more specialized in industry. On the 
contrary, adopting full trade liberalization implies more productive factors in the 
agricultural activity at the worldwide level as initially this activity is more protected. 
Therefore, the opportunity cost of perfect competition in all sectors is smaller. 
As far as the distribution of welfare gains amongst countries/zones is concerned, 
the picture is fairly unchanged under the last two simulations. This is not the case under 
perfect competition. As expected, the change in the theoretical features of the model 
implies more welfare gains for countries with an initial comparative advantage in   105
agriculture (Australia/New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, SACU, Rest of America) and less 
welfare gains for countries specializing in industry (China, India, Tunisia, Bangladesh).  
In the case of Canada, Mexico, and Rest of Sub - Saharan Africa, eroded 
preferences contribute to a contraction of activity both in the agricultural and industrial 
activities, which were particularly negative in case of imperfect competition. Therefore, 
when competition is perfect, the erosion of preferences entails less negative 
consequences.  
Table 12—World welfare gains by region (%) – Full trade liberalization under  




W o r l d 0 . 4 40 . 3 10 . 3 3
Australia/New Zealand 1.4 0.8 0.7
Canada 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Developed Asia 1.4 1.4 1.5
European Union - 25 0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Rest of OECD 0.8 1.1 1.1
USA 0.2 0.1 0.1
Argentina 1.0 -0.3 -0.2
Brazil 0.9 0.1 0.1
China -0.2 0.8 0.7
Developing Asia 0.5 0.3 0.4
India 0.4 0.6 0.7
Mexico 0.3 -0.4 -0.3
Rest of America 0.6 -0.1 0.0
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 0.7 0.9 1.0
Rest of the World 1.1 0.0 0.2
Southern Africa Custom Union 0.5 -0.2 -0.3
Tunisia 0.1 0.4 0.4
Bangladesh 1.3 1.5 1.6
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 0.9 0.6 0.7
Zambia -1.2 0.5 0.4  
Source: author’s calculation.   106
5. CONCLUSION 
Recent studies have noted lower expectations regarding the potential impact of 
trade liberalization on poverty reduction. This is due to improved assessments of existing 
trade distortions. Regional agreements, preferential schemes and recent policy changes in 
trade and agricultural policies make for a more globalized world than it was previously 
thought.  Furthermore, lesser benefits stemming from a potential Doha Development 
Agenda are expected, as assessments take into account the interplay between bound and 
applied distortions (on tariffs and domestic support). 
Nevertheless expected effects from trade liberalization are positive. Our 
assessment concludes on a $100bln world welfare gain, mainly as a result of elimination 
of agricultural distortions. This welfare gain could be amplified up to 80% if openness 
increases factor productivity. At the same time, liberalization should generally contribute 
to poverty alleviation as remuneration of unskilled labor is expected to rise in numerous 
developing countries, especially in South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Developing 
Asia. Finally, liberalization could only marginally reduce world inequality. 
There are always winners and losers from trade liberalization. In some countries 
(Mexico, Zambia), poverty may increase as liberalization leads to decreased 
remuneration of unskilled labor. This is not an uncommon impact as several studies (see 
Hertel, Ivanic, Preckel, and Cranfield, 2000) have already obtained such results.  
This assessment, however, underestimates the positive impact of trade 
liberalization on world welfare for two reasons: 
•  It does not include liberalization in services. 
•  It does not include trade facilitation and elimination of some non tariff barriers 
(technical, sanitary and phyto-sanitary norms). 
One of the major objectives of this study was also to explain divergent results in 
the literature. The first explanation comes from different assessments of the current level   107
of trade distortions: it is now widely recognized that these assessments have to take into 
account preferential schemes and regional agreements. This implies that assessments 
have now converged, but not fully. 
Today, the main source of divergences is the level of trade elasticities and the 
implementation of dynamic relations. There is no consensus yet on the impact of 
behavioral parameters. Moreover, the link between openness and factor productivity 
might be strong, but it is not fully understood and precisely estimated.  
To understand the impact of non tariff barriers or the nature of dynamic relation, 
shortcuts are possible: one can evaluate the impact of trade facilitation by assuming that 
border controls and administrative rules are equivalent to an x% tariff. One can, also 
suppose that trade openness increases global factor productivity. These options 
automatically amplify expected benefits from trade liberalization, but they do not 
improve the understanding of the impact of globalization. Furthermore, there may appear 
benefits from liberalization in areas or activities where they do not exist. For example, 
implementing a positive relation between trade openness and global factor productivity 
could generate very positive results in all developing countries while the intensity is 
questionable in certain Least Developed Countries. In addition, trade openness may have 
much greater effects on capital and skilled labor productivity than on unskilled labor; if 
this is the case, the introduction of this relation could introduce a systematic bias in the 
assessment of the impact of trade liberalization on poverty. 
It could be argued that all CGE models are structurally identical (these are 
Walrassian models), and that their duplication is not necessary. From methodological 
conclusions outlined here, however, (convergence on market access data and divergence 
on trade elasticities, dynamic relations, understanding of trade in services, and non tariff 
barriers), it appears that on the contrary, CGE models have to remain competitive. If 
knowledge on market access recently increased, it was due to competition between 
research teams. In this respect, one can expect future progress in understanding of 
dynamic relations, trade in services, the impact of non tariff barriers, and so forth.   108
The MIRAGE model has shown some real advantages in modeling of 
international trade: it is a very tractable model as sensitivity analysis is easy to 
implement; it proposes original features like vertical differentiation of products and 
foreign direct investment; it is founded on econometrically justified levels of Armington 
elasticities and micro - economically based relations. Consequently, MIRAGE provides 
realistic assessments of benefits from trade liberalization so that it is a credible and 
renowned analytical instrument.  
Furthermore, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has a role 
to play providing consistent analysis of international trade and trade negotiations and 
agreements. As a non lending institution, its role could appear especially credible for 
developing countries. Multi country general equilibrium models are only one analytical 
instrument, particularly appropriate for assessing the impact of multilateral or regional 
agreements on trade flows and macroeconomic variables. A complete evaluation of 
benefits of trade reform for developing countries requires the addition of other 
instruments like single country trade models, partial equilibrium analysis, gravity 
equation, etc. These are complementary tools, not substitutes —IFPRI also needs to 
develop an expertise in these fields. 
In terms of policy recommendations, trade reform must be very ambitious to be 
welfare improving and to have a positive impact on development. The Doha Agenda will 
not entail an implementation of full trade liberalization. On the contrary, it will lead to a 
more or less ambitious package; recent assessments of trade liberalization scenarios by 
CGEM have been successful in showing that “devil could be in the details.” Several 
policy recommendations emerge clearly from these studies: 
•  Tariff cuts have to be large and “progressive” (higher rates of reduction on higher 
tariffs). On the tariff issue, a sensitive products clause could have very negative 
consequences on the extent of liberalization even if it concerns a limited number 
of products. Furthermore, implementing a cap on tariffs, even at a relatively high 
level (200%) could be a measure fostering liberalization.   109
•  Agriculture is the main area where distortions have to be reduced.  
•  Developing countries have to liberalize their own economy. On this topic the 
Special and Differentiated Treatment that WTO offers, gives them flexibility, but 
it may have negative consequences on these countries.  
From this modeling exercise and from recent studies in the literature, expected 
benefits from trade liberalization are surprisingly low. The Asian miracle, Chile’s 
experience, Chinese and Indian liberalization all brought high growth rates per year while 
CGEM concludes on a less than 3% increase in total real income. It could mean either 
that dynamic gains are not well captured by global trade modeling or that these gains 
come from the domestic reform accompanying trade liberalization. Nevertheless, it 
implies that the relationship between trade and domestic reforms is not well understood.  
Thus, CGEMs are providing a better way to understand the impact of trade 
liberalization. This study can also be useful in defining a research agenda. Four priorities 
are clearly presented and are aimed at:  
•  A better understanding and inclusion of non tariffs barriers, administrative 
controls, and lack of infrastructure.  
•  A better understanding of dynamic relations and the way in which trade 
liberalization affects factor productivity and capital accumulation.  
•  Knowledge of the nature and the exact content of domestic reforms which could 
amplify expected benefits from trade liberalization. 
•  A detailed examination of the link between trade and poverty.  
The fourth priority has been the object of important progress in the recent years. 
This is all the more positive as poverty alleviation remains the ultimate objective of this 
debate.    110
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Annex  1 —Arable land per person (rural population) 
Country Name 2002 Country Name 2002
Australia 2.46 Lao PDR 0.17
Canada 1.46 Saudi Arabia 0.16
Kazakhstan 1.45 Swaziland 0.16
Argentina 0.92 Armenia 0.16
Russian Federation 0.86 Honduras 0.16
Lithuania 0.84 Georgia 0.15
Latvia 0.78 India 0.15
Ukraine 0.67 St. Kitts and Nevis 0.15
Guyana 0.63 Tajikistan 0.15
United States 0.61 Pakistan 0.15
Belarus 0.56 Ethiopia 0.15
Paraguay 0.55 Kenya 0.15
Togo 0.53 Vanuatu 0.15
Zambia 0.51 Italy 0.14
Central African Republic 0.51 Germany 0.14
Sudan 0.50 Burundi 0.14
Mongolia 0.49 Peru 0.14
Hungary 0.45 Rwanda 0.14
Estonia 0.45 Comoros 0.14
Moldova 0.43 Nepal 0.13
Chad 0.43 Suriname 0.13
Romania 0.43 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.13
Bulgaria 0.43 Dominican Republic 0.13
Denmark 0.42 Chile 0.13
Finland 0.42 Ecuador 0.13
Serbia and Montenegro 0.42 Eritrea 0.12
Namibia 0.41 Guinea 0.12
Mali 0.41 Liberia 0.12
Niger 0.39 Tanzania 0.11
Benin 0.39 Guatemala 0.11
Uruguay 0.39 Somalia 0.11
Turkmenistan 0.39 China 0.11
New Zealand 0.38 Korea, Dem. Rep. 0.11
Cameroon 0.38 Antigua and Barbuda 0.10
Turkey 0.37 El Salvador 0.10
Burkina Faso 0.37 Sierra Leone 0.10
Poland 0.36 United Kingdom 0.10
Nicaragua 0.36 Indonesia 0.10
Samoa 0.34 Venezuela, RB 0.10
Brazil 0.34 Haiti 0.09
Spain 0.34 Cyprus 0.09
Bolivia 0.34 Cape Verde 0.09
Libya 0.33 Slovenia 0.08
Croatia 0.33 Timor-Leste 0.08
South Africa 0.33 Vietnam 0.08
France 0.31 Yemen, Rep. 0.08
Czech Republic 0.30 Mauritius 0.08
Sweden 0.30 Malaysia 0.07
Ireland 0.29 Philippines 0.07
Tunisia 0.28 Dominica 0.07
Morocco 0.28 Jamaica 0.07
Afghanistan 0.28 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.06
Cambodia 0.28 Barbados 0.06
Macedonia, FYR 0.28 Bangladesh 0.06
Syrian Arab Republic 0.27 Trinidad and Tobago 0.06
Equatorial Guinea 0.27 Costa Rica 0.06
Kyrgyz Republic 0.27 Jordan 0.06
Belize 0.26 Netherlands 0.06
Thailand 0.26 Switzerland 0.06
Zimbabwe 0.25 Colombia 0.05
Gabon 0.25 Congo, Rep. 0.05
Greece 0.25 Israel 0.05
Mexico 0.25 Sri Lanka 0.05
Senegal 0.25 Sao Tome and Principe 0.05
Algeria 0.24 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.04
Fiji 0.24 Papua New Guinea 0.04
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.24 Solomon Islands 0.04
Iraq 0.24 Lebanon 0.04
Cuba 0.24 Netherlands Antilles 0.04
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.23 Virgin Islands (U.S.) 0.04
Angola 0.23 Korea, Rep. 0.04
Mozambique 0.23 Japan 0.03
Nigeria 0.23 Guam 0.03
Azerbaijan 0.22 Qatar 0.03
Botswana 0.22 Brunei 0.03
Malawi 0.21 Bahamas, The 0.03
Guinea-Bissau 0.21 St. Lucia 0.03
Uganda 0.21 Iceland 0.02
Ghana 0.21 New Caledonia 0.02
Myanmar 0.20 Malta 0.02
Portugal 0.19 Kiribati 0.02
Norway 0.19 United Arab Emirates 0.02
Cote d'Ivoire 0.19 Grenada 0.02
Panama 0.19 Bermuda 0.02
Lesotho 0.19 Oman 0.01
Albania 0.18 Maldives 0.01
Gambia, The 0.18 French Polynesia 0.01
Madagascar 0.18 Seychelles 0.01
Uzbekistan 0.18 Puerto Rico 0.01
Mauritania 0.18 Kuwait 0.01
Austria 0.17 Bahrain 0.00
Bhutan 0.17 Djibouti 0.00
Tonga 0.17 Singapore 0.00  
  Source:  World  Development  Indicators,  2003.   119
Annex  2 —Correspondence tables 
CORRESPONDANCE TABLE - Sector
GTAP code Label Aggregation c
pdr Paddy rice Otag
wht Wheat Whet
gro Cereal grains nec Otag
v_fV e getables. fruit. nuts VgFr
osd Oil seeds Otag
c_bS u gar cane. sugar beet Otag
pfb Plant-based fibers Plfb
ocr Crops nec Otag
ctl Cattle.sheep.goats.horses Meat
oap Animal products nec Meat
rmk Raw milk Otag






omn Minerals nec Oprm
cmt Meat: cattle.sheep.goats.horse Meat
omt Meat products nec OtFP
vol Vegetable oils and fats OtFP
mil Dairy products Milk
pcr Processed rice Rice
sgrS u gar Sugr
ofd Food products nec OtFP
b_t Beverages and tobacco products OtFP
tex Textiles Text
wap Wearing apparel Weap
lea Leather products Weap
lum Wood products Omnf
ppp Paper products. publishing Omnf
p_c Petroleum. coal products Mich
crp Chemical.rubber.plastic prods Mich
nmm Mineral products nec Mich
i_s Ferrous metals Mich
nfm Metals nec Mich
fmp Metal products Mich
mvh Motor vehicles and parts Veeq
otn Transport equipment nec Veeq
ele Electronic equipment Veeq
ome Machinery and equipment nec Veeq
omf Manufactures nec Omnf
ely Electricity Omnf




otp Transport nec TrT
wtp Sea transport TrT
atp Air transport TrT
cmn Communication OtSr
ofi Financial services nec OtSr
isr Insurance OtSr
obs Business services nec OtSr
ros Recreation and other services OtSr
osg PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat OtSr
dwe DwellingsO t S r    120
GTAP code Label Aggregation c
aus Australia AUNZ
nzl New Zealand AUNZ
xoc Rest of Oceani RofW
chn China Chin




xea Rest of East AsDvgA
idn Indonesia DvgA





xse Rest of SoutheaDvgA
bgdB a n gladesh Bgld
ind India Indi
lka Sri Lanka DvgA
xsa Rest of South A DvgA
can Canada Cana
usa United States USAm
mex Mexico Mexi









xsm Rest of South A Rame
xca Central AmericRame
xfa Rest of FTAA Rame

















xef Rest of EFTA Roec
xer Rest of EuropeRoec
alb Albania RofW
bgrB u l garia RofW
hrv Croatia RofW
cyp Cyprus EU25











xsu Rest of FormerRofW
tur Turkey Rmen
xme Rest of Middle Rmen
mar Morocco Rmen
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Rest of Middle East and North Africa
Rest of the World
Southern Africa Custom Union
Bangladesh
Rest of SubSaharan Africa
Zambia
Average
Reporting Australia/New Zealand 1.2% 3.5% 5.2% 5.3% 2.8% 3.1% 2.2% 3.0% 6.0% 3.5% 7.5% 6.6% 4.7% 5.1% 3.7% 4.1% 15.1% 3.6% 0.3% 4.8%
Canada 6.7% 2.9% 4.6% 2.2% 0.5% 2.1% 4.3% 4.8% 2.7% 5.8% 0.2% 2.8% 2.1% 2.0% 1.9% 14.3% 0.8% 0.2% 3.4%
Developed Asia 9.2% 5.2% 4.0% 5.3% 2.6% 4.6% 13.5% 11.1% 4.4% 4.3% 10.6% 4.4% 6.6% 3.2% 4.0% 5.0% 3.9% 4.0% 1.9% 4.9%
European Union - 25 10.8% 4.6% 3.5% 0.4% 3.5% 6.4% 6.9% 4.0% 3.0% 5.4% 1.4% 5.1% 0.6% 1.3% 3.0% 0.0% 1.3% 1.1% 3.2%
Rest of OECD 23.2% 6.3% 1.4% 4.6% 0.7% 5.7% 17.5% 13.9% 2.2% 2.6% 5.2% 5.1% 6.2% 1.9% 3.5% 3.9% 0.4% 2.0% 1.7% 4.3%
USA 2.4% 0.1% 2.1% 2.7% 1.4% 3.4% 2.9% 4.4% 2.3% 4.4% 0.0% 2.3% 1.5% 1.6% 0.8% 11.4% 1.0% 0.9% 2.3%
Argentina 11.7% 12.5% 13.4% 13.7% 11.4% 13.2% 4.7% 15.4% 11.2% 13.9% 9.7% 8.1% 8.3% 10.9% 13.0% 16.0% 5.6% 10.6% 12.5%
Brazil 9.7% 8.8% 13.9% 13.9% 9.4% 10.6% 3.3% 15.2% 11.0% 11.6% 13.4% 9.8% 6.0% 7.3% 11.8% 13.5% 2.4% 7.5% 11.8%
China 7.4% 5.5% 8.7% 8.3% 7.0% 5.8% 7.9% 8.6% 7.2% 7.8% 7.7% 7.7% 5.2% 7.7% 7.8% 7.3% 2.8% 2.9% 7.6%
Developing Asia 7.0% 3.5% 7.4% 5.7% 2.8% 7.8% 11.1% 14.7% 6.4% 5.4% 9.2% 3.9% 8.3% 4.4% 6.9% 8.6% 2.7% 6.8% 6.5% 6.5%
India 34.0% 37.2% 31.8% 30.5% 32.8% 28.5% 48.1% 34.2% 33.8% 35.7% 27.9% 31.2% 28.0% 31.7% 34.6% 13.2% 22.8% 34.4% 31.8%
Mexico 17.9% 1.6% 13.1% 17.0% 11.9% 1.1% 18.9% 24.4% 21.3% 12.2% 20.8% 7.4% 14.1% 17.8% 16.9% 24.7% 14.9% 14.5% 10.8%
Rest of America 9.8% 13.4% 8.6% 10.5% 11.3% 8.0% 9.2% 10.1% 11.2% 8.7% 9.8% 15.1% 9.6% 12.9% 8.6% 9.3% 12.2% 10.9% 6.9% 9.6%
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 14.0% 6.0% 9.4% 7.5% 5.7% 9.6% 14.8% 13.7% 13.6% 9.7% 14.4% 8.3% 14.7% 7.2% 9.8% 12.8% 19.5% 8.5% 9.1% 9.2%
Rest of the World 12.6% 11.3% 8.1% 8.6% 7.9% 9.5% 12.2% 13.0% 11.8% 8.2% 10.4% 9.3% 11.1% 7.2% 4.7% 12.3% 10.0% 5.0% 6.0% 8.9%
Southern Africa Custom Union 16.3% 9.9% 7.0% 8.1% 3.3% 7.9% 8.8% 17.2% 12.2% 5.9% 13.4% 6.2% 11.3% 6.1% 8.0% 0.0% 16.8% 3.3% 3.3% 8.2%
Bangladesh 10.7% 10.1% 19.0% 14.9% 7.4% 15.8% 17.3% 19.2% 20.5% 19.8% 17.2% 27.2% 25.4% 17.0% 15.4% 12.1% 29.0% 17.5% 17.4%
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 11.6% 14.2% 13.0% 16.3% 12.2% 15.6% 16.5% 20.4% 21.9% 20.6% 20.9% 13.8% 14.9% 17.4% 12.6% 19.5% 18.7% 18.7% 12.6% 16.9%
Zambia 7.6% 8.2% 15.1% 11.6% 11.0% 7.2% 8.3% 18.9% 13.8% 14.9% 10.7% 15.1% 10.6% 11.3% 9.5% 11.5% 23.7% 6.5% 11.8%
Average 9.7% 3.9% 5.4% 5.6% 2.4% 5.2% 10.5% 10.1% 5.6% 5.1% 8.3% 2.2% 6.6% 3.0% 4.9% 7.7% 4.9% 4.4% 4.7%  
Source: MacMap-HS6 and author’s calculation. 
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Annex  4 —Initial pattern of protection – Reporting country / Product - 2005 
















Australia/New Zealand 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 0.5% 0.0% 0.1% 3.9% 3.2% 12.7% 16.8% 3.0% 4.9% 3.4% 4.8%
Canada 7.9% 103.2% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 2.1% 1.7% 1.1% 10.9% 0.1% 10.4% 13.5% 2.0% 1.7% 1.5% 3.4%
Developed Asia 21.5% 46.1% 0.2% 614.7% 139.5% 18.4% 79.8% 38.3% 15.8% 1.6% 6.0% 8.7% 2.5% 3.1% 1.5% 4.9%
European Union - 25 39.7% 47.0% 0.0% 138.6% 128.6% 17.9% 0.5% 7.5% 11.1% 0.1% 5.8% 7.1% 2.1% 2.2% 1.0% 3.2%
Rest of OECD 102.3% 88.1% 0.0% 13.3% 44.0% 31.5% 108.4% 32.9% 37.0% 0.2% 3.6% 2.7% 0.7% 0.5% 1.1% 4.3%
USA 1.7% 18.8% 1.6% 4.9% 34.9% 2.7% 2.4% 2.8% 3.7% 0.0% 9.0% 10.9% 2.1% 1.3% 0.6% 2.3%
Argentina 8.6% 16.8% 7.4% 12.2% 17.5% 10.4% 5.7% 7.4% 14.1% 0.8% 18.3% 19.7% 12.1% 12.8% 13.7% 12.5%
Brazil 6.0% 19.7% 8.8% 14.5% 17.5% 8.8% 4.6% 6.7% 13.3% 0.8% 18.1% 18.2% 10.7% 13.4% 12.5% 11.8%
China 9.9% 11.4% 1.1% 1.0% 19.8% 11.9% 1.0% 11.1% 15.5% 1.2% 11.3% 13.2% 7.9% 7.3% 5.4% 7.6%
Developing Asia 3.8% 5.5% 1.6% 16.8% 19.4% 10.1% 7.7% 20.5% 12.1% 1.4% 10.3% 7.5% 5.8% 6.4% 5.6% 6.5%
India 24.2% 51.4% 5.6% 72.8% 59.5% 41.4% 100.0% 46.1% 63.1% 19.5% 29.4% 32.7% 32.4% 25.3% 27.4% 31.8%
Mexico 14.3% 32.6% 5.2% 17.4% 20.8% 22.8% 28.2% 29.5% 29.9% 10.3% 14.5% 24.0% 9.3% 7.7% 10.6% 10.8%
Rest of America 10.3% 19.2% 5.1% 31.2% 29.4% 14.1% 5.9% 8.4% 16.5% 13.2% 11.7% 14.5% 8.1% 8.4% 10.0% 9.6%
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 26.4% 40.8% 3.7% 19.3% 30.7% 26.7% 17.1% 18.2% 21.7% 4.8% 14.3% 25.6% 7.4% 6.8% 8.6% 9.2%
Rest of the World 14.5% 27.4% 1.1% 9.6% 36.5% 20.3% 22.8% 7.5% 23.4% 2.5% 11.0% 16.3% 7.9% 7.4% 10.1% 8.9%
Southern Africa Custom  Union 12.5% 38.3% 13.5% 0.0% 97.3% 7.3% 36.3% 9.6% 14.3% 0.3% 21.5% 31.3% 5.4% 6.2% 8.0% 8.2%
Bangladesh 17.7% 34.8% 0.2% 5.0% 25.2% 16.8% 5.0% 15.9% 26.5% 22.0% 29.7% 28.7% 16.8% 11.8% 21.8% 17.4%
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 16.9% 19.7% 6.1% 32.1% 23.1% 32.3% 10.6% 20.5% 33.4% 7.1% 29.4% 36.0% 15.4% 12.1% 19.9% 16.9%
Zambia 9.3% 13.8% 5.5% 4.9% 23.7% 16.7% 5.0% 8.0% 19.0% 7.3% 16.5% 24.4% 8.6% 11.0% 16.2% 11.8%
Average 21.4% 33.1% 2.3% 71.9% 52.2% 14.2% 16.1% 14.5% 13.9% 1.3% 9.5% 10.3% 4.4% 3.8% 2.9%  
Source: MacMap-HS6 and author’s calculation. 
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Rest of Middle East and North Africa
Southern Africa Custom Union
Tunisia
Bangladesh
Rest of SubSaharan Africa
Zambia
Rest of the World
Total
Exp. Australia/New Zealand 5.8% 2.0% 28.2% 19.2% 12.2% 0.9% 0.2% 0.5% 6.6% 10.4% 1.7% 0.9% 1.2% 6.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.3% 0.7% 0.0% 2.3% 100.0%
Canada 0.5% 0.0% 4.9% 10.5% 74.6% 0.7% 0.1% 0.4% 1.8% 1.3% 0.3% 1.1% 1.7% 1.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.5% 100.0%
Developed Asia 1.8% 2.0% 14.6% 19.0% 25.3% 0.9% 0.2% 0.8% 13.4% 12.0% 0.7% 1.2% 2.4% 3.5% 0.4% 0.0% 0.2% 0.8% 0.0% 0.9% 100.0%
European Union - 25 0.9% 1.4% 5.3% 59.7% 11.2% 4.0% 0.3% 0.9% 1.8% 2.6% 0.6% 0.8% 1.3% 4.4% 0.5% 0.3% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 2.9% 100.0%
USA 1.8% 16.2% 15.2% 30.3% 0.0% 1.6% 0.6% 1.9% 3.3% 6.1% 0.7% 10.2% 4.6% 4.7% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.8% 0.0% 1.4% 100.0%
Rest of OECD 0.8% 2.0% 6.4% 60.2% 12.8% 1.2% 0.2% 0.8% 1.5% 3.2% 0.5% 0.8% 1.6% 5.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7% 0.0% 1.8% 100.0%
Argentina 0.5% 1.1% 4.4% 21.8% 10.7% 0.7% 0.0% 19.9% 4.4% 3.8% 1.8% 1.6% 17.8% 7.4% 1.1% 0.3% 0.8% 0.9% 0.0% 1.0% 100.0%
Brazil 0.5% 1.5% 7.6% 28.7% 23.3% 1.3% 7.4% 0.0% 3.6% 2.7% 0.6% 3.0% 10.0% 5.1% 0.7% 0.1% 0.2% 1.1% 0.0% 2.5% 100.0%
China 1.7% 2.2% 30.4% 20.0% 28.5% 0.7% 0.3% 0.4% 0.0% 6.6% 0.7% 0.8% 1.7% 2.9% 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 1.0% 0.0% 1.3% 100.0%
Developing Asia 2.1% 1.3% 21.1% 20.5% 19.7% 0.7% 0.2% 0.5% 6.4% 18.2% 1.9% 0.9% 0.9% 3.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.4% 0.9% 0.0% 0.8% 100.0%
India 1.1% 1.7% 9.3% 29.6% 19.9% 1.3% 0.3% 1.4% 3.5% 9.9% 0.0% 0.7% 1.4% 10.8% 0.7% 0.1% 2.0% 3.7% 0.0% 2.6% 100.0%
Mexico 0.3% 3.3% 2.2% 6.9% 78.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 0.0% 4.1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 100.0%
Rest of America 0.5% 2.8% 7.2% 22.7% 33.1% 1.9% 1.1% 2.8% 2.1% 1.9% 2.8% 2.7% 14.6% 1.6% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 1.5% 100.0%
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 0.8% 0.9% 20.2% 31.8% 17.5% 0.9% 0.2% 1.0% 3.1% 7.6% 2.2% 0.4% 0.7% 8.9% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 1.0% 0.0% 1.9% 100.0%
Southern Africa Custom Union 1.3% 0.9% 10.6% 36.5% 12.5% 1.6% 0.2% 1.0% 2.7% 2.7% 3.3% 0.7% 0.8% 4.5% 9.9% 0.0% 0.0% 8.1% 1.3% 1.3% 100.0%
Tunisia 0.5% 0.8% 3.1% 71.5% 6.4% 1.0% 0.3% 0.5% 0.9% 1.5% 1.2% 0.4% 0.9% 8.6% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 1.1% 0.0% 1.1% 100.0%
Bangladesh 0.5% 1.8% 4.0% 44.3% 37.4% 1.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.2% 3.2% 0.8% 0.4% 0.6% 4.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.4% 100.0%
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 0.3% 0.7% 6.1% 40.7% 25.5% 1.4% 0.2% 2.5% 4.2% 2.9% 1.4% 0.4% 1.1% 2.3% 3.5% 0.1% 0.1% 5.1% 0.2% 1.2% 100.0%
Zambia 0.1% 0.1% 8.6% 45.9% 1.6% 3.9% 0.0% 0.1% 3.2% 6.6% 1.1% 0.1% 0.2% 9.6% 12.3% 0.0% 0.1% 5.6% 0.0% 0.8% 100.0%
Rest of the World 0.6% 0.5% 5.3% 44.0% 7.1% 3.6% 0.1% 0.5% 5.6% 2.1% 0.7% 0.3% 1.5% 7.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.6% 0.0% 20.2% 100.0%  
Source: MacMap-HS6 and author’s calculation. 
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Rest of Middle East and North Africa
Rest of the World
Southern Africa Custom Union
Tunisia
Bangladesh
Rest of SubSaharan Africa
Zambia
Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse 7.7% 1.4% 0.1% 0.6% 0.2% 0.9% 1.3% 1.8% 0.4% 0.2% 0.7% 0.3% 0.8% 0.3% 0.6% 0.9% 0.5% 0.1% 0.7% 0.3%
Milk (processed) 5.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.8% 0.3% 0.1% 1.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%
Plant-based fibers 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 1.2% 1.8% 1.0%
Rice (processed) 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 1.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%
Sugar (processed) 0.8% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 2.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.1% 1.2% 0.1% 0.1% 1.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.7% 3.0%
Vegetables an d Fruit 1.7% 0.5% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.6% 2.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 1.2% 1.7% 4.0% 1.3% 0.3% 2.6% 1.4% 0.3% 2.4% 0.9%
Wheat 1.8% 1.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.4% 5.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Other Agricultural Products 1.3% 0.9% 0.2% 0.6% 0.2% 2.0% 19.5% 13.9% 0.7% 1.5% 2.9% 0.4% 3.6% 0.6% 1.1% 1.0% 0.4% 0.6% 8.6% 4.2%
Other Food Products 5.4% 3.2% 0.7% 4.1% 3.2% 2.7% 18.0% 9.2% 1.9% 4.6% 4.2% 2.3% 8.2% 1.7% 3.1% 4.3% 4.5% 4.9% 5.3% 0.7%
Other Primary products 19.1% 7.3% 0.1% 1.0% 14.4% 0.7% 8.2% 6.2% 1.2% 4.5% 2.2% 6.9% 16.2% 40.0% 27.4% 10.6% 5.4% 0.2% 43.6% 0.5%
Textile 0.5% 0.7% 4.8% 1.7% 0.7% 1.3% 0.8% 1.1% 11.9% 4.1% 13.2% 2.2% 2.6% 2.6% 1.4% 1.3% 2.8% 24.5% 1.5% 2.2%
Wearing and Apparel 0.8% 0.5% 1.6% 1.8% 0.6% 0.7% 2.4% 3.0% 29.3% 4.4% 11.9% 3.0% 4.8% 2.8% 3.1% 1.2% 14.3% 45.4% 2.2% 0.3%
Metal mineral petroleum and chemical products 20.3% 17.0% 16.7% 23.0% 26.4% 17.2% 16.2% 18.6% 11.3% 11.6% 20.0% 9.8% 23.7% 19.5% 34.6% 36.7% 16.1% 7.3% 8.4% 70.2%
Vehicles and equipment 10.2% 40.2% 56.3% 38.3% 25.5% 43.8% 10.1% 23.4% 24.9% 48.2% 8.4% 62.2% 9.3% 8.8% 9.6% 14.7% 20.6% 1.8% 3.4% 2.3%
Other manufacturing products 4.6% 15.0% 3.0% 7.5% 8.0% 5.0% 3.3% 7.8% 12.8% 6.1% 13.3% 4.2% 6.1% 5.2% 6.0% 15.5% 2.9% 0.7% 6.7% 11.6%
Transport and Trade 9.8% 4.6% 10.4% 7.4% 8.1% 6.9% 5.0% 3.3% 3.1% 5.7% 7.6% 3.5% 10.1% 8.3% 5.7% 6.5% 18.2% 2.2% 7.1% 1.8%
Other services 9.1% 7.4% 6.3% 12.5% 12.4% 17.5% 5.9% 8.9% 1.7% 8.0% 12.3% 3.4% 9.0% 8.5% 5.5% 3.1% 12.3% 11.0% 7.7% 1.2%
Sum 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  
Source: MacMap-HS6 and author’s calculation. 
   125

































iddle East and North Africa







Rest of SubSaharan Africa
Zam
bia
Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse 5.9 13.0 6.4 -4.6 4.3 -13.4 3.3 -0.4 16.1 7.2 5.0 0.4 2.3 4.0 -6.1 3.3 4.4 3.5 0.8 -1.0 4.3
Milk (processed) 4.6 11.6 -2.5 -5.5 4.6 0.5 5.2 3.2 4.2 0.1 0.2 -3.0 -11.7 2.1 -3.3 -0.2 0.2 1.1 -9.8 -6.9 3.5
Plant-based fibers 6.9 9.0 4.2 6.7 24.1 6.7 8.3 5.8 6.6 3.8 6.9 4.5 4.4 5.4 4.5 4.1 1.3 5.1 -5.7 -0.2 4.1
Rice (processed) 3.0 8.2 4.7 -21.4 -9.7 -2.4 2.1 -6.4 4.9 5.9 4.2 5.5 3.0 2.0 2.2 1.5 2.3 -0.6 0.5 0.5 5.7
Sugar (processed) 2.3 11.3 2.0 -18.2 -7.3 -5.2 1.8 -1.2 3.4 6.6 -1.3 -3.9 4.5 7.1 0.6 -1.3 4.0 -0.2 -0.7 0.3 7.2
Vegetables and Fruit 5.3 11.1 8.7 4.0 1.6 -6.5 9.4 5.2 8.2 9.6 8.1 -0.1 6.2 7.8 1.6 5.6 6.3 4.3 1.0 2.1 8.5
Wheat 10.6 13.5 9.8 -21.5 10.4 -10.4 15.5 9.9 8.4 5.4 10.2 7.2 15.3 5.0 1.1 5.3 5.0 0.4 2.9 7.4 4.9
Other Agricultural Products 8.3 16.3 8.6 -9.6 7.9 3.3 14.8 6.3 10.2 8.5 6.1 1.4 5.4 5.6 1.0 4.6 4.9 2.9 2.1 2.1 7.5
Other Food Products -0.9 7.8 2.3 -15.1 -1.2 -4.8 2.3 3.3 4.7 -4.7 -2.3 -5.5 0.7 0.9 -0.8 0.9 2.7 -0.8 -5.6 -1.6 5.7
Other Primary products 2.9 6.4 2.2 2.6 3.0 6.2 2.1 -2.7 2.4 4.7 4.3 -6.4 3.8 -1.3 4.4 -0.4 4.7 2.7 -0.3 2.4 5.9
Textile 3.6 4.2 0.1 2.2 -1.6 -1.7 0.8 -1.6 -1.8 12.4 7.1 0.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.8 1.7 0.0 -6.2 7.8 -5.0 1.1
Wearing and Apparel 3.8 2.5 1.0 2.9 -1.0 -1.0 0.5 -0.8 0.8 10.6 1.8 -3.3 -4.3 -0.7 -1.1 0.6 -2.3 -6.6 -7.2 -5.2 1.6
Metal mineral petroleum and chemical products 0.3 5.5 1.6 1.2 1.1 0.4 1.5 4.8 0.3 -2.7 2.4 -7.5 2.2 -0.2 -7.3 1.1 2.8 -0.8 -15.5 -4.9 -6.8
Vehicles and equipment 1.5 4.5 2.1 1.9 4.0 1.3 1.4 4.1 1.1 -2.1 -1.5 -7.7 -1.5 0.6 2.3 1.7 2.0 2.1 12.9 -13.6 -17.4
Other manufacturing products 0.2 5.7 1.3 0.7 -1.2 1.0 1.4 -3.0 3.3 1.5 4.9 -5.2 4.2 0.7 -2.9 1.4 2.4 0.8 -5.9 -1.3 8.4
Transport and Trade 1.2 5.3 1.1 3.0 0.1 2.2 1.4 -5.2 4.6 0.2 5.6 -2.7 -9.9 0.7 1.1 4.1 2.3 4.3 2.8 -0.5 9.1
Other services 1.2 5.6 -1.8 4.5 -0.3 0.5 1.4 8.5 6.2 4.0 5.9 -0.6 7.3 2.8 2.8 5.6 2.3 3.1 2.6 -0.2 9.1  
Source: author’s calculation.  126
Annex  8 —Decomposing full trade liberalization by liberalizing region 
* North liberalization 
 
Annex Table 8.1— Impact of full trade liberalization in the North: world indicators  
      for 2015 - rate of change (%) 
Indicator Total
World agricultural trade 10.81
World Trade -2.37
World Welfare 0.11  
Source: author’s calculation. 
Annex Table 8.2— Impact of full trade liberalization in the North: Macroeconomic  




Terms of trade gains
Australia/New Zealand 0.2 0.1 0.6
Canada 0.0 0.6 0.0
Developed Asia 1.2 2.3 -0.2
European Union - 25 -0.2 0.2 -0.3
USA -0.1 0.0 -0.1
Rest of OECD 0.8 1.0 -0.3
Argentina -0.4 -0.1 -0.2
Brazil 0.3 0.0 0.3
China -0.3 -1.0 1.4
Developing Asia 0.3 0.0 0.6
India 0.3 -0.1 0.2
Mexico -0.5 -0.2 -0.1
Rest of America 0.2 0.0 0.4
of Middle East and North Africa 0.0 -0.2 0.2
Southern Africa Custom Union -0.2 0.0 0.2
Tunisia 0.3 0.1 -0.1
Rest of the World 0.2 0.0 0.2
Bangladesh 0.8 0.0 0.4
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 0.0 0.0 0.1
Zambia -0.7 -0.2 -0.2  
Source: author’s calculation.  127
* South liberalization 
Annex Table 8.3— Impact of full trade liberalization in the South: world indicators  
      for 2015- rate of change (%) 
Indicator Total
World agricultural Imports 18.66
World Trade 5.19
World Welfare 0.06  
Source: author’s calculation. 
Annex Table 8.4— Impact of full trade liberalization in the South: macroeconomic  




Terms of trade gains
Australia/New Zealand 0.6 0.0 0.8
Canada -0.2 0.0 0.1
Developed Asia 0.1 0.0 0.2
European Union - 25 0.0 -0.1 0.2
USA 0.1 0.0 0.1
Rest of OECD 0.1 0.0 0.3
Argentina -0.5 0.2 0.0
Brazil -0.2 0.1 -0.1
China 0.2 0.8 -0.2
Developing Asia 0.0 0.7 -0.6
India 0.5 1.5 -1.0
Mexico 0.0 1.3 -0.3
Rest of America -0.1 0.8 -0.6
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 0.8 1.2 -0.7
Rest of the World -0.5 1.1 -0.5
Southern Africa Custom Union -0.1 0.3 0.3
Tunisia 0.7 0.4 0.0
Bangladesh 1.4 1.8 -1.2
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 0.5 1.3 -0.9
Zambia 1.1 1.8 -2.2 
Source: author’s calculation.   128
Annex  9 —Decomposing full trade liberalization by activities 
 
* Liberalization in agriculture 
Annex Table 9.1— Impact of full trade liberalization in agriculture:  World    
      indicators for 2015- rate of change (%) 
World agricultural trade 37.6
World Trade 1.6
World Welfare 0.18  
Source: author’s calculation. 
Annex Table 9.2— Impact of full trade liberalization in agriculture: macroeconomic 
      indicators for 2015- rate of change (%) 
Welfare
Allocation efficiency gains
Terms of trade gains
Australia/New Zealand 0.5 -0.1 0.9
Canada 0.1 0.3 0.0
Developed Asia 1.1 2.1 -0.2
European Union - 25 0.0 0.1 -0.1
USA -0.1 0.0 0.0
Rest of OECD 0.8 1.0 -0.3
Argentina 0.2 0.0 0.2
Brazil 0.4 0.0 0.6
China -0.1 -0.1 1.0
Developing Asia 0.0 0.4 0.3
India 0.6 0.7 -0.1
Mexico 0.0 0.3 -0.1
Rest of America 0.1 0.1 0.2
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 0.2 0.4 -0.2
Southern Africa Custom Union 0.4 0.2 0.2
Tunisia 0.5 0.2 0.2
Rest of the World 0.4 0.3 0.0
Bangladesh 0.7 0.1 0.1
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 0.6 0.8 -0.3
Zambia 0.0 0.2 0.0  
Source: author’s calculation.   129
* Liberalization in industry 
Annex Table 9.3— Impact of full trade liberalization in industry: world indicators  
      for 2015-rate of change (%) 
World agricultural Imports -6.2
World Trade 1.0
World Welfare 0.0  
Source: author’s calculation. 
 
Annex Table 9.4— Impact of full trade liberalization in industry: macroeconomic  
             indicators for 2015- rate of change (%) 
Welfare
Allocation efficiency gains
Terms of trade gains
Australia/New Zealand 0.3 0.1 0.4
Canada -0.3 0.4 0.1
Developed Asia 0.2 0.4 0.2
European Union - 25 -0.3 0.1 0.0
USA 0.1 0.0 0.0
Rest of OECD 0.2 0.0 0.3
Argentina -1.1 0.1 -0.4
Brazil -0.3 0.1 -0.3
China -0.2 0.1 0.1
Developing Asia 0.2 0.3 -0.4
India 0.1 0.8 -0.7
Mexico -0.5 1.0 -0.3
Rest of America 0.0 0.7 -0.4
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 0.7 0.7 -0.2
Rest of the World -0.2 0.6 0.0
Southern Africa Custom Union -0.7 0.1 0.3
Tunisia 0.5 0.3 -0.3
Bangladesh 1.3 1.6 -0.9
Rest of SubSaharan Africa -0.1 0.6 -0.4
Zambia 0.5 1.5 -2.4  
Source: author’s calculation.   130
Annex  10 —Decomposing full trade liberalization by instruments 
 
* Elimination of tariffs 
Annex Table 10.1—Impact of full elimination of import tariffs: World indicators for 
   2015-rate  of  change  (%) 
World agricultural trade 39.5
World Trade 9.0
World Welfare 0.23  
Source: author’s calculation. 
Annex Table 10.2—Impact of full elimination of import tariffs: Macroeconomic  
      indicators for 2015- rate of change (%) 
Welfare
Allocation efficiency gains
Terms of trade gains
Australia/New Zealand 0.5 0.0 1.0
Canada 0.1 0.4 -0.1
Developed Asia 1.5 2.0 0.1
European Union - 25 0.0 0.2 0.0
USA 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rest of OECD 1.0 1.0 0.2
Argentina -0.2 0.1 0.0
Brazil -0.4 0.0 0.2
China -0.2 0.2 0.5
Developing Asia 0.5 0.7 0.0
India 0.3 1.5 -0.9
Mexico 0.0 0.6 -0.4
Rest of America -0.1 0.7 -0.3
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 0.2 0.8 -0.4
Rest of the World 0.2 0.7 -0.2
Southern Africa Custom Union 0.5 0.3 0.5
Tunisia -0.4 0.0 -0.4
Bangladesh 0.4 1.0 -1.4
Rest of SubSaharan Africa -0.5 1.1 -1.0
Zambia -0.5 0.8 -1.0  
Source: author’s calculation.  131
* Elimination of domestic support 
Annex Table 10.3— Impact of a full elimination of domestic support: World   
      indicators for 2015- rate of change (%) 
World agricultural trade -8.2
World Trade -6.1
World Welfare -0.04  
Source: author’s calculation. 
Annex Table 10.4— Impact of full elimination of domestic support: Macroeconomic  




Australia/New Zealand 0.1 0.1 0.3
Canada -0.3 0.3 0.2
Developed Asia -0.1 0.4 -0.1
European Union - 25 -0.3 0.0 -0.1
Rest of OECD 0.0 0.0 -0.1
USA 0.0 0.0 0.0
Argentina -0.7 0.1 -0.2
Brazil 0.3 0.0 -0.1
China 0.2 -0.3 0.6
Developing Asia 0.0 0.1 -0.1
India 0.5 0.0 0.0
Mexico -0.4 0.7 -0.1
Rest of America 0.2 0.0 0.1
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 0.7 0.3 0.0
Rest of the World 0.2 0.2 0.1
Southern Africa Custom Union -0.8 -0.1 0.0
Tunisia 1.3 0.5 0.2
Bangladesh 1.4 0.5 0.4
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 0.9 0.1 0.3
Zambia 1.4 1.0 -1.1  
Source: author’s calculation.  132
* Elimination of export subsidies 
Annex Table 10.5— Impact of a full elimination of export subsidies: World    
      indicators for 2015- rate of change (%) 
World agricultural trade -5.6
World Trade -1.0
World Welfare -0.1 
Source: author’s calculation. 
Annex Table 10.6— Impact of full elimination of export subsidies: Macroeconomic  




Terms of trade gains
Australia/New Zealand -0.1 0.0 -0.1
Canada -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Developed Asia -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
European Union - 25 0.0 0.0 0.0
USA -0.1 0.0 -0.1
Rest of OECD -0.3 -0.1 -0.1
Argentina -0.7 -0.1 -0.4
Brazil -0.2 0.0 -0.2
China -0.8 -1.0 1.0
Developing Asia -0.1 -0.1 0.1
India 0.1 -0.1 0.1
Mexico -0.2 -0.1 0.1
Rest of America 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rest of Middle East and North Africa -0.1 0.0 -0.2
Rest of the World -0.3 0.3 -0.2
Southern Africa Custom Union -0.1 0.0 0.0
Tunisia 0.6 0.2 0.3
Bangladesh 0.6 0.0 0.3
Rest of SubSaharan Africa -0.4 -0.1 -0.2
Zambia 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Source: author’s calculation.  133
Annex  11 —Assessing the impact of full trade liberalization by CGEM 
 
This annex provides a synoptic table on recent assessments
55 of full trade 
liberalization on world welfare and poverty
56. The next one gives the same information 
for the Doha Development Agenda.  
A study might contain several modeling exercises corresponding with different 
theoretical structures. The USDA-ERS assessment is carried out under a static and a 
dynamic version. The two Global Economic Prospects from the World Bank (in 2002 and 
2004) utilize both a dynamic framework; but the second one supposes a positive relation 
between trade openness and factor productivity. Cline 1 corresponds to a static model 
with constant return to scale, while Cline 2 assesses expected benefits from trade 
liberalization using a Steady State dynamic model under which capital rises until the rate 
of return on investment returns to the pre - liberalization level. 
Annexes 12 and 13 present three experiments of the Doha Agenda by Anderson, 
Martin and Van der Mensbrugghe (2005): the first one concerns liberalization only in 
agriculture, the second one adds a sensitive products clause, and the third one adds to the 
first experiment liberalization in industry. Bouet, Mevel, and Orden (2005) present two 
alternative scenarios, the ambitious scenario and the unambitious one, to evaluate the 
potential area of negotiation in the last U.S. and EU proposals. 
The columns in these annexes indicate technical features of the experiment 
conducted (either full liberalization or the implementation of a potential Doha 
Development Agenda – DDA-), the CGEM under which the experiment was carried out, 
the geographic and sectoral decompositions (the 1
st figure is the number of trading zones, 
                                                
55 Since 2001. 
56 In the case of the GEP 2004, it is a pro-poor scenario which would imply elimination of export subsidies, 
decoupling all domestic support and a significant cut in tariffs: rich countries would be subject to a 
maximum tariff of 10% in agriculture (5% in industry), with an average target of 5% (1%). For developing 
countries, the caps would be 15 and 10% with average of 10 and 5%.   134
the 2
nd is the number of sectors) and the data utilized. All simulations are based on the 
GTAP database, either the GTAP5 version accounting for 1997, or the GTAP6 version, 
for 2001. This database may be improved (in this case, the notation “+…” is added). For 
example, Bouët, Bureau, Decreux and Jean (2005) utilize the GTAP5 database, but 
replace GTAP tariffs by MacMap-HS6 data and construct an original dataset of domestic 
support for the European Union and the USA. Moreover they simulate a “pre-
experiment” shock for 2005, which includes not only these previous changes, but also the 
EBA initiative and AGOA, the end of the Uruguay Round, the phasing out of the Multi-
Fiber Arrangement and the enlargement of the European Union. If these liberalization 
shocks are not included before the experiment is conducted, the impact on trade and thus 
the benefits of openness would be overstated.    
The amount of world benefits which can be expected from trade liberalization is 
not the only worthwhile information. Other points are of key importance: is agriculture 
the main source of benefits? Must negotiators concentrate their efforts on market access, 
domestic support or export subsidies? Which kind of countries will be the main 
beneficiaries? Are expected benefits coming from liberalizing developed countries’ trade 
policy or that of developing countries? This is the reason why these two annexes give 
different macroeconomic results. The 7
th and 8
th rows focus on world welfare which 
results from this experiment. The increase in this indicator is assessed in $, then in 
percentage. In order to address the previous questions, rows 5 to 8 decompose this 
increase in world welfare: the part of it coming from liberalizing agriculture, then from 
improving market access, the part of world welfare benefiting developing countries and 
the one coming from liberalization in developing countries.  
Presenting the contribution of each distortion in welfare increase is not strictly 
consistent: if referring to the theory of second best, the elimination of one distortion in a 
world where several conditions for a Pareto optimum are not fulfilled does not 
necessarily entail a welfare improvement. On the contrary, adding a distortion may 
increase welfare. As a result, eliminating simultaneously tariffs, domestic support, and   135
export subsidies does not imply the same increase in welfare as the sum of the three 
separate changes in economic policy. Nevertheless, studies on the expected benefits of 
trade liberalization frequently present this decomposition. We will keep this presentation 
in our review of literature, but adopt a more consistent way of presenting results in our 
central experiment
57. 
In these two annexes, the following three rows concern other macroeconomic 
information: increase in world (global and agricultural) trade and variation of world 
agricultural prices. This last information is crucial as a frequent criticism addressed to 
trade liberalization is that it will entail an augmentation of these prices such that net food 
importing countries could lose. Then the following row indicates if there are losers in this 
process in terms of national welfare. 
Finally, the last row indicates the impact on world poverty (2$ per day definition) 
when available. This is obviously a key issue of this debate. 
 
                                                
57 The decomposition technique which is used in all these studies has been inspired by Harrison, Horridge 
and Pearson, 2000.   136
Annex  12 —Recent assessments of the impact of full trade liberalization 
Dessus et alii (1999)
Dessus et alii (1999)
Dee and Hanslow (March 2000)
Hertel (July:August 2000)
Anderson, Francois, Hertel, Hoekman and Martin (2000
USDA - ERS (2001) 1
USDA - ERS (2001) 2
The World Bank (GEP 2002) 1
The World Bank (GEP 2002) 2
The World Bank (GEP 2004) 1
The World Bank (GEP 2004) 2
Cline, 2004 1
Cline, 2004 2
Beghin and Van der Mensbrugghe, 2004
Anderson, Van der Mensbrugghe and Martin, 2005
Francois, Von Meijl and Tongeren, 2005
Hertel and Keeney, 2005
Bouet, Mevel and Orden (2005)
Bouet, 2006
Experiment Full tariff lib'n Full tariff lib'n Full lib'n Full tariff lib'n Full lib'n Full lib'n - Agric.  Full lib'n - Agric.  Full lib'n Full lib'n Pro-poor scen. Pro-poor scen. Full lib'n Full lib'n Full lib'n Full lib'n Full lib'n Full lib'n Full lib'n Full lib'n
Model used Linkage Linkage GTAP GTAP GTAP USDA - ERS mode USDA - ERS mode Linkage Linkage Linkage Linkage HRT HRT Linkage Linkage GTAP5 GTAP-Agr MIRAGE MIRAGE
Static/Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Static Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Static Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Static Dynamic Dynamic
Specific feature TO/TFP FDI TO/TFP TO/TFP SS
Geogr. and sector decomposition 16*4 16*4 19*30 19*22 12*9 agric. 12*9 agric. 15*20 15*20 23*… 23*… 25*22 25*22 23*22 27*25 16*17 30* 41*18 20*17
Data 1995 1995 1995+… 1995+… 1995 1997+… 1997+… 1997 1997 1997+… 1997+… 1997 1997 1997+… 2001+… 1997+… 2001+… 2001+… 2001+…
World welfare $82bln $1212bln $134bln $290bln $254bln $31bln $56bln $355bln $852bln $291bln $518bln $228 bln $614bln $385bln $287bln $163bln $84bln $157bln $99.6bln
in % 0,20% 3,10% 0.32% 0.69% 0.62%* 0,13% 0,24% 0,90% 2,10% 0,80% 1,40% 0,93% 2,50% 0,90% 0,70% 0,43% na 0.5% 0.33%
of which: agric. na na na na 65% na na 69% 71% 0,663 0,69 0,57 na 0,69 0,63 0,65 0,66 na na
of which: tariffs na na na na na na na na na na na na na 0,99 0,93 0,91 0,954 na na
of which: Dvg countries benef. 22% 38% na na 43% 8% 38% 52% 65% 55% 67% 38% 47% 56% 30% 8% 26% na na
of which: Dvg countries liber. na na na na 45% na na 55% 66% 0,62 0,62 0,44 na na 0,45 0,58 na na na
World trade na na na 17% na na na na 0,17 0,1 na na na na na 0,12 0,075 12.1% 5.25%
World agric. trade na na na na na na 15% na na 32% na na na 74% 76% na 21% na 34%
World agric. prices na na na na na na 12% na na na na na na na na na na na 2.5%/11%
Losers ? na no losers Mexico, Canada
Other MENA 
countries

























Poverty headcount na na na na na na na -320mln na -144mln na -110mln -440mln -72mln na na na na    137
Annex  13 —Assessing the impact of a Doha Development Agenda by CGEM: Recent assessments of the impact of a 
Doha Agenda 
Bouet, Bureau, Decreux and Jean, 2005
Fontagne, Guerin and Jean, 2005
Bchir, Fontagne and Jean, 2005
Francois, Von Meijl and Tongeren, 2005
Anderson, Martin and Van Der Mensbrugghe, 2005 1
Anderson, Martin and Van Der Mensbrugghe, 2005 2
Anderson, Martin and Van Der Mensbrugghe, 2005 3
Bouet, Mevel and Orden, 2005
Bouet, Mevel and Orden, 2005
Experiment DDA Agr DDA DDA Ind DDA DDA Agr DDA Agr + SSP DDA DDA DDA
Model used MIRAGE MIRAGE MIRAGE GTAP5 Linkage Linkage Linkage MIRAGE MIRAGE
Static/Dyanmic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic
Geogr. and sector decomposition 11*30 7*57 22*20 16*17 27*25 27*25 27*25 41*18 41*18
Data 1997+… 1997+… 2001+… 1997+… 2001+… 2001+… 2001+… 2001+… 2001+…
World welfare $23bln $146bln $12bln $100bln $75bln $18bln $96bln $41bln $104bln
in % 0.08% 0.51% 0.04% 0.34% 0.18% 0.04% 0.23% 0.17% 0.33%
of which: agric. na na 66% - - na na
of which: tariffs na na na 91% na na 99.70% na na
of which: Dvg countries benef. 21% na 14% 11% 12% loss 17% na na
of which: Dvg countries liber. na na 67% na na na na na
World trade na 3.20% na na na na 2% 4.1
World agric. trade 6.10% na na na na na na na na













































Poverty headcount na na na -1.3mln +0.3mln -6.2mln na na    138
























































Rest of Middle East 1.1%
Zimbabwe 1.2%






Rest of FTAA 1.6%
Malaysia 1.6%
Rest of South Asia 1.6%
Rest of South America 1.6%
Rest of the Caribbean 1.7%
Mozambique 1.7%
Bangladesh 1.9%







Rest of Europe 2.5%
Rest of Sub Saharan Africa 2.7%
Malta 2.9%
Rest of Oceania 3.1%
Morocco 3.2%
Vietnam 4.0%
Rest of SADC 4.0%
Tunisia 4.3%
Rest of North America 13.9% 
Source: GTAP6.   139
Annex  15 —No pre – experiment 
Annex Table 15.1— Impact of a full trade liberalization from 2001: World    
      indicators for 2015- rate of change (%) 
Indicator Total
World agricultural Imports 39.05
World Trade 4.59
World Welfare 0.45  
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Annex Table 15.2— Impact of full trade liberalization from 2001: Macroeconomic  
      indicators for 2015- rate of change (%) 
Welfare
Allocation efficiency gains
Terms of trade gains
Australia/New Zealand 1.1 0.1 1.5
Canada 0.1 0.7 0.3
Developed Asia 1.6 2.3 0.2
European Union - 25 0.0 0.2 0.0
USA 0.3 0.0 0.1
Rest of OECD 1.0 1.0 0.2
Argentina 0.5 0.4 0.7
Brazil 0.4 0.1 0.6
China 0.9 1.6 -1.0
Developing Asia 0.6 0.8 -0.1
India 0.5 1.6 -1.1
Mexico -0.2 1.4 -0.6
Rest of America 0.0 0.8 -0.2
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 0.9 1.3 -0.5
Rest of the World 0.0 1.0 0.0
Southern Africa Custom Union -0.1 0.3 0.6
Tunisia -0.8 0.2 -1.0
Bangladesh 1.0 1.8 -1.3
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 0.7 1.3 -0.5
Zambia 0.1 1.6 -2.5  
Source: author’s calculation.  140
Annex Table 15.3— Impact of full trade liberalization from 2001 on factor    
      remuneration for 2015- rate of change (%) 
 
Country/zone
Agr Unskilled real wages
Ind Unskilled real wages
Real return to capital
Real return to land
Real return to natural resources
Skilled real wages
Australia/New Zealand 10.9 2.2 -0.6 4.0 -4.8 1.4
Canada -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -24.3 4.2 0.1
Developed Asia -2.7 2.1 1.6 -31.4 -6.4 2.5
European Union - 25 0.4 0.3 -0.6 -41.4 -3.4 0.1
USA 1.4 0.1 -0.2 -15.7 2.2 0.1
Rest of OECD -4.6 0.9 0.9 -50.0 5.4 1.3
Argentina 10.5 2.6 -1.1 10.5 -10.7 -0.8
Brazil 9.5 1.7 -0.5 10.9 -9.5 0.2
China -0.6 4.2 -2.2 -9.3 -21.3 6.6
Developing Asia 0.6 1.3 0.1 -6.0 -17.1 1.0
India -1.7 1.8 -0.1 -4.8 -25.6 4.2
Mexico -4.7 0.2 0.5 -23.6 -22.9 -1.8
Rest of America 4.3 1.2 -1.3 7.9 -13.1 -0.1
Rest of Middle East and North Africa -2.4 0.9 1.1 -7.5 -10.1 1.2
Southern Africa Custom Union 5.0 0.9 -1.6 12.9 9.0 -0.2
Tunisia 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.9 -5.5 -1.0
Rest of the World -1.1 2.0 -2.5 -5.6 13.2 -0.3
Bangladesh 1.0 0.6 0.7 1.8 -6.2 -0.3
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 0.7 1.8 -1.0 0.2 -4.4 1.5
Zambia -4.2 -1.1 1.6 -8.9 -22.7 0.3  
Source: author’s calculation. 
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Annex  16 —No preferential duties 
Annex Table 16.1— Impact of a full trade liberalization: no preferential duties —   
      World indicators for 2015- rate of change (%) 
World agricultural trade 30.61
World Trade 4.11
World Welfare 0.41  
 
Source: author’s calculation. 
Annex Table 16.2— Impact of full trade liberalization from 2001: no preferential  
   duties  -  Macroeconomic  indicators for 2015- rate of change  
   ( % )  
Welfare
Allocation efficiency gains
Terms of trade gains
Australia/New Zealand 1.1 0.1 1.4
Canada 00 . 6 0 . 3
Developed Asia 1.1 1.8 0
European Union - 25 -0.1 0.3 -0.1
Rest of OECD 0.5 1.1 -0.2
USA 0.2 0 0.2
Argentina -0.2 0.3 0.3
Brazil 0.9 0 0.7
China 0.4 0.8 0
Developing Asia 1 1.2 -0.5
India 1.3 3.1 -1.5
Mexico -0.2 1.1 -0.1
Rest of America 2.5 3 -0.9
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 0.6 1.2 -0.6
Rest of the World -0.3 1 -0.1
Southern Africa Custom Union 2.7 0.4 1.9
Tunisia 5.2 6.6 -1.8
Bangladesh 1.8 1.7 -0.8
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 21 . 1 0 . 5
Zambia 2.7 1.7 -1.1  
Source: author’s calculation.  142
Annex Table 16.3— Impact of full trade liberalization from 2001: No preferential  
      duties – factor remuneration for 2015- rate of change (%) 
 
Agr Unskilled real wages
Ind Unskilled real wages
Real return to capital
Real return to land
Real return to natural resources
Skilled real wages
Australia/New Zealand 11.5 2.3 -0.6 3.8 -12.4 1.5
Canada 0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -24.3 3.8 0
Developed Asia -2.6 1.6 1.1 -30.1 -0.9 1.8
European Union - 25 -0.6 0.5 -0.8 -42.4 -3.6 -0.2
Rest of OECD -6.7 0.9 0.2 -50.9 -1.9 1.3
USA 1.1 0.2 -0.2 -17.1 1.8 0.1
Argentina 6.2 1.4 -1.4 2.9 -8.7 -1.6
Brazil 6.1 1.9 1 1.4 -9.7 1.1
China -1.6 1.1 -0.6 -7.5 -25.5 3.1
Developing Asia -0.5 0.2 0.1 -7.1 -19.7 0.9
India -0.4 3.3 -0.5 -4.4 -29.9 6.5
Mexico -4 0.6 0.8 -23 -13.2 -2
Rest of America 6 4.5 0 4.9 -19.8 3.9
Rest of Middle East and North Africa -1.5 1.3 0.1 -6.7 -11.3 1.1
Rest of the World -1.8 1.3 -3.1 -6.9 22.4 -1.6
Southern Africa Custom Union 6.2 3.2 2.1 10.3 -4.3 2.8
Tunisia -1.1 5.5 7.6 -14.7 -25 7.9
Bangladesh 2.4 1.9 0.3 3.1 -3.1 1.2
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 3 3.2 0.7 2.4 -2.6 2.8
Zambia -0.9 1 4 -6.3 -26.9 3.7  
Source: author’s calculation. 
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Annex  17 —Higher trade elasticities 
Annex Table 17.1— Impact of full trade liberalization: Linkage elasticities — World 
      indicators for 2015- rate of change (%) 
Indicator
Total
World agricultural trade 57.07
World Trade 5.25
World Welfare 0.44  
Source: author’s calculation. 
Annex Table 17.2—Impact of full trade liberalization from 2001: linkage elasticities  




Terms of trade gains
Australia/New Zealand 0.9 0.1 1.4
Canada 0.0 0.7 0.1
Developed Asia 1.8 2.3 0.1
European Union - 25 -0.1 0.3 -0.1
USA 0.2 0.0 0.1
Rest of OECD 1.1 1.3 -0.1
Argentina 0.0 0.3 0.4
Brazil 0.5 0.1 0.7
China 0.6 0.8 0.1
Developing Asia 0.6 1.1 -0.1
India 1.0 2.4 -1.1
Mexico -0.2 1.5 -0.6
Rest of America 0.1 0.5 0.1
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 1.4 1.5 -0.3
Rest of the World 0.6 1.2 -0.2
Southern Africa Custom Union 0.0 0.4 0.6
Tunisia 0.3 0.4 -0.5
Bangladesh 1.7 2.0 -1.1
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 1.2 1.9 -0.8
Zambia 0.7 1.8 -2.1  
Source: author’s calculation.   144
Annex Table 17.3—Impact of full trade liberalization from 2001: Linkage    
   elasticities—factor  remuneration for 2015 - rate of change (%) 
 
Country / Zone
Agr Unskilled real wages
Ind Unskilled real wages
Real return to capital
Real return to land
Real return to natural resources
Skilled real wages
Australia/New Zealand 10.6 2.1 -0.8 4.8 -3.9 1.2
Canada -0.7 -0.2 -0.3 -23.0 2.0 -0.1
Developed Asia -2.1 2.4 1.7 -35.1 -4.9 2.9
European Union - 25 -0.4 0.4 -0.7 -43.0 -3.9 0.0
USA 0.6 0.1 -0.2 -17.0 1.9 0.1
Rest of OECD -4.7 1.2 0.8 -51.8 0.6 1.6
Argentina 6.6 1.7 -1.5 4.8 -5.7 -1.4
Brazil 9.5 2.1 -0.7 6.6 -9.1 0.6
China -0.9 2.5 -1.8 -7.9 -16.1 4.3
Developing Asia -0.3 1.5 0.3 -9.3 -14.3 1.5
India -3.4 2.6 1.6 -7.8 -17.3 5.4
Mexico -5.7 0.4 0.6 -26.0 -21.2 -1.7
Rest of America 5.9 1.7 -1.5 11.8 -11.9 -0.2
Rest of Middle East and North Africa -3.4 1.5 1.6 -9.5 -8.2 2.1
Southern Africa Custom Union 5.6 1.1 -1.7 17.1 6.2 -0.1
Tunisia 0.4 1.0 0.7 -1.8 -7.4 0.4
Rest of the World -0.4 2.3 -1.6 -3.2 8.5 0.7
Bangladesh 0.3 1.7 1.7 -0.1 -2.5 1.0
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 0.1 2.3 -0.4 0.5 -2.9 2.0
Zambia -6.3 -0.4 2.8 -11.8 -14.1 1.1  
Source: author’s calculation. 
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Annex  18 —Trade increases factor productivity 
Annex Table 18.1—Impact of full trade liberalization on world indicators with  
   positive  relation  between  trade openness and factor    
      productivity for 2015 - rate of change (%) 
 
World agricultural Imports 32.49
World Merchandise Trade 4.87
World Welfare 0.59  
Source: author’s calculation. 
Annex Table 18.2— Impact of full trade liberalization on national indicators with  
   positive  relation  between  trade openness and factor    
      productivity for 2015 - rate of change (%) 
 
Country Allocation efficiency gains
Terms of trade gains
W
elfare
Australia/New Zealand 0.0 1.3 0.3
Canada 0.7 0.2 0.3
Developed Asia 2.2 0.1 1.3
European Union - 25 0.2 -0.1 0.2
USA 0.0 0.1 0.3
Rest of OECD 1.0 0.1 1.2
Argentina 0.2 0.3 -0.4
Brazil 0.0 0.4 -0.2
China 0.9 0.3 1.9
Developing Asia 0.8 -0.2 0.5
India 1.7 -1.0 3.2
Mexico 1.3 -0.5 0.4
Rest of America 0.8 -0.2 0.6
Rest of Middle East and North Africa 1.2 -0.4 1.5
Southern Africa Custom Union 0.3 0.5 0.0
Tunisia 0.3 -0.3 0.0
Rest of the World 0.9 -0.1 0.9
Bangladesh 1.8 -1.0 2.5
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 1.4 -0.7 1.7
Zambia 1.6 -2.3 -0.6  
Source: author’s calculation.   146
Annex Table 18.3—Impact of full trade liberalization on factor remuneration with  
   positive  relation  between  trade openness and factor    
      productivity for 2015- rate of change (%) 
 
Agr Unskilled real wages
Ind Unskilled real wages
Real return to capital
Real return to land
Real return to natural resources
Skilled real wages
Australia/New Zealand 8.6 1.5 -1.3 2.1 -4.2 0.8
Canada -0.4 0.1 0.0 -25.1 4.3 0.2
Developed Asia -3.1 2.0 1.3 -30.8 -4.1 2.3
European Union - 25 0.0 0.6 -0.4 -41.8 -3.0 0.1
Rest of OECD -4.2 1.1 1.1 -48.8 5.4 1.4
USA 0.5 0.2 -0.2 -17.6 2.3 0.2
Argentina 5.0 1.4 -1.9 1.8 -6.9 -0.9
Brazil 6.3 1.5 -1.3 3.8 -8.7 0.5
China 0.0 3.5 -0.4 -7.2 -18.0 6.4
Developing Asia 0.4 1.3 -0.1 -6.1 -16.6 1.3
India -0.1 4.4 3.0 -4.6 -17.9 7.9
Mexico -3.9 1.1 1.0 -23.4 -23.2 -0.3
Rest of America 4.3 2.0 -0.5 6.8 -13.2 0.9
Rest of Middle East and North Africa -1.8 1.8 1.8 -7.0 -11.6 2.3
Rest of the World -1.2 2.4 -1.1 -6.1 11.6 1.3
Southern Africa Custom Union 4.4 1.1 -1.5 11.1 9.0 0.2
Tunisia 0.4 0.6 0.3 -1.6 -6.9 0.0
Bangladesh 1.9 2.8 2.5 0.4 -6.5 2.6
Rest of SubSaharan Africa 1.0 2.6 0.5 0.0 -4.5 2.9
Zambia -5.3 -1.6 0.9 -10.4 -23.8 0.3  
Source: author’s calculation. 
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